THE WHOLE-LIFE SENTENCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bild
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence ◽  
Court Of Appeal

THERE can be little doubt that there is disagreement between the Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over the whole-life sentence in England and Wales. Despite evolving jurisprudence on the issue of life-long detention emanating from Strasbourg, the Court of Appeal has readily upheld the English whole-life sentence in recent years. It has been doing so by adopting a very wide interpretation of the Secretary of State's power to order the compassionate release of a life sentence prisoner.

Life Meaning Life: Is There Any Hope of Release for Prisoners Serving Whole Life Orders?

2011 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seema Kandelia
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Life Meaning ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Degrading Treatment

This article reviews the system of whole life orders in England and Wales, looking in particular at whether such sentences constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This issue came before the European Court of Human Rights in 2008 in the case of Kafkaris v Cyprus. The court held that a whole life tariff would not violate Article 3 as long as there was some possibility that a life sentence was de jure or de facto reducible. The possible grounds for the release of a prisoner serving a whole life sentence in England and Wales is, however, extremely limited. This article will assess to what extent the release procedures regarding whole lifers meet the criteria laid down by the European and domestic courts and whether there is any realistic hope of release for prisoners sentenced to whole life orders.

scholarly journals A Vinter retreat in Europe

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Domestic Court ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that domestic procedures for reviewing whole life prison sentences in England and Wales were in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In response, the domestic Court of Appeal declined to revise those procedures, or the material relating to them, and held that the Grand Chamber was incorrect in its finding; the law did in fact give prisoners hope for future release. Rather than reasserting the reasoning and findings of Vinter, the Grand Chamber has been appeased by the clarification offered by the UK court. The contradictions in that retreat from the Vinter judgement are analysed here and the future standing of the court is prophesized in relation to that decision.

scholarly journals Apportioning Responsibility between the UN and Member States in UN Peace-Support Operations: An Inquiry into the Application of the ‘Effective Control’ Standard after Behrami

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cedric Ryngaert
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Member States ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Current Article ◽  
And Control ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Dutch Court

There is a tendency among the judiciary to apply the standard of ‘effective control’ as the applicable yardstick for apportioning responsibility for wrongful acts between the United Nations and the member states contributing troops to UN peace-support operations. This is evidenced by recent decisions in the cases of Srebrenica (Dutch Court of Appeal, 2011), Al Jedda (European Court of Human Rights, 2011) and Mukeshimana (Belgian First Instance Court, 2010), which appear to repudiate the ‘ultimate authority and control’ standard espoused by the European Court of Human Rights in Behrami (2007). This process may have been set in motion by (the current) Article 7 of the ILC's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, which may in due course reflect customary international law. From a policy perspective, the application of an ‘effective control’ standard is highly desirable, as it locates responsibility with the actor who is in a position to prevent the violation.

scholarly journals Life sentence penalty and extradition under article 3 of the ECHR: A leading case of the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Mario Antinucci
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Severe Form ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Life Imprisonment ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Criminal Justice Reform ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence ◽  
The Moment

Life sentence penalty covers a diverse range of practices, from the most severe form of life imprisonment without parole, in which a person is sentenced to die in prison so long as their sentence stands, to more indeterminate sentences in which at the time of sentencing it is not clear how long the sentenced person will spend in prison. Dealing with the question whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state where is accused of a crime for which a sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed can potentially violate article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.What all these sentences have in common, however, is that at the time the sentence is passed, a person is liable to be detained for the rest of his or her natural life. We all know “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules” and relevant international instruments on the rehabilitation of imprisonment, but at the moment more than 73 States in the world retain life imprisonment as a penalty for offences committed while under the age of 18. General perspective of criminal justice reform in Latin America should take into a right account the meaning of life - imprisonment penalty under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

scholarly journals Deprivation of Liberty and Human Dignity in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Penal Policy ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 

Emergencies and Equivocality Under the Inherent Jurisdiction: A Local Authority v BF [2018] EWCA CIV 2962 and Southend-On-Sea Borough Council v Meyers [2019] EWHC 399 (FAM)

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-686
Author(s):  
Amber Pugh
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Local Authority ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Borough Council ◽  
Level I ◽  
Article 5 ◽  
Vulnerable Adults ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract In A Local Authority v BF [2018] EWCA Civ 2962, the Court of Appeal refused to grant permission to appeal against an interim judgment that deprived a capacitous man, Mr Meyers, of his liberty. The deprivation of liberty was held to be justified on the basis that there was evidence suggesting that he was of unsound mind under Article 5(1)(e) of the European Convention on Human Rights and, in any event, it was an emergency which temporarily obviated the need to establish that he was of unsound mind. In this commentary, I argue that the decision was flawed in two respects. First, the need to establish ‘unsound mind’ could not be dispensed with because it was not an emergency and, secondly, the Court’s interpretation of ‘unsound mind’ was overly broad and cannot be reconciled with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Subsequently, in Southend-On-Sea Borough Council v Meyers [2019] EWHC 399 (Fam), which was the substantive hearing of Mr Meyers’ case, Hayden J made an order preventing Mr Meyers from living with his son, with the decision being framed as a restriction on movement rather than a deprivation of liberty. I contend that the restrictions placed on Mr Meyers may amount to a deprivation of liberty. On a broader level, I argue that the use of the inherent jurisdiction to deprive vulnerable adults of their liberty is incompatible with Article 5, and that these cases demonstrate the potential for draconian decisions to be made when using a jurisdiction with shifting parameters to protect adults who are deemed to be ‘vulnerable’, a concept that is equivocal in nature.

The extent to which a conviction can be regarded as ‘safe’, notwithstanding unfairness in the trial process, has had to be re-considered following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in R v Condron [2000] Crim LR 679. The result is that the Court of Appeal should not disengage the issue of the fairness of the trial from the issue of whether or not the conviction is safe. In essence significant violations of the right to a fair trial provided by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights are, of themselves, likely to render a conviction unsafe; see further R v Francom (2000) The Times, 24 October. In R v Togher and Others (2000) The Times, 21 November, Lord Woolf CJ went so far as observe that the approach of the Court of Appeal should be in step with that of the European Court of Human Rights with the result that the denial of a fair trial contrary to Art 6 would now inevitably lead to a finding that the resulting conviction was unsafe. Such a conclusion is a direct result of the obligation created by s3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to the effect that domestic legislation, such as the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, should be read, so far as possible, in a manner that gave effect to Convention rights. R v Davis (2000) The Times, 25 July, whilst not departing from this broad proposition, emphasises that it may still be necessary to look at the circumstances of a particular case before concluding that a violation of Art 6 has rendered a conviction unsafe – it will be a matter of fact and degree. Even if an appeal against conviction succeeds the accused may still face a retrial. The Court of Appeal has the discretion to order a retrial under s 7 of the 1968 Act if it appears to the court that the interests of justice so require. If there has been a total mistrial the Court of Appeal can issue a writ of venire de novo – setting events back to where they were before the irregularity that rendered the trial a mistrial occurred. Some appeals against conviction will be partially successful in that the Court of Appeal can allow the appeal but substitute a conviction for a lesser-included offence – an obvious example being the quashing of a murder conviction and the substitution of a conviction for manslaughter. Appeal by the prosecution: against over lenient sentences

1996 ◽  
pp. 72-73
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
De Novo ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
European Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Times ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Human Rights and the Whirligig of Time

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Stephen Sedley
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Comparative Study ◽  
Law School ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Western World ◽  
Memorial Lecture ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Sir Stephen Sedley, former Judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, considers the nature of human rights in this article, which is based on the text of the annual Ruth Adler Memorial Lecture delivered at Edinburgh University Law School in 2015. Sir Stephen undertakes a comparative study of the concept of human rights, one which takes in discussion of human rights culture in the non-Western world as well as the proposal for a British “bill of rights” to replace the European Convention on Human Rights.

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