scholarly journals The Right to Vote: Implications of New Zealand's International Legal Obligations and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 575
Author(s):  
Sarah McClelland

This article challenges several aspects of the then-new electoral laws outlining the MMP ("Mixed Member Proportional") system, and claims that they are not consistent with international obligations or with the right to vote set out in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The aspects covered are the rules relating to voting by prisoners, the residential requirements for voting, and the election of list MPs.

2019 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 322-340
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Sikora

The purpose of this article is to analyse and describe fundamental individual rights in relation to the Constitution of Sweden and New Zealand. Basic human rights include the right to dignity, right to liberty and the right to equality. Everyone is equally entitled regardless of origin, race, gender or education. Based on the analysis of several acts concerning the constitutional legislation of both countries it is evident that there is a lack of uniformity the nature of these have been complex and difficult to convey. Concerning Sweden, the Constitution consists of four acts in which the act of government includes standards governing and representing protection of the rights a liberty of a citizen. Constitutional legislation of New Zealand is more complicated because it consists of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, numerous laws, statutes setting up by the New Zealand Parliament as well as numerous constitutional customs, which may constitute legal standards and translate into precedent acts of courts. Despite the daily violation of rights in both Sweden and New Zealand, the complex legal systems protect and secure the rights of the people in their countries by introducing a series of laws and other regulations. The government of both countries, as well as public authority and other non-governmental organisations do their best to ensure they are respected and not violated. It should be noted that both Sweden and New Zealand have proven to comply with the obligations imposed on them under their national and international obligations with some undoubtable success, with generally well accepted principles in the whole civilised world.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Annie O'Connor

<p>Harmful Digital Communications have become a pervasive and serious problem in New Zealand. The Harmful Digital Communications Bill aims to address this problem in a number of ways. This paper focuses on the civil enforcement regime and the criminal offence of causing harm by posting a digital communication established by the Bill. It considers these aspects of the Bill in light of the right to freedom of expression, and analyses whether they constitute a justified limitation on that right. By applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 section 5 analysis from Hansen v R, the paper discovers that the civil enforcement regime is a justified limitation, but the new criminal offence is not. The paper concludes that the inclusion of a public interest defence in the offence would allow it to effectively ameliorate the harm caused by online abuse without impinging on freedom of expression more than is reasonably necessary.</p>


2001 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Parkinson

Among Arguments Advanced In Favour Of Direct Democracy, legitimacy pleas loom large. If the rules governing people can only be legitimate when those rules arise from and represent the will of all, then it is commonly argued that people should have the right to vote not just for representatives but on substantive issues of public policy as well. To claim otherwise is regarded as anti-democratic: for example, Bogdanor writes that ‘in the final analysis, the arguments against referendums are arguments against democracy’, while Saward asks, ‘What better way to maximize responsiveness of rulers to the ruled than by fostering a system in which the ruled themselves make the decisions?’


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rose Louise Goss

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Harriet Bush

This article examines the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act 2011 which was passed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the case Hamed v R. This Act provided that a search was not unlawful simply because video surveillance was used. The article explores the previous court decisions on the lawfulness of police use of covert video surveillance in order to ascertain whether the premise upon which the Act was based, that video surveillance was lawful before Hamed v R, was correct. It then looks at the ratio decidendi of Hamed v R and the potential wider implications of this judgment. Finally, it assesses the state of the law under the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act and whether this Act limited the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure which is contained in s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.


1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-285
Author(s):  
Wilberforce

I was not surprised when, from several alternative subjects, you chose, as the title of my Lecture, the need for a Constitution in Britain. Those of us without a written constitution are indeed, a select club—New Zealand, Israel, the United Kingdom.I will start with a quotation from Lord Salmon. In a recent lecture, he said: In this country [U.K.] we have an unwritten constitution. I have always regarded this as a blessing and never agreed with the theoretical objections to it. It is superbly flexible and above all it has stood the test of time. It works—and works admirably. But I am beginning to wonder whether it might not be wise to evolve, not an elaborate written constitution but perhaps the equivalent of a modern Bill of Rights. A statute which should lay down our basic freedoms, provide for their preservation and enact that it could not be repealed save by, say, a 75% majority of both Houses of Parliament.One can recognize in this passage the views of an eminent common lawyer, believing in the strength and potentialities of the common law as a flexible instrument, in, of course, the right hands: of one who believes deeply in human freedom, and who is concerned about the threat to it: who desires an explicit definition of the basic liberties and who believes that these can be protected by a sufficiently strong, entrenched, legal system. In this he undoubtedly reflects the views of many people, probably of the majority of ordinary men.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Mary Lincoln

<p>With little case law concerning nudity and the right to freedom of expression, this paper aims to uncover the appropriate frameworks to be used to determine the following questions: (a) when is public nudity “expression” for the purposes of s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and (b) in what circumstances involving “expressive” public nudity would it be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable to limit the right to freedom of expression using s 4(1)(a), as per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act? As regards the first of these questions, this paper critiques the current test in use in New Zealand for determining whether conduct is expression – the test developed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-general (Quebec) – and advocates for the adoption of a purposive approach to determining the scope of the right to freedom of expression. As for the second of these questions, this paper advocates for the adoption of “the modified Hansen sequence” proposed by Professor Claudia Geiringer. This paper then uses recent examples of public nudity involving naturists and protestors to test these frameworks and to illustrate how they would operate in practice.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nina White

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rose Louise Goss

<p>The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.</p>


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