scholarly journals A Fairly Genuine Comment on Honest Opinion in New Zealand

2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 127
Author(s):  
Bevan Marten

This paper discusses the defence of honest opinion in relation to New Zealand’s Defamation Act 1992. Two key issues are addressed: the place of the common law “public interest” requirement in the New Zealand context, and the concept of “genuineness” under section 10 of the Act. It is argued that the public interest requirement should be abolished, and that the relevant statutory provisions be redrafted to achieve this. The redraft would also clarify a potential flaw in the wording of the defence that may render it unavailable to some defendants who are quoting the opinions of others.

1983 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-149
Author(s):  
Ian Eagles

The rules governing the exclusion of evidence in the public interest are usually discussed as if they were wholly the creation of the common law. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is a submerged statutory underside to Crown privilege, an underside which is no less important for being hitherto largely invisible to the judicial eye. More than 100 Acts and statutory instruments restrict the use which government departments and other public bodies may make of the information they acquire. Each such Act or instrument is a potential barrier to the use of the information in the courtroom. Just why this vast mass of legislation should have remained for so long forensically invisible is not immediately apparent. It is true that most of it was drafted to regulate disclosure outside the courtroom and its evidentiary provisions are often tucked away in obscure subsections whose import may be unclear to those administering the Acts.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Murray Alexander King

<p>Rail safety is closely controlled, but there is less supervision of the actual road, its construction and condition. Safety is the responsibility of the road user, not the provider. This is a feature of the common law, including the rule that no liability attaches to road omissions, and of legislation governing road and rail. It has its roots in the many centuries of highway development. New Zealand legislation has few safety duties for road owners, but very comprehensive and strict obligations for railways. This is also true internationally, except that in some jurisdictions there are enhanced controls on road. Health and safety laws may not cover the public safety aspects of roads, but they do cover all aspects of railways. The imbalance increases the cost and reduces the effectiveness of rail. Potential reforms of the law are proposed.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Murray Alexander King

<p>Rail safety is closely controlled, but there is less supervision of the actual road, its construction and condition. Safety is the responsibility of the road user, not the provider. This is a feature of the common law, including the rule that no liability attaches to road omissions, and of legislation governing road and rail. It has its roots in the many centuries of highway development. New Zealand legislation has few safety duties for road owners, but very comprehensive and strict obligations for railways. This is also true internationally, except that in some jurisdictions there are enhanced controls on road. Health and safety laws may not cover the public safety aspects of roads, but they do cover all aspects of railways. The imbalance increases the cost and reduces the effectiveness of rail. Potential reforms of the law are proposed.</p>


2001 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1053 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel A Yurkowski

The existence, or not, of a public interest defence in the sphere of copyright law has been an issue of contention for many years. Due to the comprehensive statutory fair dealing defences available, only a handful of defendants have sought to rely on this defence, which exists at common law. However, when the defence has been raised, the judges have been unable to reach a consensus on its status, scope and indeed availability as a defence to breach of copyright.This paper analyses the extent to which public interest concerns are addressed in statutory copyright law, and presents arguments in support of extending the common law public interest defence to copyright law. However, any such defence must be limited in its scope and applicability, so as to avoid becoming a "thieves charter".


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sachin Chaturvedi ◽  
Krishna Ravi Srinivas ◽  
Vasantha Muthuswamy

Biobank-based research is not specifically addressed in Indian statutory law and therefore Indian Council for Medical Research guidelines are the primary regulators of biobank research in India. The guidelines allow for broad consent and for any level of identification of specimens. Although privacy is a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution, courts have limited this right when it conflicts with other rights or with the public interest. Furthermore, there is no established privacy test or actionable privacy right in the common law of India. In order to facilitate biobank-based research, both of these lacunae should be addressed by statutory law specifically addressing biobanking and more directly addressing the accompanying privacy concerns. A biobank-specific law should be written with international guidelines in mind, but harmonization with other laws should not be attempted until after India has created a law addressing biobank research within the unique legal and cultural environment of India.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nicola Jane Hulley

<p>This paper presents an argument that there is a public trust doctrine which is part of New Zealand’s common law. The public doctrine imposes an obligation on administrative decision-makers, with respect to decisions that impact commonly held natural resources, to act in the interests of the public. I argue the doctrine was inherited by New Zealand in 1840, as part of the English common law, and that it has been subsequently recognised in the New Zealand common law. I also argue that the doctrine has not been extinguished by the Resource Management Act 1991 or the Marine Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011: the common law doctrine supplements these regulatory regimes. My argument concludes that the doctrine is best conceived of as a ground of judicial review, perhaps under the heading of illegality, and that there are strong normative arguments for its augmentation by common law development or legislative codification.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nicola Jane Hulley

<p>This paper presents an argument that there is a public trust doctrine which is part of New Zealand’s common law. The public doctrine imposes an obligation on administrative decision-makers, with respect to decisions that impact commonly held natural resources, to act in the interests of the public. I argue the doctrine was inherited by New Zealand in 1840, as part of the English common law, and that it has been subsequently recognised in the New Zealand common law. I also argue that the doctrine has not been extinguished by the Resource Management Act 1991 or the Marine Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011: the common law doctrine supplements these regulatory regimes. My argument concludes that the doctrine is best conceived of as a ground of judicial review, perhaps under the heading of illegality, and that there are strong normative arguments for its augmentation by common law development or legislative codification.</p>


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Campagnolo

The public interest immunity (PII) doctrine empowers the government to suppress information, the disclosure of which would injure the community as a whole. However, when such information is relevant to the fair adjudication of legal rights, a tension arises between two competing aspects of the public interest: the interest of good government and the interest of justice. This tension raises questions of constitutional importance. Who should decide which aspect of the public interest must win? How should that decision be made? The aim of this article is to address these questions. In the first section, it is claimed that the courts, as opposed to the government, should have the final word on the validity of PII claims, as it would be contrary to the rule of law to prevent them from meaningfully reviewing the validity of PII claims and controlling the admissibility of evidence in legal proceedings. In addition, because of their greater independence and impartiality, judges are better placed than public officials to fairly adjudicate PII claims, especially when the government is a party to the proceedings. No classes of government secrets, not even Cabinet secrets, should be exempted from judicial review. While there is a consensus on these principles under the common law, the level of deference afforded to Cabinet immunity claims, and the way in which these claims are assessed, is not consistent in the Commonwealth. To fix this shortcoming, in the second section, it is argued that the courts should adopt a new rational approach consisting of four pillars: a narrow standard of discovery, an executive onus of justification, a cost-benefit analysis, and a judicial duty to minimize injury. The implementation of a rational approach would bolster predictability, certainty, and transparency in the judicial assessment of Cabinet immunity claims, and foster a better balance between the interests of good government and justice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson

Despite the hackneyed expression that ‘judges should interpret the law and not make it’, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alicja Jagielska-Burduk

LEGAL STATUS OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND WORKS OF ART IN THE PRL Summary The article deals with the legal status of works of art and cultural property in the Polish legislation during communism period. Classifying those objects as private property was considered as a very difficult task, because of their material value and the public interest in saving them for future generations. The strict limitations of individuals property were perceived as unusual and as a result a new sort of property – the private cultural property was distinguished. Moreover, the concepts of the common heritage and res extra commercium could be observed in the light of the PRL ideas. It should be emphasized that the above mentioned theories for improving cultural heritage regulations are the most popular in the nowadays’ international discussion.


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