scholarly journals Not my Doctrine? Finding a Contract Law Explanation for Non Est Factum

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 245
Author(s):  
Simon Connell

Non est factum (Latin for "not my deed") is a common law doctrine that can allow the signer of a legal document to escape the usual legal consequences of their signature. In its early days, non est factum was available only to blind and illiterate persons who, without being careless, relied on another party's seriously flawed explanation of the document. Non est factum can void contracts, but I argue the general explanation for the doctrine is not a satisfactory explanation for why it applies to contracts. This article considers whether there is an explanation for non est factum that is consistent with contract law thinking. I argue that there is, and explain non est factum as an application of the objective principle set out in Smith v Hughes. 

Author(s):  
Vogenauer Stefan

This commentary focuses on Article 5.1.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning release of a contractual right by agreement. Under Art 5.1.9, an obligee may release its right by agreement with the obligor. An offer to release a right gratuitously shall be deemed accepted if the obligor does not reject the offer without delay after having become aware of it. The terminology used in Art 5.1.9 was chosen with particular care. The term ‘release’ was preferred over the concept of ‘waiver’ that has no agreed meaning between the common law systems. This commentary argues that the use of ‘release’ is somewhat problematic from the perspective of U.S. contract law. It also discusses the agreement in terms of offer and acceptance, the legal consequences of a release by agreement, and the burden of proof relating to release of a contractual right by agreement.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Legal Studies ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Dietrich

The common law has solved questions of liability arising in the context of precontractual negotiations by resort to a range of different doctrines and approaches, adopting in effect ‘piecemeal’ solutions to questions of precontractual liability. Consequently, debate has arisen as to how best to classify or categorise claims for precontractual work and as to which doctrines are best suited to solving problems arising from anticipated contracts. The purpose of this article is to consider this question of how best to classify (cases of) precontractual liability. The initial focus will be on the ongoing debate as to whether principles of contract law or principles of unjust enrichment can better solve problems of precontractual liability. I will be suggesting that unjust enrichment theory offers little by way of explanation of cases of precontractual liability and, indeed, draws on principles of contract law in determining questions of liability for precontractual services rendered, though it does so by formulating those principles under different guises. Irrespective, however, of the doctrines utilised by the common law to impose liability, it is possible to identify a number of common elements unifying all cases of precontractual liability. In identifying such common elements of liability, it is necessary to draw on principles of both contract and tort law. How, then, should cases of precontractual liability best be classified? A consideration of the issue of classification of precontractual liability from a perspective of German civil law will demonstrate that a better understanding of cases of precontractual liability will be gained by classifying such cases as lying between the existing categories of contract and tort.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 85-106
Author(s):  
J Barnard-Naudé

This paper is a response to Dale Hutchison’s recent arguments about the role of fairness in contract law after the Constitution. From the point of view of transformative constitutionalism, the paper argues that the fairness ‘debate’ in the South African law of contract should be approached as what it so patently is, namely, as evidence of a deep ideological conflict that has existed in our law of contract for a very long time, and that this debate now exists within the context of a larger debate about the appropriate transformative reach of the Constitution. The argument takes the form of two ‘dangerous supplements’ to Hutchison’s discourse. The first of these supplements contends that indeterminacy is a symptom of the common law itself, rather than a result of contract law’s contact with the Constitution. The second dangerous supplement suggests a responsible judicial engagement with bona fides and ubuntu, one that can exploit the strengths of both the common law and the Constitution and that understands good faith and ubuntu to be ‘inter-linking’ constitutional values that should be enlisted in unison or at least in resonance when it comes to the question of fairness in our contemporary law of contract. In conclusion, I offer a reading of Hutchison’s own politics of contract law and contend that his is an altruistic politics committed to the standard form. I contend that this politics of contract law is consistent with a transformative understanding of the post-apartheid legal order. ‘Law, like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell one another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one another, and authority. In this, law is no different from the Boston Globe, the CBS evening news, Mother Jones, or a law school faculty meeting. When we tell one another stories, we use languages and themes that different pieces of the culture make available to us, and that limit the stories we can tell. Since our stories influence how we imagine, as well as how we describe, our relationships, our stories also limit who we can be’.


1993 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 308
Author(s):  
Shaik Mohd Noor Alam S.M. Hussain

Malaysia dan Indonesia memiliki persamaan dan perbedaan dalam sistem hukum. Keduanegara mengenal Hukum Islam dan Hukum Adat. Namun berkenaan dengan hukum Baratmaka Malaysia menganut "Common Law System ", sedangkan Indonesia negeri yangdimasukkan dalam "Civil Law System ". Karangan berikut ini mencoba memperbandingkansahnya suatu perjanjian menurut hukum "Common Law" Malaysia dan "Civil Law" Indonesia. Terlihat adanya perbedaan dalam unsur-unsur yang harus dipenuhi untuk sahnya suatu perjanjian di kedua negara tersebut.


Yuridika ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 469
Author(s):  
Akhmad Budi Cahyono

Default is something that often occurs in contractual relationship. It can be not perform its obligations in the contract in all or in a part, performing its obligations but not in accordance with was agreed, performing its obligations but not in time, and performing something that is prohibited in the contract. Due to default, the injured party may claim compensation and / or terminate the contract. The problem is, the Indonesian Civil Code does not specify how a contract can be terminated in case of default. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comparative study in other countries in terms of how a default can terminate the contract. The British which adopt common law tradition where jurisprudence is the main source of law is the right choice for conducting comparative studies. Countries with common law traditions have detailed legal rules based on jurisprudence. As in Indonesia, according to British contract law, defaults also can terminate the contract. However, unlike in Indonesia, according to British contract law, termination due to a default is only allowed in the event that the default is very serious. The very serious forms of default will be elaborated and become a part of the discussion in this paper.


Author(s):  
James Gordley

‘Classical’ contract law was built on a substantive premise about contract law and two premises about legal method. The substantive premise was voluntaristic: the business of contract law is to enforce the will or choice of the parties. The first methodological premise was positivistic: the law is found, implicitly or explicitly, in the decisions of common law judges. The second methodological premise was conceptualistic: the law should be stated in general formulas which can be tested by their coherence. Finally, ‘classical’ contract law reflected an attitude about how best to steer a course — as every legal system must — between strict rules and equitable considerations. Since the early twentieth century, classical contract law has been breaking down. Allegiance to its premises has weakened as has the preference for rigor. At the same time, scholars have found classical law to be inconsistent even in its own terms. Nevertheless, much of it has remained in place faute de mieux while contemporary jurists have tried to see what is really at stake in particular legal problems. This article describes their work.


2021 ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat

This chapter illustrates personalized law “in action” by examining it in three areas of the law: standards of care under the common law tort doctrine of negligence, mandated consumer protections in contract law, and criminal sanctions. In each area, the chapter examines personalization of commands along several dimensions. In tort law, standards of care could vary according to each injurer’s riskiness and skill, to reduce the costs of accidents. In contract law, mandatory protections could vary according to the value they provide each consumer and differential cost they impose on firms, to allocate protections where, and only where, they are justified. And in criminal law, sanctions would be set based on what it takes to deter criminals, accounting for how perpetrators differ in their motives and likelihood of being apprehended, with the potential to reduce unnecessary harsh penalties.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


2021 ◽  
pp. 467-492
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier ◽  
Jill Poole

Course-focused and comprehensive, Poole’s Textbook on Contract Law provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. In general terms non-performance constitutes a breach of contract. The contract may have expressly allocated the risk of certain external events which occur after the contract is made to one of the parties by means of a force majeure clause. The terms of this clause will determine the parties’ positions if the event in question occurs. In the absence of an express allocation of the risk, the frustration doctrine is a residual doctrine that governs when such frustrating events intervene, without the fault of either party. These frustrating events relate to impossibility, illegality or frustration of the common purpose of both parties. This chapter examines the legal basis of the frustration doctrine, when it applies, when it does not apply and the legal consequences of frustration on the parties’ positions. Frustration automatically terminates the contract for the future and, where it applies, the provisions of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 govern the parties’ pre-existing legal position.


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