Ch.5 Content, third party rights and conditions, s.1: Content, Art.5.1.9

Author(s):  
Vogenauer Stefan

This commentary focuses on Article 5.1.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning release of a contractual right by agreement. Under Art 5.1.9, an obligee may release its right by agreement with the obligor. An offer to release a right gratuitously shall be deemed accepted if the obligor does not reject the offer without delay after having become aware of it. The terminology used in Art 5.1.9 was chosen with particular care. The term ‘release’ was preferred over the concept of ‘waiver’ that has no agreed meaning between the common law systems. This commentary argues that the use of ‘release’ is somewhat problematic from the perspective of U.S. contract law. It also discusses the agreement in terms of offer and acceptance, the legal consequences of a release by agreement, and the burden of proof relating to release of a contractual right by agreement.

2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


Author(s):  
ONG Burton

Singapore’s contract law framework, in the context of third party beneficiaries, has stayed faithful to the approach taken under English law. The common law in Singapore has adopted the privity of contract rule, various common law exceptions to the rule, and a statutory regime to empower third parties to enforce contractual terms in prescribed circumstances. The privity rule confines the benefits and burdens under a contract to the contract parties; only they have given consideration and only they can sue and be sued under it. However, various reasons support the third party beneficiary having some right to enforce that benefit and a range of common law mechanisms have been recognized by the courts to allow the third party to do this. Some are true exceptions, others operate by recharacterizing the status of the third party into that of a primary party, thereby eliminating the lack of privity. In cases where the third party may potentially be able to sue the promisor in tort, the basis for loosening the privity doctrine to permit the third party to sue the promisor in contract, and the character of the damages recoverable from the party in breach, requires closer scrutiny.


Author(s):  
Jill Poole ◽  
James Devenney ◽  
Adam Shaw-Mellors

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. Contract Law Concentrate contains a wealth of information on the field of contract law to aid with revision and understanding the elements of the contract law syllabus. It looks specifically at the components of agreement, enforceability criteria comprising intention to create legal relations, consideration, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It also focuses on some problems associated with reaching agreement, such as whether the terms are sufficiently certain, and mistakes which prevent agreement. The doctrine of privity determines who has the ability to enforce the contract and whether a third party can take the intended benefit of a contract. Contract Law Concentrate focuses on the terms (or promises) of the contract and breach of contract when those promises are broken. It also examines exemption clauses and unfair contract terms. Next it looks at remedies for the breach of contract. It then turns to contractual impossibility and risk where the default rules of common mistake (initial impossibility) and frustration (subsequent impossibility) will determine the parties’ positions in the absence of party allocation. Finally, it outlines contractual remedies for actionable misrepresentations and looks briefly at the common law doctrine of duress and the equitable doctrine of undue influence.


Studies in the Contract Laws of Asia provides an authoritative account of the contract law regimes of selected Asian jurisdictions, including the major centres of commerce where limited critical commentaries have been published in the English language. Each volume in the series aims to offer an insider’s perspective into specific areas of contract law—remedies, formation, parties, contents, vitiating factors, change of circumstances, illegality, and public policy—and explores how these diverse jurisdictions address common problems encountered in contractual disputes. A concluding chapter draws out the convergences and divergences, and other themes. All the Asian jurisdictions examined have inherited or adopted the common law or civil law models of European legal systems. Scholars of legal transplant will find a mine of information on how received law has developed after the initial adaptation and transplant process, including the influences affecting and mechanisms of these developments. The many points of convergence and divergence (in both form and in substance) emerge. These provide good starting points for regional harmonization projects. Volume II of this series deals with contract formation and contracts for the benefit of third parties in the laws of China, India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Typically, each jurisdiction is covered in two chapters; the first deals with contract formation, while the second deals with contracts for the benefit of third parties.


Author(s):  
Eva Steiner

This chapter examines the law of contract in France and discusses the milestone reform of French contract law. While this new legislation introduces a fresh equilibrium between the contracting parties and enhances accessibility and legal certainty in contract, it does not radically change the state of the law in this area. In addition, it does not strongly impact the traditional philosophical foundations of the law of contract. The reform, in short, looks more like a tidying up operation rather than a far-reaching transformation of the law. Therefore, the chapter argues that it is questionable whether the new law, which was also intended to increase France's attractiveness against the background of a world market dominated by the Common Law, will keep its promise.


Legal Studies ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Dietrich

The common law has solved questions of liability arising in the context of precontractual negotiations by resort to a range of different doctrines and approaches, adopting in effect ‘piecemeal’ solutions to questions of precontractual liability. Consequently, debate has arisen as to how best to classify or categorise claims for precontractual work and as to which doctrines are best suited to solving problems arising from anticipated contracts. The purpose of this article is to consider this question of how best to classify (cases of) precontractual liability. The initial focus will be on the ongoing debate as to whether principles of contract law or principles of unjust enrichment can better solve problems of precontractual liability. I will be suggesting that unjust enrichment theory offers little by way of explanation of cases of precontractual liability and, indeed, draws on principles of contract law in determining questions of liability for precontractual services rendered, though it does so by formulating those principles under different guises. Irrespective, however, of the doctrines utilised by the common law to impose liability, it is possible to identify a number of common elements unifying all cases of precontractual liability. In identifying such common elements of liability, it is necessary to draw on principles of both contract and tort law. How, then, should cases of precontractual liability best be classified? A consideration of the issue of classification of precontractual liability from a perspective of German civil law will demonstrate that a better understanding of cases of precontractual liability will be gained by classifying such cases as lying between the existing categories of contract and tort.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 85-106
Author(s):  
J Barnard-Naudé

This paper is a response to Dale Hutchison’s recent arguments about the role of fairness in contract law after the Constitution. From the point of view of transformative constitutionalism, the paper argues that the fairness ‘debate’ in the South African law of contract should be approached as what it so patently is, namely, as evidence of a deep ideological conflict that has existed in our law of contract for a very long time, and that this debate now exists within the context of a larger debate about the appropriate transformative reach of the Constitution. The argument takes the form of two ‘dangerous supplements’ to Hutchison’s discourse. The first of these supplements contends that indeterminacy is a symptom of the common law itself, rather than a result of contract law’s contact with the Constitution. The second dangerous supplement suggests a responsible judicial engagement with bona fides and ubuntu, one that can exploit the strengths of both the common law and the Constitution and that understands good faith and ubuntu to be ‘inter-linking’ constitutional values that should be enlisted in unison or at least in resonance when it comes to the question of fairness in our contemporary law of contract. In conclusion, I offer a reading of Hutchison’s own politics of contract law and contend that his is an altruistic politics committed to the standard form. I contend that this politics of contract law is consistent with a transformative understanding of the post-apartheid legal order. ‘Law, like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell one another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one another, and authority. In this, law is no different from the Boston Globe, the CBS evening news, Mother Jones, or a law school faculty meeting. When we tell one another stories, we use languages and themes that different pieces of the culture make available to us, and that limit the stories we can tell. Since our stories influence how we imagine, as well as how we describe, our relationships, our stories also limit who we can be’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 245
Author(s):  
Simon Connell

Non est factum (Latin for "not my deed") is a common law doctrine that can allow the signer of a legal document to escape the usual legal consequences of their signature. In its early days, non est factum was available only to blind and illiterate persons who, without being careless, relied on another party's seriously flawed explanation of the document. Non est factum can void contracts, but I argue the general explanation for the doctrine is not a satisfactory explanation for why it applies to contracts. This article considers whether there is an explanation for non est factum that is consistent with contract law thinking. I argue that there is, and explain non est factum as an application of the objective principle set out in Smith v Hughes. 


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriela Shalev

Chapter 4 of the new Israeli Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, introduces the concept of a contract in favour of a third party, while granting express recognition to the right of a third party beneficiary. Even those, (including the author) who maintain, that the right of a third party beneficiary could and should be derived, even before the commencement of the new Law, from the general principles and premises of the old Israeli law of contract, cannot fail to see in the above-mentioned chapter an important innovation in the Israeli legal system.This paper is a comparative analysis of the institution of third party beneficiary. The analysis will consist of a presentation and critical examination of the central concepts and doctrines involved in the institution under discussion, and it will be combined with a comparative survey of the arrangements adopted in various legal systems. The choice of this approach stems from the particular circumstances of the new legislation.While in most countries, comparative legal research is a luxury, in Israel it is a necessity. The new legislation in private law is inspired to a great extent by Continental codifications. As far as the law of contract is concerned, Israel is now in the process of becoming a “mixed jurisdiction”: departing from the common law tradition and technique, and heading towards an independent body of law, derived from various sources, mainly Continental in both substance and form.


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