scholarly journals Excluding Undeserving Claimants: New Zealand's Interpretation of Art 1F(c) Refugee Convention

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Abby Ward

<p>This paper reviews New Zealand judicial interpretation of the “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” as stated in art 1F(c) Refugee Convention, in the light of subsequent foreign jurisprudence. Article 1F excludes claimants from gaining refugee status under the Convention if there are “serious reasons for considering” they have committed a proscribed act. The ambiguous ambit of art 1F(c) had attracted little jurisprudence before the New Zealand authority’s 1995 decision in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. However, art 1F(c) jurisprudence has significantly increased in the face of new global issues such as terrorism, and an expanding United Nations mandate. This paper aims to aid future New Zealand courts in art 1F(c) cases, by assessing Refugee Appeal 2338/94 in light of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pushpanathan v Canada and the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Al Sirri and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Abby Ward

<p>This paper reviews New Zealand judicial interpretation of the “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” as stated in art 1F(c) Refugee Convention, in the light of subsequent foreign jurisprudence. Article 1F excludes claimants from gaining refugee status under the Convention if there are “serious reasons for considering” they have committed a proscribed act. The ambiguous ambit of art 1F(c) had attracted little jurisprudence before the New Zealand authority’s 1995 decision in Refugee Appeal 2338/94. However, art 1F(c) jurisprudence has significantly increased in the face of new global issues such as terrorism, and an expanding United Nations mandate. This paper aims to aid future New Zealand courts in art 1F(c) cases, by assessing Refugee Appeal 2338/94 in light of the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pushpanathan v Canada and the United Kingdom Supreme Court decision in Al Sirri and DD v Secretary of State for the Home Department.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Sam McMullan

Many New Zealanders live in shared living arrangements. The result of this is that reasonable expectations of privacy are becoming more limited. State officials may conduct a lawful search where a person consents to such a search if that person has the authority to consent. Where people live in shared living arrangements, several people may have authority to consent to a search of the same property. This article explores the extent of a third party's power to consent to property searches where more than one person has authority to consent to a search under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012. It argues that the question of reasonable expectations of privacy should not be assessed by reference to property rights. It also considers the concept of "apparent" authority which has arisen in New Zealand from the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Bradley as well as the concept of a present and objecting occupant which has arisen in the United States in the Supreme Court decision of Georgia v Randolph.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ayla Saroz

<p>This paper provides a critical analysis of the sentence of reparation in New Zealand, as set out by s 32 of the Sentencing Act 2002. The scope of the sentence is examined with particular regard to the recent Supreme Court decision, which limited reparation so that only victims of offences can benefit from the sentence. The definition of “victim”, as determined by the Sentencing Act, is confined to direct victims of criminal offending. Thus, any indirect victim suffering harm or loss from criminal offending cannot benefit from reparation. This paper questions whether that limitation gives reparation an appropriate scope, or whether some extension should be made so that the sentence is not restricted in its application to only benefit direct victims. In so doing, this paper argues that the criminal law is the suitable domain to address such issues of compensation and therefore, an extension of the reparation sentence is required. Alternative ways of limiting reparation to address this compensation issue are outlined. Ultimately it is proposed that an additional provision should be included within the definition of “victim”, for the purpose of s 32, so that indirect victims can also benefit from a sentence of reparation.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Emma Jane Smith

<p>In 2012 the Supreme Court of New Zealand ruled on Right to Life New Zealand Inc v The Abortion Supervisory Committee. The case was brought by way of application for judicial review, with Right to Life New Zealand Inc arguing that the Supervisory Committee had made an error of law in interpreting its functions under the Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977. A majority of the Court held that the Supervisory Committee does not have the power to review decisions made by certifying consultants in individual cases. However, both the text and the purpose of the Act support the minority view, that the Supervisory Committee must seek information about individual cases in order to fulfil its functions under the Act. It appears that the majority judgment was motivated by policy concerns due to an arguable change in Parliamentary intent since 1977. The majority should have acknowledged the policy values that guided its decision or accorded with the minority view rather than straining the statutory wording. Either of those actions would have better prompted Parliament to reform the law to reflect modern circumstances.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ayla Saroz

<p>This paper provides a critical analysis of the sentence of reparation in New Zealand, as set out by s 32 of the Sentencing Act 2002. The scope of the sentence is examined with particular regard to the recent Supreme Court decision, which limited reparation so that only victims of offences can benefit from the sentence. The definition of “victim”, as determined by the Sentencing Act, is confined to direct victims of criminal offending. Thus, any indirect victim suffering harm or loss from criminal offending cannot benefit from reparation. This paper questions whether that limitation gives reparation an appropriate scope, or whether some extension should be made so that the sentence is not restricted in its application to only benefit direct victims. In so doing, this paper argues that the criminal law is the suitable domain to address such issues of compensation and therefore, an extension of the reparation sentence is required. Alternative ways of limiting reparation to address this compensation issue are outlined. Ultimately it is proposed that an additional provision should be included within the definition of “victim”, for the purpose of s 32, so that indirect victims can also benefit from a sentence of reparation.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 749-756
Author(s):  
Hannah Woolaver

The First Liberian Civil War (1989–1996), in which Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) waged an ultimately successful military campaign to depose President Samuel Doe, was characterized by widespread atrocities. During this period, Agnes Reeves Taylor, known as “The Mother of the Revolution” and at the time Charles Taylor's wife, allegedly committed multiple acts of torture in her capacity as a high-ranking member of the NPFL. After moving to the United Kingdom, Agnes Taylor was charged in 2017 with seven counts of torture and one of conspiracy to commit torture under Section 134 of the UK Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA), which domesticates aspects of the UN Convention Against Torture 1984 (CAT) and asserts universal jurisdiction over torture. During the prosecution, a question over a key definitional element of the crime was appealed to the UK Supreme Court (Supreme Court): whether nonstate actors could be liable under the statute, which requires that torture be carried out by a “public official or person acting in an official capacity” (para. 14). The Court gave a qualified answer in the affirmative, holding that this definition includes individuals acting for a nonstate body that exercises control over territory and carries out governmental functions in this territory. As the first apex court decision extending liability for torture to de facto authorities, the Supreme Court decision is likely to have significant jurisprudential influence well beyond the United Kingdom.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
William Steel

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-486
Author(s):  
Kristen Boon

The July 2019 decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands constitutes the final act of a long litigation arising from the July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica. After Bosnian Serb militias attacked the safe area of Srebrenica, members of the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat), which was responsible for safeguarding the enclave under a UN mandate, permitted between 8,000 and 10,000 men and boys to be taken away by Bosnian Serb forces. Those men and boys were eventually killed by forces commanded by General Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, president of the autonomous Republika Srpska. This Supreme Court decision and related rulings involve issues of international responsibility for the conduct of peacekeepers—in particular, attribution of conduct to the United Nations and its member states and immunity of international organizations.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
William Steel

<p>In 2000, a full Court of Appeal in Vickery v McLean excluded all generally published allegations of criminal conduct from the protection of Lange qualified privilege. Highlighting difficulties with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, this paper argues that New Zealand’s current approach represents an unjustifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression and is out of line with comparable jurisdictions. It suggests that adopting the principle from the recent UK Supreme Court decision in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd, within the existing Lange framework, strikes a more appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Doing so would allow Lange privilege to protect unproven, but verified, allegations of criminal impropriety whilst adequately safeguarding reputations and guarding against fears of trial by media.</p>


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