scholarly journals Possible scenarios for China-U.S. Relations by 2030

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Thanh Duy Vu

<p>The rise of China and relative decline of the United States have caused a heated debate on a possible power shift in the Asia-Pacific. Whether China and the U.S. will become friends or enemies remains an unanswered question. This necessitates a thorough study on the future of China-U.S. relations and how they will affect the strategic chessboard in the region.  This Thesis examines the possible scenarios of China-U.S. relations by 2030. It argues that while the nature of China-U.S. relations is characterized by strategic competition, increasing interdependence between the two countries requires them to cooperate and co-exist with each other. If current trends continue, by 2030, the most likely scenarios for China-U.S. relations will, in descending order, be a continued China-U.S. strategic competition in peaceful co-existence, a new Cold War, a G-2 style condominium, and a predominance by China over the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. The Thesis also finds that unlike the past, China-U.S. relations will be increasingly influenced by external factors and unpredictable events or crises. Each of the scenarios in China-U.S. relations will have a different but equally profound impact on the security architecture in the region, especially the ASEAN-led mechanisms for regional security cooperation. These results suggest that at times of power shifts between the U.S. and China, scenario-based planning can be a viable policy option for countries in the Asia-Pacific.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Thanh Duy Vu

<p>The rise of China and relative decline of the United States have caused a heated debate on a possible power shift in the Asia-Pacific. Whether China and the U.S. will become friends or enemies remains an unanswered question. This necessitates a thorough study on the future of China-U.S. relations and how they will affect the strategic chessboard in the region.  This Thesis examines the possible scenarios of China-U.S. relations by 2030. It argues that while the nature of China-U.S. relations is characterized by strategic competition, increasing interdependence between the two countries requires them to cooperate and co-exist with each other. If current trends continue, by 2030, the most likely scenarios for China-U.S. relations will, in descending order, be a continued China-U.S. strategic competition in peaceful co-existence, a new Cold War, a G-2 style condominium, and a predominance by China over the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific. The Thesis also finds that unlike the past, China-U.S. relations will be increasingly influenced by external factors and unpredictable events or crises. Each of the scenarios in China-U.S. relations will have a different but equally profound impact on the security architecture in the region, especially the ASEAN-led mechanisms for regional security cooperation. These results suggest that at times of power shifts between the U.S. and China, scenario-based planning can be a viable policy option for countries in the Asia-Pacific.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 04 (04) ◽  
pp. 495-514
Author(s):  
Ling Shengli ◽  
Lv Huiyi

With the rise of China and relative decline of the United States, the question of whether both countries will fall into the so-called “Thucydides’ Trap” — an analogy to the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece — has triggered heated debate within international academia. By discussing the misunderstanding about the concept and conducting a three-level analysis of modern Sino-U.S. relations, this article identifies a few major flaws in making a simple analogy between the Athens-Sparta confrontation in ancient Greece and the Sino-U.S. relationship today. It concludes that a war between China and the United States is unlikely to take place thanks to the confines of the international system, the different nature of alliance networks from the ancient Greek period, the economic interdependence among countries, and the changing public attitude toward war. It also suggests both countries expand their economic, political, security and cultural cooperation, so as to ultimately overcome the “Thucydides’ Trap.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (04) ◽  
pp. 85-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

U.S.-China comprehensive competition is currently playing out on an increasingly global scale. The competition's primary locus is the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and it is centered in Southeast Asia. The United States and China each possess comparative advantages in the region. Beijing's advantages are predominantly economic and diplomatic, whereas Washington's are more multifaceted. Although the Barack Obama administration's “pivot” significantly raised the U.S profile in Southeast Asia, China has also expanded its presence and influence. The two powers are increasingly locked in a classic strategic competition, but the pervasive media narrative in the region holds that China is gaining the upper hand. While this gravitation toward Beijing has become a popular meme, it is not empirically accurate—as the United States still possesses substantial overall advantages. Still, the regional balance is dynamic, and the United States needs to remain comprehensively engaged—or else the balance of influence will default to China. At present, the Sino-American competition in Southeast Asia is not (yet) acute and zero-sum. Therefore, the two powers should be able to manage their tensions, limit their rivalry, and practice competitive coexistence.


Author(s):  
Roberts Cynthia ◽  
Leslie Armijo ◽  
Saori Katada

This chapter evaluates multiple dimensions of the global power shift from the incumbent G5/G7 powers to the rising powers, especially the members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Taking note of alternative conceptualizations of interstate “power,” the text maps the redistribution of economic capabilities from the G7 to the BRICS, most particularly the relative rise of China and decline of Japan, and especially Europe. Given these clear trends in measurable material capabilities, the BRICS have obtained considerable autonomy from outside pressures. Although the BRICS’ economic, financial, and monetary capabilities remain uneven, their relative positions have improved steadily. Via extensive data analysis, the chapter finds that whether one examines China alone or the BRICS as a group, BRICS members have achieved the necessary capabilities to challenge the global economic and financial leadership of the currently dominant powers, perhaps even the United States one day.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Gross

This essay challenges those strains of contemporary social theory that regard romantic/ sexual intimacy as a premier site of detraditionalization in the late modern era. Striking changes have occurred in intimacy and family life over the last half-century, but the notion of detraditionalization as currently formulated does not capture them very well. With the goal of achieving a more refined understanding, the article proposes a distinction between “regulative” and “meaning-constitutive” traditions. The former involve threats of exclusion from various moral communities; the latter involve linguistic and cultural frameworks within which sense is made of the world. Focusing on the U.S. case and marshaling various kinds of empirical evidence, the article argues that while the regulative tradition of what it terms lifelong, internally stratified marriage has declined in strength in recent years, the image of the form of couplehood inscribed in this regulative tradition continues to function as a hegemonic ideal in many American intimate relationships. Intimacy in the United States also remains beholden to the tradition of romantic love. That these meaning-constitutive traditions continue to play a central role in structuring contemporary intimacy suggests that detraditionalization involves the relative decline only of certain regulative traditions, a point that calls into question some of the normative assessments that often accompany the detraditionalization thesis.


Author(s):  
Tatheer Zahra Sherazi ◽  
Amna Mahmood

Asia Pacific, which is extended Eastward to the states of Oceania, Westward to Pakistan, Southward to New Zealand, and Northward to Mongolia, is currently a pivot of the globe due to its economic growth. Since last two decades, it has got status of ‘growth center’ owing to its high economic growth rate. The United States (US) had been very active in Asia Pacific throughout the Cold War period, but in post-Cold War era, it was disengaged due to its pre-occupation in Middle East. However, the rise of China attracted US again with multiple arrangements at political, economic and social fronts. There are two world views about the US presence in Asia Pacific. The first one asserts that the Asia Pacific is more secure without the presence of US, while others takes the US presence as a patron for stability and solidarity within the region. The US policy of ‘Pivot to Asia’, ‘Asia Pacific’ commonly known as ‘Rebalancing’ ensured its new commitment of deep engagement in Southeast Asia. Policy shift under Trump administration from ‘Pivot to Asia’ to ‘Free Indo-Pacific’ has direct as well indirect implications for Pakistan. The study analyses the US strategies and polices under the theory of ‘Offensive Realism,’ where ‘rational powers uncertain of intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive’. Analytical, descriptive approaches are adopted in order to analyse US ongoing strategies.


Author(s):  
I. Danilin

The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.


Author(s):  
Osvaldo Rosales

Latin America experienced economic ups and downs in the past decade, and faces a gloomy outlook for 2015–2020. This chapter first delineates the near-term growth prospects for the region, examining the subregional patterns closely with three national cases—Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela—and analyzing the external constraints for the region’s economic growth. It then examines the major challenges ahead for the region with analysis of Latin America’s economic relationship with the United States and China, respectively. On the one hand, while the U.S.’s current bilateral approach leaves the economic relationship with the region fragmented, the economic and trade cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America can be strengthened through fostering productive integration and the development of regional value chains oriented toward the U.S. market. On the other hand, China’s growing presence in the region poses challenges to Latin America countries, namely achieving export diversification, diversification of Chinese investments in the region, and Latin investment in China and Asia-Pacific.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 265-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Han Su

Since the beginning of its reform and opening up over three decades ago, China has taken great efforts to integrate into the GATT/WTO-centered international trade system and the U.S. Dollar-centered international monetary system. By using the U.S. Dollar as the principal currency in its international economic engagement while exercising strict capital controls domestically, China has practically adopted a U.S. Dollar-dependent strategy to promote export, attract foreign investment, and maintain financial security, thus it has achieved lasting economic growth. However, with the declining credibility of the U.S. Dollar due to the U.S. financial crisis in 2008, and the increasing strategic competition between China and the United States, more and more Chinese in the policy and academic circles are skeptical of China's highly dependent monetary policy. Since 2009, China has begun to adopt a more proactive international monetary strategy by taking such measures as promoting the internationalization of the RMB, initiating new reforms of the international monetary system, and fostering a new regional monetary order. Such changes imply that China is changing its role: moving from being a dependent to a reformer of the U.S. Dollar system, which reflects a salient dimension of the evolving relationships between China and the broader international system.


Author(s):  
Nataliya Stepanova

In her presentation, the speaker focuses on the national security documents published in the United States and Russia in 2021. The Interim strategic national security guidance, published just seven weeks after the Biden administration came to power, testifies to the intention of the current US leadership to distance itself from the legacy of Donald Trump. Major attention is paid to domestic politics and ideological components of the new administration&apos;s agenda. Continuity with the 2017 National Security Strategy remains in relation to the strategic competition with China, while less attention is devoted to Russia. In July 2021, an updated National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation was released. It reflects significant changes in the vision of Russia&apos;s role in global politics. Major focus is on the issues of information and environmental security. The speaker notes that the US and Russian strategic documents are subject to a general trend of expansion of the concept of national security to include the aspects of domestic security, as well as socio-economic and cultural aspects. In the foreign policy sphere, the strategies are mainly focused on the Asia-Pacific region. 


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