Computation of Efficient Nash Equilibria for Experimental Economic Games

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Rhoda Ong'awa Esilaba ◽  
Edgar O. Otumba ◽  
Alfred W. Manyonge
2017 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Y. Olivola ◽  
Alexander Todorov

AbstractThe influence of appearances goes well beyond physical attractiveness and includes the surprisingly powerful impact of “face-ism” – the tendency to stereotype individuals based on their facial features. A growing body of research has revealed that these face-based social attributions bias the outcomes of labor markets and experimental economic games in ways that are hard to explain via evolutionary mating motives.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-381

Jeffrey V. Butler of EIEF and University of Nevada, Las Vegas reviews “Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective”, by Jean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Seventeen papers, plus thirteen case studies available for download only, explore the historical emergence of prosocial norms and their relationship to economic growth. Papers in the text discuss theoretical foundations─the coevolution of social norms, intrinsic motivation, markets, and the institutions of complex societies; cross-cultural methods, sites, and variables; major empirical results─markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment; and double-blind dictator games in Africa and the United States─differential experimenter effects. Case studies available for download discuss Hadza behavior in three experimental economic games; the effects of sanctions and third-party enforcers on generosity in Papua New Guinea; an experimental investigation of dictators, ultimatums, and punishment; behavioral experiments in the Yasawa Islands, Fiji; economic game behavior among the Shuar; economic experimental game results from the Sursurunga of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea; Maragoli and Gusii farmers in Kenya─strong collective action and high prosocial punishment; sharing, subsistence, and social norms in Northern Siberia; the influence of property rights and institutions for third-party sanctioning on behavior in three experimental economic games; cooperation and punishment in an economically diverse community in highland Tanzania; social preferences among the people of Sanquianga in Colombia; the effects of birthplace and current context on other-regarding preferences in Accra; and prosociality in rural America─evidence from dictator, ultimatum, public goods, and trust games.” Ensminger is Edie and Lew Wasserman Professor of Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology. Henrich is Professor and Canada Research Chair in Culture, Cognition, and Coevolution in the Economics and Psychology Departments at the University of British Columbia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron D. Lightner ◽  
Edward H. Hagen

AbstractResearchers, including Boyer & Petersen (B&P), commonly use experimental economic studies to draw their conclusions. These studies conventionally strip away context and present participants only with abstract rules. Because context is a strictly necessary component of the decision-making process, it is not clear that inferences about high-level folk psychological concepts (e.g., rationality) can be drawn from decontextualized economic games.


Decision ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis F. Martinez ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg

Field Methods ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew M. Gervais

Experimental economic games reveal significant population variation in human social behavior. However, most protocols involve anonymous recipients, limiting their validity to fleeting interactions. Understanding human relationship dynamics will require methods with the virtues of economic games that also tap recipient identity-conditioned heuristics (RICHs). This article describes three RICH economic games—an allocation game, a taking game, and a costly reduction game—that involve monetary decisions across photos of one’s social network, integrating recipient identities while maintaining decision confidentiality. I demonstrate the ecological validity of these games in a study of male social relationships in a rural Fijian village. Deciders readily map these games onto daily life, and target earnings vary widely; consistent with ethnography, relative need is the primary rationale for decisions across the games, while both punitive and leveling motives drive reduction behavior. Consequently, altruism and spite are both elevated relative to anonymous target games in neighboring villages.


2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Alonso Diaz ◽  
Nicolás Enrique Arévalo Jaimes ◽  
Sebastian Balcucho ◽  
Daniel Duque ◽  
Tatiana García ◽  
...  

Exposure to violence has lasting effects on economic behavior years after it has ended. Previous literature has proved that there is an increase in altruism, impatience, and risk-seeking. However, it is unknown if regular citizens, not directly involved in the conflict, perceive such economic behavior in post-conflict actors. We asked participants to report, relative to them, how Colombia's post-conflict actors (ex-guerrillas, ex-paramilitaries, and victims) behave in different economic games (dictator game, lotteries, and intertemporal discounting). Our sample of university students believes that victims are less altruistic than current evidence with real victims, not particularly risky, and impatient. Also, that former combatants are risk-seeking, impatient, and altruistic towards victims. These beliefs about post-conflict actors' economic behavior do not consistently coincide with behavioral changes found in actual actors involved in violence and could guide reintegration policies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (11) ◽  
pp. 2108-2131
Author(s):  
V. I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
A. S. Gorbatov ◽  
K. N. Kudryavtsev

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