scholarly journals THE IDEA OF THE GOOD LIFE IN ARISTOTLE AND CONFUCIUS

Author(s):  
John Gabriel Mendie ◽  
Stephen Nwanaokuo Udofia

Man, by nature, desires to live a good and happy life. But often times, the enduring quest for the blissful and delightful, eludes man. This constant questing and concurrent yearning make man restless, until his hopes and aspirations of the good or happy life, are crowned with an éclat. But, can man ever attain or realize this feat in the society? Is the idea of the good life, a mirage, a myth or reality? Even more seriously, what does the good life really entail? Is it predicated on material things, that is, on the mundane? Or is the good life, a kind of utopia, an ideal that seeks to bring to the glare of publicity, the “oughts” of life as the case may be? Since the idea of the good life is something well-defined, does it also imply that there is such a thing as the bad life? If, such exist, what would it consist of? Armed with these cogitations, this paper, attempts an expository-comparative study of the good life, its constitutive elements and its attainability in the thoughts of two distinguished philosophers: Confucius (in the East) and Aristotle (in the West).

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-123
Author(s):  
John D. Fair

Uneasily situated between counterculture images projected by James Dean in Rebel Without a Cause (1955) and the dawning of the “Age of Aquarius” a decade later, there emerged a motion picture interlude of innocence on the beaches of Southern California. It was fostered by Gidget (1959) and then thirty “surf and sex” movies that focused on young, attractive bodies and beach escapades rather than serious social causes.The films, argues Kirse May, “created an ideal teenage existence, marked by consumption, leisure, and little else.” Stephen Tropiano explains how their popularity helped shape “the archetypal image of the American teenager” and, reinforced by the surfin' sounds of Jan and Dean, the Beach Boys, and other recording groups, “turned America's attention to the Southern California coastline,” where “those who never set foot on its sandy shores were led to believe that life on the West Coast was a twenty-four-hour beach party.” This study examines a notable film of this genre to determine how musclemen were exploited to exhibit this playful spirit and how their negative reception reinforced an existing disregard toward physical culture. Muscle Beach Party illustrates how physical culture served other agendas, namely the need to address American fears of juvenile delinquency and to revive sagging box-office receipts within the guise of the “good life” of California.


2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Elaine Graham

AbstractThe so-called 'happiness hypothesis', associated with the work of the economist Richard Layard, has attracted much public debate over recent years. Its main contention is that despite rising levels of material prosperity in the west, incidence of recorded happiness and greater quality of life has not increased accordingly. In considering the major contributory factors to happiness and well-being, however, Layard is not alone in identifying the significance of religious values and participation in religion for positive and enduring levels of happiness. In response, this article critiques some of the evidence correlating religion and well-being, as well as considering the broader and much more vexed question of how far public policy is capable of incorporating questions of belief and value into its indicators of happiness and the good life. Drawing on traditions of virtue ethics as the cultivation of 'the life well-lived', I ask whether specifically Christian accounts of human flourishing and the good life still have any bearing in the wider public domain, and what 'rules of engagement' might need to be articulated in any dialogue between Christian values and the discourse of theology and a pluralist society.


Author(s):  
Ray Abrahams

Vigilantes have arisen at many times in different regions of the world, taking the law into their own hands as defenders, often by force, of their view of the good life against those they see to be its enemies. They have a strong attraction for some commentators and they rouse equally strong hostility in others. For yet others, who attempt to take a broader view, they are a source of deep ambivalence. Academic interest in the phenomenon has grown strongly over recent years, and this has contributed significantly to an increase in knowledge of its distribution beyond the bounds of western Europe, the United States, and particularly in many parts of Africa. Although vigilantes are most commonly male, increased evidence of women’s vigilantism has also come to light in recent years. Vigilantism is difficult to define in rigorous terms, partly because of general problems of comparative study, but there are also special reasons in this case. Vigilantism is not so much a thing in itself as a fundamentally relational phenomenon which only makes sense in relation to the formal institutions of the state. It is in several ways a frontier phenomenon, occupying an awkward borderland between law and illegality. Many of its manifestations are short-lived and unstable, nor is it always what it claims to be. For these reasons, definitions of vigilantism are best treated as an “ideal type,” which real cases may be expected to approximate to or depart from. This approach provides the possibility of comparing different cases of vigilantism and also allows one to explore the differences and similarities between it and other “dwellers in the twilight zone,” such as social bandits, mafias, guerrillas, and resistance movements.


Author(s):  
Paul B. Decock

Philo of Alexandria represents a Hellenistic tradition of reading the Scriptures in which reading is seen as a spiritual exercise together with other spiritual exercises, like attention, thorough investigation of the issues, self-mastery, detachment, etcetera (see Her. 253; Leg. 3:18), which has as aim the transformation and growth of the person towards the good and happy life. Interaction with the spiritual wealth of the Greek philosophical traditions was seen as a fruitful asset and challenge. This article highlights some of the key themes of Philo’s philosophical or spiritual reading of the Scriptures: the priority of God and of the health of the soul, the importance of human progress, the recognition of one’s nothingness in order to know God, the necessity to choose, human effort and divine achievement, as well as harmony with God, nature and the self as the aims of the good life. Christian spiritual writers, like Origen, found in Philo’s approach to the Scriptures and in his reflections on the spiritual journey a very inspiring model.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Dahlsgaard ◽  
Christopher Peterson ◽  
Martin E. P. Seligman

Positive psychology needs an agreed-upon way of classifying positive traits as a backbone for research, diagnosis, and intervention. As a 1st step toward classification, the authors examined philosophical and religious traditions in China (Confucianism and Taoism), South Asia (Buddhism and Hinduism), and the West (Athenian philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) for the answers each provided to questions of moral behavior and the good life. The authors found that 6 core virtues recurred in these writings: courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence. This convergence suggests a nonarbitrary foundation for the classification of human strengths and virtues.


Author(s):  
Elyse Platt

My research focuses on the nature of happiness as presented by contemporary philosopher Fred Feldman in his recent work, What is This Thing Called Happiness?(2010). Feldman offers an innovative theory of happiness that suggests happiness is contingent on a subject’s capacity to acquire more pleasure than displeasure in his or her surroundings. Feldman’s model is a valuable contribution to the study of happiness because it calls attention to the power a subject has in determining her own happiness. Like many of his predecessors including Aristotle, Feldman describes the happy life as the Good Life. However, where Aristotle measures the Good Life in terms of virtue, Feldman uses welfare as his metric. A problem with Feldman’s approach is that he rejects Aristotle’s arguments for why happiness is the Good without providing a suitable alternative. In this paper, I address the limitations of Feldman’s model by examining the implications of this omission. I will argue that Feldman lacks a conclusive argument for why the Good Life consists of welfare. Most significantly, Feldman’s account is problematic because it leads to the unusual conclusion that many of us are not in fact pursuing the Good Life for fear of becoming moral monsters. By reintroducing virtue into our description of happiness, and arguments for why happiness is our greatest good, I think that we can rescue contemporary theories of happiness from the repugnant moral conclusions that I have suggested are present in Feldman’s work.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuiza Martínez Rivera

ABSTRACTIn Aristotelian political philosophy, the biological definition of man as a “political animal” functions as the premise upon which the polis can be created. According to Aristotle, man is an animal characterized by rational and communicative abilities that drive him to build communities in pursuit of the “good life.” This definition of human nature presupposes the creation of the polis as the only space where man can fully develop his virtues and live a full and happy life. However, Aristotle’s conception of the polis, only grants political participation within it to individuals that fit this description. This restriction begets the question of who remains beyond the margins of the polis? Beyond the boundaries of this political space remain all those who make life possible in the polis: women, workers, and slaves. Further yet, beyond all economic and social networks, lies the concept that will be the purpose of this article, the “beast,” a human characterized by a lack of political disposition, both in developed instances (like the polis) and the more primitive ones (like a tribe or the home). Following Aristotle’s logic, bestial men are not useful members of the community because they do not fulfill the role of the political animal, as their actions are not guided by the pursuit of the common good. We will argue that as a result, the beast suffers a triple exclusion: political, because he is denied citizenship; social, since he is barred from participating in the community that supports the polis economically; and, biologically for he is excluded from the conceptual group of human.RESUMENEn la filosofía política aristotélica, la definición biológica del hombre como “animal político” funciona como justificación para la creación de la polis. Aristóteles clasifica al hombre como un animal caracterizado por su habilidad racional y comunicativa, capacidades que lo determinan a formar comunidades con miras a la “vida buena”. Esta definición de la naturaleza humana supone la creación de la polis; el único espacio donde el hombre puede desarrollar sus virtudes y vivir una vida plena y feliz. Dentro de esta polis, Aristóteles le otorga participación política solo a los individuos que cum-plen con esta descripción. A partir de esto surge la pregunta: ¿Quiénes quedan al margen de la polis? Fuera de este espacio político quedan todos los que hacen posible la vida en la polis: las mujeres, los trabajadores y  los esclavos. Más allá de estas redes económicas y sociales queda el propósito de este artículo, la “bestia”: los seres humanos caracterizados por su carencia de disposición política tanto en instancias desarrolladas como la polis y las más primitivas como la aldea o el hogar. De esta manera, los hombres bestiales son inútiles para la vida en comunidad ya que no cumplen con su función como animales políticos y sus acciones no están guiadas por un bien común. Se argumentará que a partir de esto que la bestia padece una triple exclusión: la política, al negársele la posibilidad de ciudadanía; la social, al prohibirle la partici-pación en la comunidad que sustenta económicamente a la polis y, por último, la biológica al ser excluido del conjunto conceptual de los hombres.


1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 667-668
Author(s):  
Isaac Prilleltensky
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