L’ipséité et non le moi : promesses et potentialités d’un concept

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-156
Author(s):  
Claude Romano

Does Heidegger really have a “theory of the self ” in the same way as, say, Descartes, Locke or Husserl? This is what has often been concluded bymany interpreters of Being and Time, and it is that view that this paper challenges. Heidegger not only rejects the supposition of a substantial ego, along the lines of Descartes’ conception, but he also repudiates, more generally, any “self ” understood as a present-at-hand being, an inner core of Dasein, as he insists on the intrinsic connection between the “egologies,” from Descartes to Husserl, and “traditional ontology”. The fundamental-ontological approach of Selbstheit and Selbstsein, that is, ipseity and Beingoneself, constitutes rather a complete paradigm-shift in the history of Modern philosophy, and a complete break with the egologies as a whole, since both concepts refer only to “ways of being” or “ways of existing” of Dasein. Insofar as its novelty is acknowledged, the concept of ipseity may thus also be taken as an heuristic tool to investigate the history of philosophy, and especially to reformulate in slightly different terms the problem that was at the centre of the courses on « subjectivity and truth » of the late Foucault

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-160
Author(s):  
Jorge Ledo

The aim of this volume is not to offer a comprehensive overview of the multifarious aspects of fiction and its implications for early modern philosophy, but to be an invitation, from the standpoint of the history of philosophy, to survey some of the fundamental problems of the field, using six case-studies written by some of the finest international scholars in their respective areas of Renaissance studies. Although perhaps not evident at a first reading, these six studies are linked by common concerns such as the theoretical relationship between (literary) history, rhetoric, poetics, and philosophy; the tensions between res, verba, and imago; and the concept of enargeia. They have been arranged according to the chronology of the corpus each one considers.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taras Kononenko ◽  
Nataliia Shcherbyna ◽  
Iryna Petlenko ◽  
Alina Borodii

The archeographic guide contains a list of meaningful topics that were considered by scholars in research publications of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in the field of philosophy from 1944 to 1961. The guide raises the issue of archeography of the philosophical source and the preconditions of research in the field of history of philosophy. The author’s team of compilers has developed a methodology for reproducing detailed and verified source data of research publications, created a model of presenting the components of the description of the philosophical source and the concluded sequence of such components as the basis of the original historical and philosophical research. The proposed model involves the use of electronic document tools. The guide can be used in the periodical thematic content analysis of the history of philosophy: Hellenistic-Roman, Middle Ages and Renaissance, new (modern) philosophy, Soviet institutional philosophy, modern philosophy. The guide will be helpful for anyone interested in archeography and philosophical source studies.


Author(s):  
Moshe Halbertal

This chapter analyzes how the movement of the self to self-transcendence has been articulated in different ways in the history of philosophy. In his phenomenology of the sacrificial aspect of political violence, Paul Kahn observes that the double aspect of sacrifice—self and other—continues to this day. The chapter considers the potential relationship between self-sacrifice and violence in war by briefly analyzing the laws of war. In addition, it studies how origin narratives of states and political or religious communities sometimes refer to heroic sacrifices performed by the founding generation. A past sacrifice can become a binding political constraint on present-day politicians. With the burden of an earlier sacrifice, the issue is not about withdrawing from a losing situation and maximizing utility but is instead a concern about retroactive desecration.


2021 ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
Michael Frede

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study of the history of philosophy. In general, there is an enormous difference between those who concern themselves with ancient philosophy, those who concern themselves with medieval philosophy, and the students of the history of modern philosophy. And, across this distinction, there is a great variety of approaches. One should not forget that the historiography of philosophy itself in many ways is a product of history and reflects the historical context in which it is pursued. Nevertheless, what this book is interested in is not the factual question of why historians of philosophy do what they do, but the theoretical question, the question of how one ought to conceive of and explain what they do; though they themselves in this work may not in fact be guided by these assumptions and principles, there must be such principles to the extent that their activity is a rational activity. It is also important to note that philosophers tend to criticize historians of philosophy as being unduly historical and not sufficiently philosophical.


Author(s):  
Karin de Boer

This chapter examines Hegel’s lectures on the history of modern philosophy in view of the tension between, on the one hand, his ambition to grasp philosophy’s past in a truly philosophical way and, on the other hand, the necessity to account for the actual particularities of a wide range of philosophical systems. Hegel’s lectures are put in relief by comparing their methodological principles to those put forward by his Kantian predecessor Tennemann. After discussing Hegel’s conception of modern philosophy as a whole, the chapter turns to his reading of Locke, Leibniz, and, in particular, Kant. In this context, it also compares Hegel’s assessment of Kant’s achievements to that of Tennemann. The chapter concludes by considering Hegel’s account of the final moment of the history of philosophy.


Philosophy ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 66 (255) ◽  
pp. 81-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Lowe

How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of substance as an outmoded relic of prescientific metaphysics—as the notion of some kind of basic and perhaps ineffable stuff—then the suggestion that the self (or indeed anything) is a substance may appear derisory. Even what we ordinarily call ‘stuffs’—gold and water and butter and the like—are, it seems, more properly conceived of as aggregates of molecules or atoms, while the latter are not appropriately to be thought of as being ‘made’ of any kind of ‘stuff’ at all. But this only goes to show that we need to think in terms of a more sophisticated notion of substance—one which may ultimately be traced back to Aristotle's conception of a ‘primary substance’ in the Categories, and whose heir in modern times is W. E. Johnson's notion of the ‘continuant’. It is the notion, that is, of a concrete individual capable of persisting identically through qualitative change, a subject of alterable predicates that is not itself predicable of any further subject.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Gregorio Piaia

The present work proposes a reflexion about difficulties involved in the distinction between “doing philosophy” and “making history of philosophy”. We support the convenience of this problematic distinction, but in a way that the coexistence of the two perspectives guarantees mutyal enrichment. In particular, we insist that the second perspective promotes an attitude that is more open to understanding the distinct ways in which the human being has tried to acces to the truth, and that avoids the self-sufficiency in which the first risks falling.


Author(s):  
Christia Mercer

Anne Conway (1631–79) was an English philosopher whose only work, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, was published posthumously in 1690. Conway’s arguments against Descartes’s account of matter constitute a cutting criticism of his views and offer significant insight into an important and under-studied anti-Cartesian trend in the second half of the seventeenth century. Conway’s response to Descartes helps us discern some of the more original and radical ideas in her philosophy. Like so many other significant early modern women, Conway was left out of the history of philosophy by later thinkers.


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