scholarly journals Global Governance: The World Trade Organization’s Contribution

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1061
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Mitchell ◽  
Elizabeth Sheargold

Democracy and administrative law concern ideas of governance, legitimacy, and accountability. With the growth of bureaucracy and regulation, many democratic theorists would argue that administrative law mechanisms are essential to achieving democratic objectives. This article considers the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) contribution to governance both in terms of global administrative law and democracy. In relation to administrative law, it first explores the extent to which the WTO’s own dispute settlement process contributes to this area. Second, it considers the operation of administrative law principles embedded within the WTO Agreements on Members. For example, the WTO Agreements require that certain laws be administered “in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.” This obligation was recently considered by the Appellate Body, but uncertainty remains about the scope this provision has to permit WTO panels to review domestic administrative practices. In relation to the WTO’s contribution to democracy, this article first considers the challenges and limitations of the current system of decision making within the WTO and compares it to democratic theory. Second, it examines how democracies comply with the findings of WTO dispute settlement tribunals and how compliance could be improved. It concludes by speculating on the implications of this discussion for public international law more broadly.

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW D. MITCHELL

Based on the notion that the needs of developing countries are substantially different from those of developed countries, the principle of special and differential treatment (S&D) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows a certain degree of discrimination in favour of developing countries. This article considers the potential of this principle in resolving disputes within the WTO. S&D developed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 and is today reflected in a series of provisions in various WTO agreements. The meaning of S&D as a broader principle could assist in interpreting such provisions. In addition, the principle of S&D could conceivably be used as part of the inherent jurisdiction of Panels and the Appellate Body in connection with procedural aspects of dispute settlement. However, the article concludes that, due to the incoherence of S&D, as well as the difficulties involved in distinguishing between developing countries and in advancing their interests as an amorphous group, S&D is presently of limited value as an independent principle in WTO dispute settlement.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joost Pauwelyn

How does the World Trade Organization (WTO) relate to the wider corpus of public international law? What, in turn, is the role of public international law in WTO dispute settlement? This paper aims at resolving these two difficult questions. No straightforward answers to them can be found in WTO rules. Yet answering them has major ramifications both for the WTO (is the WTO a largely “self-contained regime” or is it not?) and for international law (is the future of international law further fragmentation or increased unity?). This exercise will be conducted under the law as it stands today—that is, the law as it may be invoked at present before the WTO “judiciary” (panels and the Appellate Body). Of course, WTO members (viz., the WTO “legislator”) could clarify or change the relationship between WTO rules and other rules of international law. However, it is unlikely that such changes will occur any time soon. In part I, I examine the general relationship between public international law and WTO law. I then assess, more specifically, the role of public international law in WTO dispute settlement in part II and offer some conclusions in part III.


Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon

When asked what, if anything, distinguishes US-Clove Cigarettes from other disputes filed with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), an Appellate Body (AB) Secretariat staff member replied: ‘A number of things and nothing at the same time’.1 This answer aptly captures the story of trade-and disputes and the DSS’s goal-attainment patterns in such cases, as revealed in this second part of the book. On the one hand, as in all WTO disputes, the DSS appears to be engaged in this class of cases in the routine legal exercise of law application and interpretation while pursuing its multiple goals, including rule-compliance and dispute resolution. On the other hand, as a WTO practitioner remarked when discussing the ‘interpretative exercise’ carried out by the DSS in trade-and disputes:...


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.


1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Schoenbaum

We have now had three years' experience with the dispute-settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into existence as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations on 1 January 1995. By any objective standard, this system of dispute settlement is a resounding success. Well over 100 cases have been brought to the WTO, and, as at the end of 1997,25cases had been settled at the consultation stage, 61 were under consultations and 36 were in or beyond the panel-appeal process. The newly created Appellate Body has decided nine cases, the quality of its opinions as well as those of the dispute-settlement panels is generally excellent. Member States of the WTO are complying with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron ◽  
Kevin R. Gray

Unlike the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT), the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)1 covers a much wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now embraces services, intellectual property, procurement, investment and agriculture. Moreover, the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements, Panel reports and understandings of the parties. All trade obligations are subsumed under the umbrella of the WTO, of which all parties are members. Member States have to accept the obligations contained in all the WTO covered agreements: they cannot pick and choose.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
WOLFGANG WEISS

This article focuses on the interpretation and application of law in WTO dispute settlement from the angle of legal certainty and predictability. An analysis of the interpretation of WTO law shows that in general it does not differ from the interpretation of other public international law as interpretative rules well known in international law are applied. This together with the consistence provided by the respect of earlier panel and Appellate Body reports safeguard legal certainty. Furthermore, legal certainty and predictability requires clarity in the law applicable in WTO dispute settlement, in particular as regards non-WTO law. It will be shown that apart from peremptory norms of public international law (ius cogens), the relevance of international law outside WTO law is limited. Non-WTO treaty law must not be applied except if referred to by WTO law or incorporated therein. Apart from that international law of any kind can only be considered when interpreting WTO law. In certain circumstances this applies even to non-WTO treaty law to which not all WTO members are parties. Due to the as yet limited importance of non-WTO law, legal certainty and predictability also depend on the issue of conflict of norms, which also is relevant as far as the interrelationship of the different WTO agreements is concerned. In this regard predictability and legal certainty cannot be fully reached.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN

Governments perceive UN human rights conventions and the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as separate legal regimes. WTO jurisprudence, by contrast, interprets WTO rules as parts of international law and may soon be confronted with legal claims that WTO obligations are to be construed with due regard to the human rights obligations of WTO members. The diverse constitutional traditions of WTO members, and their political opposition to linking WTO law to human rights, make it unlikely that WTO members will respond to the UN proposals for a ‘human rights approach to trade’ by adopting a WTO Declaration clarifying that WTO rules are flexible enough to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the human rights obligations of WTO members (section 1). Following the invitation by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy to form ‘cosmopolitan constituencies’ in support of global public goods (like a rules-based world trading system), this article makes concrete proposals for the initiative by the International Law Association (ILA) to elaborate an ILA Declaration clarifying the complex interrelationships between trade law, human rights and WTO jurisprudence (section 2). As many human rights arguments presented in trade disputes in the EC Court and in the European Court of Human Rights could likewise be raised in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, the article examines whether the ‘constitutional methodologies’ applied by European courts offer lessons for further ‘constitutionalizing’ trade governance in the WTO in conformity with the human rights obligations of all WTO members.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
Patricia Yurie Dias

RESUMOO trabalho analisa o papel complementar dos regulamentos e padrões privados dos Estados e das entidades não estatais às regras da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) com o intuito de gerar maior segurança e qualidade para os produtos no âmbito do comércio internacional. A OMC visa promover a liberalização e eliminação da discriminação do comércio internacional. Dessa forma, por meio do estudo de alguns casos submetidos ao Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC, em que pese a maioria dos casos submetidos ao OSC terem tido desfechos distintos, constatou-se que os padrões privados podem complementar as regras da OMC, desde que não sejam medidas protecionistas  disfarçadas de barreiras não tarifárias ao comércio internacional.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Internacional; Jurisdição Internacional; Padrões privados; Comércio Internacional; OMC.ABSTRACTThe paper examines the complementary role of the private regulations and standards of States and non-state entities to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to promote safety and quality for products in the scope of international trade. The WTO aims to promote the liberalization and elimination of discrimination in international trade. Thus, through the study of some cases submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), despite the fact that most cases submitted to the DSB had different conclusions, it was found that private standards can complement the rules of the WTO, if they are not protectionist measures disguised as non-tariff barriers to international trade.KEYWORDS: International Law; International Jurisdiction; Private Standards; International Trade; WTO.


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