Los sentimientos morales, un elemento articulador de la justicia como imparcialidad

2018 ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Yasmin Díaz Saldes
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
The Political ◽  
Life Project ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Sense Of Justice

Los sentimientos morales, un elemento articulador de la justicia como imparcialidadMoral feelings, an articulating element of justice as impartialityOs sentimentos morais, um elemento articulador da Justiça como imparcialidade ResumenLa noción de sujeto que subyace en la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls, es un elemento fundamental para la propuesta de justicia como imparcialidad, pues se trata de un sujeto concebido a partir de la noción kantiana de persona moral. Esto significa que el sujeto es capaz de autodeterminarse y, en función de esta autodeterminación, la comunidad política debe garantizar las condiciones para que pueda desarrollar su proyecto de vida. En tanto, la propuesta de la justicia como imparcialidad es una propuesta de sociedad liberal, que busca garantizar las libertades básicas del individuo y establecer las condiciones de posibilidad de una comunidad política pluralista, por medio de la articulación de principios de la justicia reconocidos y valorados por todos los integrantes de la sociedad, de manera que la estabilidad de la comunidad política radica en la fidelidad a los principios articuladores del orden social. Esta fidelidad se consigue por medio de lo que Rawls denomina el “sentido de la justicia”. AbstractThe notion of subject that underlies the theory of justice by John Rawls is a fundamental element for proposing justice as impartiality, since it is a subject conceived from the Kantian notion of a moral person. This means that the subject is capable of self-determination and, in function of this self-determination, the political community must guarantee conditions so he or she can develop a life project. Meanwhile, the proposal of justice as impartiality is a proposal of a liberal society, seeking to guarantee individual basic freedoms and establish conditions of possibility for a pluralist political community through the articulation of principles of justice recognized and valued by all members of society, so that the stability of the political community lies in the fidelity to the articulating principles of social order. This fidelity is achieved through, what Rawls calls, a “sense of justice.”ResumoA noção de sujeito que subjaz na teoria da justiça de John Rawls, é um elemento fundamental para a proposta de justiça como imparcialidade, pois se trata de um sujeito concebido a partir da noção kantiana de pessoa moral. Isto significa que o sujeito é capaz de autodeterminar-se e, em função desta autodeterminação, a comunidade política deve garantir as condições para que possa desenvolver seu projeto de vida. Assim, a proposta da justiça como imparcialidade é uma proposta de sociedade liberal, que busca garantir as liberdades básicas do indivíduo e estabelecer as condições de possibilidade de uma comunidade política pluralista, por meio da articulação de princípios da justiça reconhecidos e valorados por todos os integrantes da sociedade, de maneira que a estabilidade da comunidade política radica na fidelidade aos princípios articuladores da ordem social. Esta fidelidade alcança-se por meio do que Rawls denomina o “sentido da justiça”.

scholarly journals Rescuing Rawlsian Justice: Are Fraternity and Difference Principle Compatible?

2021 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
R.Yu. Belkovich ◽  
S.V. Vinogradov
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Order ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Internal Contradiction ◽  
The Difference

The revival of the academic interest in the problem of fair distribution of resources in the society, which is one of the key issues for the political thought today, is largely associated with the name of John Rawls and his Theory of Justice. The article is devoted to the analysis of Rawls’s arguments in support of the difference principle as one of the principles of social justice. According to Rawls (whose arguments later formed the foundation for a separate direction in the political-philosophical thought known as luck egalitarianism), due to the random nature of the original distribution of talents, inequality in human wellbeing cannot be justified by an appeal to a merit. However, because strict equality in distribution might reduce productivity of the owners of talent, achieving the best outcome for all requires such inequalities that incentivize the more talented to work as efficiently as possible for the benefit of the less talented. This compromise drew criticism from ardent egalitarians, among which Gerald Cohen articulated objections to the difference principle most clearly and compared the claims of the most talented for material rewards with extortion. Having considered possible justifications for the need for incentives, based on Rawls’s argument in the Theory of Justice, the authors conclude that these justifications do not solve the problem that Cohen revealed. Appealing to human nature merely translates the dispute into the methodological realm: should the theory of justice proceed from reality, or should it be guided by the ideal? In turn, the inevitability of a conflict of private interests does not fit well with Rawls’s ideal of fraternity as an integral part of a just social order. According to their conclusion, in order to resolve the internal contradiction in Rawls’s theory, it is necessary to abandon either the postulates of luck egalitarianism or difference principle. However, both of these options directly contradict Rawls’s intellectual constructs and undermine the basic foundations of his concept.

Rawlsian Stability & Feminism

1998 ◽  
pp. 83-89
Author(s):  
Mary Lyn Stoll
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Feminist Critique ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Stability

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defends two principles of justice, in part by an appeal to stability. Rawls claims that coupled with the publicity condition, the two principles are preferable because they are more likely to encourage stability than are average utilitarian theories. Rawls' radical and feminist opponents have found this appeal to stability problematic since they believe that achieving justice may sometimes necessitate the destabilization of society. Moreover, utilitarian critics argue that even if stability is granted as justification for a theory of justice, it seems at least plausible that institutions structured according to an average utilitarian conception of justice could yield a society that is just as stable. I will argue that with an accurate understanding of Rawls' appeal to stability, these sorts of criticisms lose their strength, and Rawls' argument for the stability of his two principles over average utilitarianism appears that much more convincing. Thus, by getting clear on what Rawls' appeal to stability entails, we gain a fuller understanding of his theory and its justification. Finally, I will consider a revised feminist critique that appeals to the appropriate understanding of stability and go on to suggest how Rawls might respond to such a critique.

Rawls’ Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives

1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Amdur
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth ◽  
International Perspectives ◽  
Principles Of Justice

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls seeks to derive principles of justice from the agreement of rational, hypothetical individuals, each concerned to further his own interests. From a carefully defined initial situation of choice, Rawls derives two basic principles: one demanding equal liberties for all, the other permitting inequalities in wealth and authority only when they serve to maximize the expectations of those who are left worst off. This article explores the political and social implications of Rawls' theory. It is argued (1) that the theory requires a constitutional democracy, offering very strong protection to political and intellectual liberties; and (2) that it also requires a highly egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Although Rawls does not discuss international distributive justice, there are good reasons for concluding that his distributive principles ought to apply globally.

Justice as Fairness: For Groups?

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Homogeneous State ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Indigenous Groups ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Almost All

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

La Idea de “Razón Publica” (y su Revisión) en el Último Rawls

2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Key Topics ◽  
Political Philosopher

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.

Aristotle, Kant and Rawls on Moral Motivation in a Just Society

1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Standards Of Conduct ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Just Society

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 171-174
Author(s):  
Timothy Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Fair Share ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Economic Fairness ◽  
Children's Interests ◽  
Good Environment

The central arguments of this book have been that children are owed a good environment in which to grow up and that adults are owed the stable and supported right to care for children if they so desire. In Part I, I explored how to conceptualize children’s justice and how to measure whether children’s interests are being met by their society. I showed why children’s interests cannot be understood in terms of holding a set of resources, even if resources are understood in a very broad sense. When the subject of justice is understood to be adults, then it makes sense that the role of principles of justice simply be giving each person their fair share. This was the perspective taken by the two most influential liberal thinkers of the last century, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. I suggested their approach cannot cope with the needs of children, since children might have a fair share of economic resources yet grow up socialized into beliefs, values and practices that are harmful to their current and future flourishing. A theory of justice must, therefore, take holistic account of the various ways in which upbringing might affect a person’s life, thus looking at its effects on children’s well-being. To meet this challenge, I offered an objective list account of children’s well-being which suggested that this is principally driven by the quality of their relationships with others. This theoretical shift implies a reconceptualization of what justice is about. Instead of justice being understood primarily as economic fairness, it must be seen as fundamentally about creating a society with norms and practice which foster flourishing interpersonal relationships, with a particular concern for the least advantaged children whose interests must be given priority....

Rawlsian Justice and the Financing of the National Health Service

1976 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudine McCreadie
Keyword(s):  
National Health Service ◽  
Health Service ◽  
National Health ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Level Of Care ◽  
Advisory Panel ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Rawlsian Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice

ABSTRACTJohn Rawls' ATheory of Justicewas published in Britain in 1972. The summation of many years' work by Professor Rawls, it has stimulated widespread admiration and criticism. In this article Rawls' theory is summarized briefly together with some of the major criticisms that have been made of it. An attempt is then made to apply one of Rawls' principles of justice to the question of health services financing, using as a case study the recommendations of an advisory panel of the British Medical Association, which reported in 1970. These recommendations involved extending the private sector in medical care, on the argument that the flow of resources to the National Health Service would increase and, despite possible greater inequalities, result in an improvement in the level of care for all. Judged by the Rawlsian principle, these recommendations are not found likely to represent a just solution to the question of health service financing.

Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Semantic Representation ◽  
New Venture ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Historical Antecedents

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.

Education

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Clayton
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Educational Opportunity ◽  
Political Community ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Class Differences ◽  
Adequate Education ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Sense Of Justice

This chapter discusses the central questions about the content and distribution of education debated by philosophers in recent years. How should educational opportunity be distributed between individuals? Should society aim to achieve equal opportunity, or should it allow departures from equality provided the least advantaged are thereby helped or everyone enjoys an adequate education? Should society seek to eliminate or temper only inequalities that are caused by class differences, or also those caused by individuals’ genetic endowments? Education is not merely a good to be distributed; it is also a vehicle for shaping individuals’ beliefs and desires. Is it permissible for the political community to raise children to have a sense of justice, and for the community or parents to get children to adopt a particular conception of the good life, such as particular religious convictions? Finally, may parents determine the kind of education that their child receives?

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