Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.

Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Daniels

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”


Philosophies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44
Author(s):  
Alfonso D’Amodio

In this paper, I present the suggestion that a suitable theory of “justice as fairness” could offer a consistent path for solving many issues related to the actual crisis of the classical liberal model of economy and democracy, by substituting the abstract “equality” principle, with the concrete “equity” one in the notion of justice. After a short discussion of some main characters of the present worldwide crisis of the classical liberal model, I present two main theories of justice as fairness. John Rawls’ theory in political philosophy that emphasizes how really equitable judgements must overcome the equalitarianism of the Classical Liberalism, by considering the real possibilities of individuals and groups of accessing and enjoying commodities and utilities, as well as, the “basic liberties” defining the citizen equal dignity in the Modern State. Rawls propose, therefore, a notion of fairness compliant with the Kantian normativism, and a notion of fair distributive justice based on the ethical principle of the maximin, as a criterion for judging the righteousness of the State Institutions. The other theory of justice as fairness I discuss in this paper is an evolution of Rawls’ in the direction of the development of a “comparative distributive justice”, without any normativism. This theory is developed in the context of the newborn discipline of the “social choice theory”, formalizing social decision processes, with applications in economic, social, and political sciences. What characterizes Sen’s theory is its original synthesis between the Aristotelian notion of fairness, based on the “personal flourishing”, and Adam Smith’s ethical principle of the “extended sympathy”, by which making comparable different approaches to pursue the personal flourishing, i.e., for achieving “valued and valuable ways of being and of doing”, compliant with, and respectful of, different value systems.


Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody S. Kraus

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.


MELINTAS ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Alfensius Alwino

Through the history of philosophy, the theme of justice has become a very important topic. Thinkers of the theories such as utilitarianism, intuitionism, eudaimonism, perfectionism, liberalism, communitarianism, and socialism have discussed the theme. As French philosopher Alain Badiou has pointed out, the central of political studies from the time of Plato to the present day is justice. The question is what is justice? For John Rawls, justice is the supreme virtue of human. In <em>A Theory of Justice</em>, Rawls asserts that justice is the first priority in social institutions, as is truth in the system of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is not true, so the laws and institutions, however efficient and neat, must be reformed or removed if it is unfair. Rawls criticizes the theory of justice in Lockean liberalism and Marxian socialism. Both theories of justice are very strong colouring the landscape of debate on the roots of thinking about justice. For Rawls, liberalism that accentuates basic freedoms can create inequality between people who have better abilities with less fortunate people. Similarly, socialism which accentuates equality ignores basic freedoms. The two theories of justice are considered ideological in the sense that there are hidden interests behind the jargons of freedom and equality. Rawls then develops an abstract theory of justice, in which the participants depart from a veil of ignorance, so that they are free of any interest and ambition. Here they might build a cooperative contract in a society governed by the principles of justice.


Author(s):  
L. W. Sumner

Since its appearance in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of justice has attracted much critical attention. Most of this attention has inevitably centred on the two principles of justice for institutions and on their derivation from the original position. This paper will examine a part of the system which has not yet received such close scrutiny — Rawls’ theory of political obligation in general and civil disobedience in particular. My main aim is to understand this theory, since there are crucial respects in which it is undeveloped. But I shall also along the way comment on its possibilities; these comments will for the most part take the form of comparisons with its utilitarian rival.In what follows I shall not confine myself to the material in Rawls’ book, but rather use the appearance of the book as an opportunity to review the development of the theory of political obligation since “Justice as Fairness”. When one surveys the period bounded by that initial paper and by the book, certain patterns form.


OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020


Author(s):  
Kealeboga J Maphunye

This article examines South Africa's 20-year democracy by contextualising the roles of the 'small' political parties that contested South Africa's 2014 elections. Through the  prism  of South  Africa's  Constitution,  electoral legislation  and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, it examines these parties' roles in South Africa's democratisation; their influence,  if any, in parliament, and whether they play any role in South Africa's continental or international engagements. Based on a review of the extant literature, official documents,  legislation, media, secondary research, reports and the results of South Africa's elections, the article relies on game theory, rational choice theory and theories of democracy and democratic consolidation to examine 'small' political parties' roles in the country's political and legal systems. It concludes that the roles of 'small' parties in governance and democracy deserve greater recognition than is currently the case, but acknowledges the extreme difficulty experienced by the 'small'  parties in playing a significant role in democratic consolidation, given their formidable opponent in a one-party dominant system.


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