scholarly journals Incompatibility of Laws and Natural Resources: A Case Study of Land Revenue Laws and Their Implications in Federal Areas of Pakistan

2007 ◽  
Vol 46 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1105-1117
Author(s):  
Syed Arshad Hussain Shah ◽  
Syed Akhter Hussain Shah ◽  
Mahmood Khalid

Better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic reforms [Root and May (2006)]. Consider prisoners dilemma, to Law and Economics Scholars, the inevitability of prisoner’s dilemmas arising to block potentially efficient exchanges explains the need for and consequently the adoption of contract law. When the law enforces contracts, it permits the participants in a potential prisoners’ dilemma the option of escaping the dominant strategy equilibrium of non-cooperation, which prevents the achievement of efficient exchanges, by permitting the parties to effectively pre-commit to future cooperative behavior. Mutual pre-commitments can produce the efficient cooperate-cooperate equilibrium. The existence of contract law then tends to foster efficient cooperative behaviour. Institutions are considered to provide the mechanisms by which individuals can resolve social dilemmas [Steins (1999)]. They are sets of rules that people have created in order to control/regulate the behavior of people using a natural resource. Several layers of institutions are important for institutional development and economic performance. These layers, from the slowest moving to the fastest moving are: human motivations and social institutions, political institutions, legal institutions and private institutions [Azfar (2006)]. Institutions perform their role to frame rules, procedure and enabling environment for implementation of rules. Rights of individuals are recognised and recognised through institutions as well.

Author(s):  
Klaas Hendrik Eller

Contract is a central trope of transnational ordering. In the shadow of the various attempts to harmonize contract law at the transnational level (such as through UNIDROIT), the very institution of contract already forms the backbone of transnational interaction. Yet, as this chapter outlines, contract theory is for the most part ill-prepared to capture the constitutive role of contracts in the regulation and critique of transnational social institutions, such as global value chains or digital platforms. In such scenarios, beyond being geared toward efficiency between parties, contracts embody a plurality of rationalities and interests and form a discursive space. Albeit often in a fragile way, contracts emerge as equivalents of political institutions inasmuch as the state legal order no longer provides substantial background justice. The chapter surveys how realist and critical traditions in contract theory, in both their US and European variants, are presently being recalibrated to properly reconstruct transnational social conflicts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (02) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yuli Anwar

cash management strategy (cash management) in order to optimize the foundation fund civil insan prosper (yims) year 2004-2009. Cash management strategy (cash management) in order to optimize the funds on Madani Insan Sejahtera Foundation (Yims) include: revenue from the year 2004 amounting to Rp. 18,250,500.00 until 2009 to Rp. 559,454,000.00 or 300 times increase. Similarly, expenditure in the form of compensation, public health services, skills training, caring teachers and preachers, the economic empowerment of the ummah, qurban from 2004 amounting to Rp. 17,787,500.00 until 2009 to Rp. 559 005 100 is almost 300%. The channeling of funds up to 98% - 102% from 2004 to 2009. The remaining funds are used for operational reserves the foundation. The Foundation expects an increase in revenue from activities that are funded in accordance mission of the foundation is: (1) to provide services to the community through empowerment programs that integrate educational programs, health, economy and skills. (2) Being a liaison between the haves with the community through the distribution of funds can not afford the social, charity, infaq, shodaqoh and humanitarian funds. (3) Establish partnerships with both private institutions, government or other social institutions in reducing social problems in the community. Keywords : cash management 


Author(s):  
Robert D. Woodberry

Although often ignored, religion has profoundly shaped political and economic conditions around the world. This claim is suggested by three historical divergences: a divergence between Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim regions of Europe (these differences emerged after the Reformation and began to dissipate only after World War II); a divergence between Protestant and Catholic settler colonies in Oceania and the Americas; and a divergence between the impacts of Protestant and Catholic missionaries on societies throughout the global South prior to Vatican II (which ended in 1965). This article discusses religion and the spread of human capital and political institutions, focusing on Christian missions as a quasi-natural experiment. It argues that both in Europe and in the global South, Protestants shaped human capital development (mass education and mass printing) and institutional development (civil society, colonial rule of law, and market economics)—especially prior to the 1960s. Together, these shaped elites' incentives and thus long-term prospects for economic development and political democracy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 140 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Cameron Harwick

If there exist no incentive or selective mechanisms that make cooperation in large groups incentive-compatible under realistic circumstances, functional social institutions will require subjective preferences to diverge from objective payoffs – a “noble lie.” This implies the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable “inside” and “outside” perspectives on social institutions; that is, between foundationalist and functionalist approaches, both of which have a long pedigree in political economy. The conflict between the two, and the inability in practice to dispense with either, has a number of surprising implications for human organizations, including the impossibility of algorithmic governance, the necessity of discretionary rule enforcement in the breach, and the difficulty of an ethical economics of institutions. Leeson and Suarez argue that “some superstitions, and perhaps many, support self-governing arrangements. The relationship between such scientifically false beliefs and private institutions is symbiotic and socially productive” (2015, 48). This paper stakes out a stronger claim: that something like superstition is essential for any governance arrangement, self- or otherwise. Specifically, we argue that human social structure both requires and maintains a systematic divergence between subjective preferences and objective payoffs, in a way that usually (though in principle does not necessarily) entails “scientifically false beliefs” for at least a subset of agents. We will refer to the basis of such preferences from the perspective of those holding them as an “inside perspective,” as opposed to a functionalist-evolutionary explanation of their existence, which we will call an “outside perspective.” Drawing on the theory of cooperation, we then show that the two perspectives are in principle irreconcilable, discussing some implications of that fact for political economy and the prospects of social organization.


Author(s):  
Angela Alonso

The Second Reign (1840–1889), the monarchic times under the rule of D. Pedro II, had two political parties. The Conservative Party was the cornerstone of the regime, defending political and social institutions, including slavery. The Liberal Party, the weaker player, adopted a reformist agenda, placing slavery in debate in 1864. Although the Liberal Party had the majority in the House, the Conservative Party achieved the government, in 1868, and dropped the slavery discussion apart from the parliamentary agenda. The Liberals protested in the public space against the coup d’état, and one of its factions joined political outsiders, which gave birth to a Republic Party in 1870. In 1871, the Conservative Party also split, when its moderate faction passed a Free Womb bill. In the 1880s, the Liberal and Conservative Parties attacked each other and fought their inner battles, mostly around the abolition of slavery. Meanwhile, the Republican Party grew, gathering the new generation of modernizing social groups without voices in the political institutions. This politically marginalized young men joined the public debate in the 1870s organizing a reformist movement. They fought the core of Empire tradition (a set of legitimizing ideas and political institutions) by appropriating two main foreign intellectual schemes. One was the French “scientific politics,” which helped them to built a diagnosis of Brazil as a “backward country in the March of Civilization,” a sentence repeated in many books and articles. The other was the Portuguese thesis of colonial decadence that helped the reformist movement to announce a coming crisis of the Brazilian colonial legacy—slavery, monarchy, latifundia. Reformism contested the status quo institutions, values, and practices, while conceiving a civilized future for the nation as based on secularization, free labor, and inclusive political institutions. However, it avoided theories of revolution. It was a modernizing, albeit not a democrat, movement. Reformism was an umbrella movement, under which two other movements, the Abolitionist and the Republican ones, lived mostly together. The unity split just after the shared issue of the abolition of slavery became law in 1888, following two decades of public mobilization. Then, most of the reformists joined the Republican Party. In 1888 and 1889, street mobilization was intense and the political system failed to respond. Monarchy neither solved the political representation claims, nor attended to the claims for modernization. Unsatisfied with abolition format, most of the abolitionists (the law excluded rights for former slaves) and pro-slavery politicians (there was no compensation) joined the Republican Party. Even politicians loyal to the monarchy divided around the dynastic succession. Hence, the civil–military coup that put an end to the Empire on November 15, 1889, did not come as a surprise. The Republican Party and most of the reformist movement members joined the army, and many of the Empire politician leaders endorsed the Republic without resistance. A new political–intellectual alignment then emerged. While the republicans preserved the frame “Empire = decadence/Republic = progress,” monarchists inverted it, presenting the Empire as an era of civilization and the Republic as the rule of barbarians. Monarchists lost the political battle; nevertheless, they won the symbolic war, their narrative dominated the historiography for decades, and it is still the most common view shared among Brazilians.


Author(s):  
Hud Hudson

This first chapter argues that the philosophy of pessimism is well grounded, quite independent of any particular religious orientation. At its core, the philosophy of pessimism simply offers (on the whole) dismal predictions about what nearly all of us can expect to experience in our private lives and interpersonal relationships, about the welfare of our fellow creatures, about the character of our social institutions and global politics, and about our prospects for progress on these matters in the future. The collective evidence for this view drawn from the plight of animals, the natural dispositions of human persons, our checkered history of social and political institutions, the world’s religions and wisdom traditions, and humanity’s achievements in art, literature, music, and philosophy is clear and compelling. Moreover, the chapter argues that this pessimism is overdetermined and even more austere for the Christian who takes the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin seriously. Yet the good news for the Christian is that this philosophy of pessimism can be tempered by reasons for optimism—reasons which furnish a hope for salvation and also a hope that before every tear is wiped away, the groans of creation and the sufferings of its creatures will have properly inspired us to cooperate with God in the process of Atonement. Finally, special attention is given to the Felix Culpa theodicy as a further source of optimism for the Christian.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Jennifer Murtazashvili

Externally assisted state-building efforts cost trillions but typically fail to produce states capable of providing public goods and services on their own. Drawing on the public choice literature and evidence from historical state-building processes, we argue that political self-sufficiency depends on political institutions that allow for self-governance, reasonably high levels of fiscal and administrative capacity, economic institutions that encourage wealth creation, and social institutions that reinforce political and economic freedom. Importantly, we do not expect that democracy is a critical determinant of political self-sufficiency. Our theory explains why state building in Afghanistan in the two decades since 2001 did not produce a more functional state. Despite massive international investment in blood and treasure, the state-building effort prioritised national elections over institutional reforms that encourage local self-governance, failed to establish meaningful constraints on national political decision-makers (especially the president) and disregarded customary private property rights and customary processes to adjudicate land disputes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 351-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERTO RICCIUTI ◽  
ANTONIO SAVOIA ◽  
KUNAL SEN

AbstractA central aspect of institutional development in developing economies is building tax systems capable of raising revenues from broad tax bases, i.e. fiscal capacity. While it is recognised that fiscal capacity is pivotal for state building and economic development, it is less clear what its origins are and what explains its cross-country differences. We focus on political institutions, seen as stronger systems of checks and balances on the executive. Exploiting a recent database on public sector performance in developing economies and an IV strategy, we estimate their long-run impact, distinguishing between the accountability and transparency of fiscal institutions (impartiality) and their effectiveness in extracting revenues. We find that stronger constraints on the executive foster the impartiality of tax systems. However, there is no robust evidence that they also improve its effectiveness. Our findings also suggest that the overall impact on both total tax revenues and income tax is economically relevant.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).


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