The vulgarity of democracy. Political, pornography, masculinity and politics in Ecuador

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Andrade
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Process ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Public Office ◽  
The Public ◽  
Image Objects ◽  
Audience Responses ◽  
Neoliberal Policies ◽  
Deviant Sexuality

The Vulgarity of Democracy explores key aesthetics and affective aspects of democracy via a visual ethnographic exploration of political pornography and the public uses of machismo to construct agendas for popular redemption in Guayaquil, Ecuador, during the 1980s. This period was the beginning of a highly conflictive social process as a result of the imposition of neoliberal policies. Its focus is on the life and work of Pancho Jaime (1946-1989), the most controversial and widely known rock promoter and independent journalist. Between 1984 and his assassination in 1989, Jaime’s underground publications used in-depth investigation as well as gossip, pornographic cartoons, and obscene language to comment on democracy and the corruption of political elites. Jaime’s strategy was to denounce the conduct of powerful figures in public office, and caricaturize their deformed bodies as indexes of their supposedly “deviant” sexuality. Following contemporary and comparative discussions on the political economy of images, and the materiality of image-objects, X. Andrade analyzes the production, circulation, and consumption of Pancho Jaime’s political magazines, audience responses to grotesque visual and aggressive textual discourses, and the effects of revealing public secrets about popular understandings of politics.

Our universities away from partisan Altsarat

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
أ.د.عبد الجبار احمد عبد الله
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Political Organization ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Office ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
The Public ◽  
The University

In order to codify the political and partisan activity in Iraq, after a difficult labor, the Political Parties Law No. (36) for the year 2015 started and this is positive because it is not normal for the political parties and forces in Iraq to continue without a legal framework. Article (24) / paragraph (5) of the law requires that the party and its members commit themselves to the following: (To preserve the neutrality of the public office and public institutions and not to exploit it for the gains of a party or political organization). This is considered because it is illegal to exploit State institutions for partisan purposes . It is a moral duty before the politician not to exploit the political parties or some of its members or those who try to speak on their behalf directly or indirectly to achieve partisan gains. Or personality against other personalities and parties at the expense of the university entity.

The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takaaki Masaki
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Geographical Distribution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Development Projects ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Aid Allocation ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Swing Voters

Abstract:This article utilizes a newly available dataset on the geographical distribution of development projects in Zambia to test whether electoral incentives shape aid allocation at the subnational level. Based on this dataset, it argues that when political elites have limited information to target distributive goods specifically to swing voters, they allocate more donor projects to districts where opposition to the incumbent is strong, as opposed to districts where the incumbent enjoys greater popularity.

The Political Economy of Health: Revisiting Its Marxian Origins to Address 21st-Century Health Inequalities

2020 ◽  
pp. e1-e8
Author(s):  
Michael Harvey
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Health Research ◽  
The Political ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Race And Racism ◽  
The Public ◽  
Critical Theories ◽  
Political Economy Of Health ◽  
Marxian Political Economy

The “political economy of health” is concerned with how political and economic domains interact and shape individual and population health outcomes. However, the term is variously defined in the public health, medical, and social science literatures. This could result in confusion about the term and its associated tradition, thereby constituting a barrier to its application in public health research and practice. To address these issues, I survey the political economy of health tradition, clarify its specifically Marxian theoretical legacy, and discuss its relevance to understanding and addressing public health issues. I conclude by discussing the benefits of employing critical theories of race and racism with Marxian political economy to better understand the roles of class exploitation and racial oppression in epidemiological patterning. (Am J Public Health. Published online ahead of print December 22, 2020:e1–e8. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305996 )

After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico

1999 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Neoliberal Reforms ◽  
Market Governance ◽  
Neoliberal Policies ◽  
Political Entrepreneurs ◽  
New Institutions

Neoliberal economic reforms, rather than unleashing market forces, can result in new institutions for market governance. By vacating institutionalized policy domains, neoliberal reforms can trigger two-step reregulation processes, as first, political entrepreneurs launch projects to build support coalitions by reregulating markets, and second, societal groups respond to these projects by mobilizing to influence the terms of reregulation. Depending on the strengths and strategies of politicians and societal groups, reregulation processes result in varied institutions for market governance. The article develops this argument by analyzing how neoliberal reforms in Mexico led to the construction of distinct institutions for market governance across four states (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla). The findings from Mexico highlight the importance of moving beyond the questions of why developing countries choose neoliberal policies and how they implement them. Students of the political economy of development should shift their attention instead to understanding the kinds of new institutions that replace those destroyed or displaced by neoliberal reforms.

What’s Wrong with Institutions? A Short History of the Clash between IRAs and Turkish Populists

Populism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-171
Author(s):  
Emre Balıkçı
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Short History ◽  
Political Will ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Neoliberal Policies

AbstractThe aim of this article is to reveal the institutional dimensions of populism, which tend to be ignored because of the hegemony of economic analysis of the subject. Whereas many researchers assume that populism is a result of the negative economic effects of neoliberal policies on the middle class, I argue that populism is also a corollary of neoliberal institutions’ effect on the political power of so-called ordinary people. To illustrate this, I focus on the rhetoric of Turkish populists concerning two important economic institutions in Turkey: the Public Procurement Authority and the Central Bank. This examination shows that Turkish populists view the independent institutions of neoliberalism as a barrier against the people’s political will and define themselves as fighters for democracy.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 519-541
Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Public ◽  
Generic Models ◽  
Redistribution Policy ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

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