scholarly journals Rifkin’s misreadings of the zero-marginal cost of production of information technology

Author(s):  
Philippe Rouchy

In this paper, I address contemporary attacks on rationalism thanks to Rifkin’s concepts of “extreme productivity” and “zero marginal cost of production” as examples of an ideological twist on genuine economic expressions. The main issue dealt with epistemological issues in the context of the contemporary communication age. It consists to clarify the relation between economic ideas and their relation to reality. To proceed accordingly, I implement a hermeneutic method applied to Rifkin’s discourse. That method is grounded in the scholarly tradition of “the ordinary language philosophy”. Its results proceed to show 2 distinct language games at work: 1- the neoclassical definition of marginal cost and its own logic is distinct from Rifkin’s use of it. 2- Rifkin uses the expression “marginal cost” under the auspices of an ideological discourse on the demise of capitalism. 3- The confusion is based on a systematically deceptive use of scholarly referencing. I conclude by drawing some lessons for the role of a multidisciplinary defense of economic rationality in contemporary discourse.

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Achmad Bahrur Rozi

All religion have different expressions in articulating the truth of their teachings. The differences occur not onlyamongst different religions, but also in school of thoughts, sects, and ideologies in the same religion. Thismeans that the use of religious language amongst the groups is not necessarily lead to one goal and to thesame meaning. This paper aims to examine the use of religious language from the perspective of its usageusing ordinary language philosophy approach (language philosophy) or more specifically known as languagegames intiated by the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889). Such study is veryimportant to compenstate for current analysis which tends to be empirical-positivistic. This trend emphasizesthe pragmatic aspects of the language than the grammatical aspect. Thus, in the context of religious language,one the same language of riligous language is used not for one purpose only. This means that there is no onlyone way for religious sentences to gain the meaning, but it can discribe some realities depending on the users.Key Word: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna AbstrakSemua agama memiliki ekspresi berbeda dalam mengartikulasikan kebenaran ajarannya. Cara pengungkapanyang berbeda ini bahkan tidak hanya terjadi antar-agama yang berbeda, tetapi terjadi juga dalam aliran,mazhab, dan ideology dalam satu agama yang sama. Artinya bahwa penggunaan bahasa agama antarkelompokbelum tentu megarah pada satu sasaran makna yang sama. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengkaji bahasaagama dari perspektif penggunaannya melalui pendekatan filsafat bahasa biasa (language philosophy) ataulebih spesifik dikenal dengan language games yang digagas oleh filsuf kelahiran Austria, Ludwig Josef JohannWittgenstein (1889). Studi semacam ini dipandang sangat penting guna mengimbangi analisis yang selama inicenderung empiris-positivistik. Kecenderungan ini menekankan bahasa pada aspek pragmatic daripada aspekgramatikalnya. Dengan demikian, dapat disimpulkan dalam konteks bahasa agama, bahwa satu bahasa yangsama dari bahasa agama dipakai tidak hanya untuk satu tujuan saja. Ini artinya bahwa pernyataan-pernyataanagama tidak mendapatkan maknanya dengan satu cara saja, tetapi bisa menggambarkan beberapa relaitasmenurut aturan main si pemakainya.Kata Kunci: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 76-87
Author(s):  
Roman A. Yuriev ◽  

The article considers the thesis about A. Ayer’s radical empiricism as one of the possible conceptual sources for the development of the theory of J. Austin’s speech acts. In contemporary research literature more attention is devoted to the inquiry of the discussion between A. Ayer and J. Austin on the matter of “sense-data”. At the same time it can be stated that few attention is devoted to the historical and philosophical reconstruction of their mutual influence. The importance of this kind of reconstruction is caused by the fact that contention between A. Ayer and J. Austin in Oxford during 1930s and 1940s can be viewed as preliminary work of reception of the idea of L. Wittgenstein’s “language-games”. By comparing A. Ayer’s “empirical / ethical” and J. Austin’s “conservative / performative” oppositions one could show that A. Ayer’s earlier views on ethics expressed in his work “Language, Truth and Logic “cannot be unconditionally attributed to the logical positivism. Ayer’s following statements were considered: 1) ethical judgements state as judgments of arousal of feelings and stimulation to action; 2) ethical judgements state as expression of ethical feelings; 3) ethical judgements add nothing in terms of factual meaning; 4) feelings are not a necessary condition for their expression. In conclusion one can say that in a certain sense Ayer’s approach to the ethical judgment is open to understanding that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. The results of its ethical analysis can be viewed as an important impulse to the development of ordinary language philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to consider logical positivism as including the inevitable premises for creation the ordinary language philosophy.


This book examines the nature of philosophical methodology, defined as the study of philosophical method: how to do philosophy well. It considers a number of hypotheses that explain the nature of philosophical methodology, including eliminativism, epistemologism, theory selectionism, necessary preconditionalism, and hierarchicalism. It also tackles a range of topics such as ‘ordinary language philosophy’, the role of logic in philosophical methodology, phenomenology, philosophical heuristics, and methods in the philosophy of literature and film. Other chapters discuss the method of reflective equilibrium, the notions of conceivability and possibility, naturalistic approaches to philosophical methodology, the methodology of legal philosophy, aesthetics and the philosophy of art as branches of analytic philosophy, issues and methods in the philosophy of mathematics, how and whether faith conflicts with reason, and critical philosophy of race.


2015 ◽  
pp. 63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Laugier

This paper studies the concept of form of life as central to ordinary language philosophy (as understood in Wittgenstein’s, Austin’s and Stanley Cavell’s work): philosophy of our language as spoken; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life. Such an approach to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy shifts the question of the common use of language – central to Wittgenstein’s Investigations – to the definition of the subject as voice, and to the reinvention of subjectivity in language. The voice is both a subjective and common expression: it is what makes it possible for my individual voice, or claim, to become shared and for our forms of life to be intertwined with a lifeform.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Avner Baz

I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”


Author(s):  
Luana Sion Li

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.


Author(s):  
Avner Baz

The article presents, clarifies, defends, and shows the contemporary relevance of ordinary language philosophy (OLP), as a general approach to the understanding and dissolution of at least very many traditional and contemporary philosophical difficulties. The first section broadly characterizes OLP, points out its anticipation in Immanuel Kant’s dissolution of metaphysical impasses in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, and then shows its contemporary relevance by bringing its perspective to bear on the recent debates concerning the philosophical ‘method of cases’. The second section responds to a series of common objections to, and misunderstandings of, OLP.


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