A.J. Ayer and J.L. Austin: from “Ethical Judgements” to “Performative”

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 76-87
Author(s):  
Roman A. Yuriev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Mutual Influence ◽  
Ethical Judgment ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy

The article considers the thesis about A. Ayer’s radical empiricism as one of the possible conceptual sources for the development of the theory of J. Austin’s speech acts. In contemporary research literature more attention is devoted to the inquiry of the discussion between A. Ayer and J. Austin on the matter of “sense-data”. At the same time it can be stated that few attention is devoted to the historical and philosophical reconstruction of their mutual influence. The importance of this kind of reconstruction is caused by the fact that contention between A. Ayer and J. Austin in Oxford during 1930s and 1940s can be viewed as preliminary work of reception of the idea of L. Wittgenstein’s “language-games”. By comparing A. Ayer’s “empirical / ethical” and J. Austin’s “conservative / performative” oppositions one could show that A. Ayer’s earlier views on ethics expressed in his work “Language, Truth and Logic “cannot be unconditionally attributed to the logical positivism. Ayer’s following statements were considered: 1) ethical judgements state as judgments of arousal of feelings and stimulation to action; 2) ethical judgements state as expression of ethical feelings; 3) ethical judgements add nothing in terms of factual meaning; 4) feelings are not a necessary condition for their expression. In conclusion one can say that in a certain sense Ayer’s approach to the ethical judgment is open to understanding that the meaning of a word is its use in the language. The results of its ethical analysis can be viewed as an important impulse to the development of ordinary language philosophy. Therefore, it is possible to consider logical positivism as including the inevitable premises for creation the ordinary language philosophy.

scholarly journals On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind

2018 ◽  
pp. 130-142
Author(s):  
G. A. Zolotkov
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind (that is, logical positivism and philosophy of ordinary language) were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of philosophy of mind shows evaporating of that stance and gradual recovery of the more sympathetic view toward the mind problematic. Thus, there were two main frameworks in analytical philosophy of mind: 1) the framework of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy dominated in the 1930s and the 1940s; 2) the framework that dominated since the 1950s and was featured by the critique of the first framework. Thus, the history of analytical philosophy of mind moves between two highly opposite understandings of the mind problematic. The article aims to found the causes of that move in the ideas of C. Hempel and G. Ryle, who were the most notable philosophers of mind in the 1930s and the 1940s.

Morals of Encounter in Steve Jobs

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 134-155
Author(s):  
Kyle Barrowman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Film Studies ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Test Case ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Stanley Cavell ◽  
Probative Value ◽  
Performative Utterance ◽  
Steve Jobs

In this article, the author argues for the probative value of ordinary language philosophy for the discipline of film studies by way of an analysis of the conversational protocols discernible in the film Steve Jobs (2015). In particular, the author focuses on the work of J.L. Austin, specifically his theory of speech acts and his formulation of the performative utterance, and Stanley Cavell, specifically his extension of Austinian speech act theory and his formulation of the passionate utterance, and analyzes the interactions between the titular character and his daughter through this unique Austinian/Cavellian lens. In so doing, the author endeavors to encourage more scholars in the field of film-philosophy to explore the key concepts and arguments in ordinary language philosophy for use in analyzing films. Despite its having been virtually ignored by film scholars over the last half century, one of many regrettable effects of the Continental bias of film scholars generally and film-philosophers specifically, the author contends that ordinary language philosophy provides powerful tools for the analysis of dialogue and communication in film, with Steve Jobs serving as a particularly insightful test case of the broad utility of ordinary language philosophy for film studies.

scholarly journals RADIKALISME AGAMA DALAM PERMAINAN BAHASA

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Achmad Bahrur Rozi
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Religious Language ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Current Analysis ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Grammatical Aspect ◽  
Pragmatic Aspects

All religion have different expressions in articulating the truth of their teachings. The differences occur not onlyamongst different religions, but also in school of thoughts, sects, and ideologies in the same religion. Thismeans that the use of religious language amongst the groups is not necessarily lead to one goal and to thesame meaning. This paper aims to examine the use of religious language from the perspective of its usageusing ordinary language philosophy approach (language philosophy) or more specifically known as languagegames intiated by the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889). Such study is veryimportant to compenstate for current analysis which tends to be empirical-positivistic. This trend emphasizesthe pragmatic aspects of the language than the grammatical aspect. Thus, in the context of religious language,one the same language of riligous language is used not for one purpose only. This means that there is no onlyone way for religious sentences to gain the meaning, but it can discribe some realities depending on the users.Key Word: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna AbstrakSemua agama memiliki ekspresi berbeda dalam mengartikulasikan kebenaran ajarannya. Cara pengungkapanyang berbeda ini bahkan tidak hanya terjadi antar-agama yang berbeda, tetapi terjadi juga dalam aliran,mazhab, dan ideology dalam satu agama yang sama. Artinya bahwa penggunaan bahasa agama antarkelompokbelum tentu megarah pada satu sasaran makna yang sama. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengkaji bahasaagama dari perspektif penggunaannya melalui pendekatan filsafat bahasa biasa (language philosophy) ataulebih spesifik dikenal dengan language games yang digagas oleh filsuf kelahiran Austria, Ludwig Josef JohannWittgenstein (1889). Studi semacam ini dipandang sangat penting guna mengimbangi analisis yang selama inicenderung empiris-positivistik. Kecenderungan ini menekankan bahasa pada aspek pragmatic daripada aspekgramatikalnya. Dengan demikian, dapat disimpulkan dalam konteks bahasa agama, bahwa satu bahasa yangsama dari bahasa agama dipakai tidak hanya untuk satu tujuan saja. Ini artinya bahwa pernyataan-pernyataanagama tidak mendapatkan maknanya dengan satu cara saja, tetapi bisa menggambarkan beberapa relaitasmenurut aturan main si pemakainya.Kata Kunci: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna

Pragmatics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francois Recanati
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Formal Semantics ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Formal Languages ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Ideal Language ◽  
Truth Conditional

Analytic philosophers have made lasting contributions to the scientific study of language. Semantics (the study of meaning) and pragmatics (the study of language in use) are two important areas of linguistic research which owe their shape to the groundwork done by philosophers. Although the two disciplines are now conceived of as complementary, the philosophical movements out of which they grew were very much in competition. In the middle of the twentieth century, there were two opposing ‘camps’ within the analytic philosophy of language. The first – ‘ideal language philosophy’, as it was then called – was that of the pioneers, Frege, Russell and the logical positivists. They were, first and foremost, logicians studying formal languages and, through these formal languages, ‘language’ in general. Work in this tradition (especially that of Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski and later Montague) gave rise to contemporary formal semantics, a very active discipline developed jointly by logicians, philosophers and grammarians. The other camp was that of so-called ‘ordinary language philosophers’, who thought important features of natural language were not revealed, but hidden, by the logical approach initiated by Frege and Russell. They advocated a more descriptive approach, and emphasized the ‘pragmatic’ nature of natural language as opposed to, for example, the ‘language’ of Principia Mathematica. Their own work (especially that of Austin, Strawson, Grice and the later Wittgenstein) gave rise to contemporary pragmatics, a discipline which (like formal semantics) has developed successfully within linguistics in the past thirty years. From the general conception put forward by ordinary language philosophers, four areas or topics of research emerged, which jointly constitute the core of pragmatics: speech acts; indexicality and context-sensitivity; non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning; and contextual implications. In the first half of this entry, we look at these topics from the point of view of ordinary language philosophy; the second half presents the contemporary picture. From the first point of view, pragmatics is seen as an alternative to the truth-conditional approach to meaning associated with ideal language philosophy (and successfully pursued within formal semantics). From the second point of view, pragmatics merely supplements that approach.

scholarly journals Rifkin’s misreadings of the zero-marginal cost of production of information technology

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Rouchy
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Economic Rationality ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Cost Of Production ◽  
Definition Of

In this paper, I address contemporary attacks on rationalism thanks to Rifkin’s concepts of “extreme productivity” and “zero marginal cost of production” as examples of an ideological twist on genuine economic expressions. The main issue dealt with epistemological issues in the context of the contemporary communication age. It consists to clarify the relation between economic ideas and their relation to reality. To proceed accordingly, I implement a hermeneutic method applied to Rifkin’s discourse. That method is grounded in the scholarly tradition of “the ordinary language philosophy”. Its results proceed to show 2 distinct language games at work: 1- the neoclassical definition of marginal cost and its own logic is distinct from Rifkin’s use of it. 2- Rifkin uses the expression “marginal cost” under the auspices of an ideological discourse on the demise of capitalism. 3- The confusion is based on a systematically deceptive use of scholarly referencing. I conclude by drawing some lessons for the role of a multidisciplinary defense of economic rationality in contemporary discourse.

Contemporary Metaphysics

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Hazlett
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Early 20Th Century ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Aristotelian Tradition

There is no general agreement or consensus about how to define metaphysics. The word itself derives from the title of one of Aristotle’s books, one that deals with decidedly metaphysical issues, but intuitively metaphysical issues are discussed by Aristotle as much in his other works as in the Metaphysics. Contemporary metaphysics ranges over a broad set of questions: questions about what reality is like, at its most fundamental; questions about the nature of human agency and perception; questions about the legitimacy of metaphysics itself. The only way to know what contemporary metaphysics is about is to understand the relevant texts, issues, and figures. Hence this article, which presents important and influential background readings in the various subareas of metaphysics. These “areas” of metaphysics (like the various “areas” of philosophy) are deeply interconnected, to say the least. Indeed the quotes used here indicate doubts about the very idea of distinct “areas.” On this score, the artificiality of the divisions employed here cannot be overemphasized. This article is concerned with contemporary metaphysics in the “analytic” tradition, and as such it ignores some important philosophers. Most importantly, this article does not cover the historical background to contemporary analytic metaphysics, which includes the Aristotelian tradition that still shapes contemporary metaphysical thinking; the Humean empiricism and Kantian idealism to which analytic metaphysicians owe so much; and finally, the “Absolute Idealism” of F. H. Bradley (the negative reaction to which helped spawn “analytic” philosophy as we know it). Nor does it cover early-20th-century analytic philosophy, including logical positivism, or ordinary language philosophy. The aim here is to provide background reading for those concerned with contemporary metaphysics. The texts selected are mostly from the last half of the 20th century, and, for the most part, they are those that have had the most impact on contemporary debates.

Whose Dream Is It Anyway?

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 263-287
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
External World ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Second Line ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
First Line ◽  
Standard Type ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Cartesian Skepticism

I start with two basic lines of response to Cartesian skepticism about the ‘external world’: in the first, which is characteristic of Analytic philosophers to this day, the focus is on the meaning of ‘know’—what it ‘refers’ to, its ‘semantics’ and its ‘pragmatics’; in the second, which characterizes Continental responses to Descartes, the focus is on the philosophizing or meditating subject, and its relation to its body and world. I argue that the first approach is hopeless: if the Cartesian worry that I could be dreaming right now so much as makes sense, the proposal that—under some theory of knowledge (or of ‘knowledge’)—my belief that I am sitting in front of the computer right now may still be (or truly count as) a piece of knowledge, would rightfully seem to the skeptic to be playing with words and missing the point. I then argue that the practice of Ordinary Language Philosophy, which has mostly been linked to the first line of response to Cartesian skepticism, may be seen as actually belonging with the second line of response; and I show how a form of what may be called “Existentialist Ordinary Language Philosophy” can be used to reveal the nonsensicality of the Cartesian skeptical worry. My argument takes its cue from Thompson Clarke’s insight—an insight that Clarke himself has not pursued far or accurately enough—that our concept of Dream is not a concept of the “standard type.”

INFLUENCE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY ON ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF H. L. A. HART

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (18) ◽  
pp. 315-330
Author(s):  
Luana Sion Li
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Ordinary Language Philosophy ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Legal Philosopher ◽  
Linguistic Philosophy ◽  
The Way

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.

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