scholarly journals Social Estate Nature of Punishments in the Russian Army before the First World War

Manuscript ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 2546-2550
Author(s):  
Vladimir Viktorovich Tuarmenskij ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora V. Starostenko

The activity of the Orthodox military clergy in the Russian army on the territory of Galicia during the First World War is considered. It was established that the religious situation in Galicia and the conduct of hostilities on the enemy’s territory had a great influence on the activities of military priests. The attitude of the protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy to the uniate question, the specificity of the interaction of military priests with the local population are shown. The features of the organisation and implementation of services are analysed. The work of priests to maintain a fighting spirit is considered. Cases of both conscientious and unacceptable attitude to the service was established.


Author(s):  
Mariusz Kulik

AbstractBefore the First World War a part of Polish territory, including Lubelszczyzna was in the Military District in Warsaw. There were standing five army corps, which consisted of 200,000 soldiers. In Lubelszczyzna there was standing one corps - XIV Army Corps in the power of 30,000 men. Due to the current rules, the could be very few among them. The restrictions referred to officers too, but only to the Catholics (Catholic’s vacant). Poles of others religions were out of the restrictions. Poles were mainly commanders, up to the brigade commanders. Among them there were also generals Eugeniusz de Hennig Michaelis and Edward Kolankowski. After the war broke out the number of Poles in the Russian army increased, which was connected with the mobilization, the war acts and their consequences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 386-392
Author(s):  
Alexander Yu. Polunov

The article examines the aspects of the confessional policy in the territory of Galicia in the period of its occupation by the Russian army in the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915. The author pays attention to the factors of confessional policy development related to the activities of the Russophile (“Moscow-phile”) party in Galicia and the initiatives of Russian social and church circles sympathizing with pro-Russian Galicians. The author believes that Galicia’s place in the public conscience was largely determined by the symbolic significance of that region, - the last part of the East-Slavic area that was not a part of Russia by the beginning of the 20th century. Relying on the attitude of the Galician “Russophiles”, the nationally-oriented Russian church and public circles counted on the quick spreading of the Orthodoxy and Russian culture in the annexed areas. Most of those expectations did not come true, both due to the terroristic campaign against “Russophiles” conducted by the Austrian administration just after the break o the war, and due to the interdepartmental contradictions complicated by the activity of the Russian authorities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 892-901
Author(s):  
V. O. Zverev ◽  
◽  
O. G. Polovnikov ◽  

The article discusses the limited intelligence capabilities of the gendarmerie departments of the Warsaw Governor General (Lomzinska, Warsaw, Kielce, Lublin, and Radom provinces) in the fight against German and Austrian spies in the second half of 1914 and the first half of 1915. One reason for the secret police’s lack of readiness is the reluctance of the gendarmerie-police authorities to organize counter-response work on an appropriate basis. The rare, fragmentary, and not always valuable information received by agents of the investigating authorities did not allow the gendarmes to organize full-scale and successful operational work on a subordinate territory to identify hidden enemies of the state. The low potential, and, in some cases, the complete uselessness of secret service personnel for the interests of the military wanted list led to the fact that most politically disloyal persons were accidentally identified by other special services. In most cases, spies were detected either due to information from army intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, or due to the vigilance of military personnel of the advanced units of the Russian army. The authors conclude that the gendarmerie departments were unable to organize a systematic operational escort of military personnel of the Russian armies deployed in the Warsaw Military District. Despite the fact that the duty of the gendarmerie police included not only criminal procedures, but also operational searches, there was no qualified identification of spies with the help of secret officers.


Perceptions ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Jack Sweeney

The purpose of this study was to research the role that Austria-Hungary played in the Eastern Front of the First World War. Specifically, there is research into their clumsy actions in the tragic battle of Galicia. The research was conducted through the works of several historians that focus on Austria-Hungary and Russia in the First World War. Overall, the weak leadership, trans cultural makeup of the army, and the sheer numbers of the imperial Russian Army resulted in a complete rout in both the Battle of Galicia and the Brusilov Offensive. If it had not been for the sheer power and efficiency of Germany, the Austro-Hungary Empire would have capitulated to Russia in the first year of the war.


Author(s):  
Nataliia KRAVETS

The article deals with the national-cultural activities of Vasyl Prokhoda in the POW camps in Austria-Hungary during the First World War. First of all, the stages of military service in the Russian army on the eve and during the Great War have been clarified (1912 – beginning of service in the 51st Lithuanian Regiment in Simferopol; 1913 – courses of the reserve ensigns; November 1914 – the rank of ensign; the Austro-Hungarian front of the First World War; winter 1914–1915 – participation in the Carpathian Operation of the Russian Army, captivity). Special attention is paid to his staying in the POW camps (Josefstadt, Liberec, Brux (Most), Theresienstadt (Terezin), stages of his national identity evolution. It stated that the formation of V. Prokhoda's national identity was facilitated by various factors: first of all, acquaintance with K. Kuril, program documents of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, creation of Ukrainian libraries, choirs, drama clubs in the camps, reading of works by T. Shevchenko, M. Vovchka, etc. The author also investigates the public activities of V. Prokhoda in the POW camps, his contribution to the organization of Ukrainian life there, highlights living conditions in the camps (according to his observations), as well as specifics of inter-ethnic relations against the backdrop of events of the Russian Revolution 1917. The perception and attitude of nationally conscious Ukrainians (prisoners of war), in particular, V. Prokhody, to the creation of the Ukrainian Central Rada, its I and II Universals, the resolutions of the first military congresses in Ukraine, the Bolshevik coup in Russia in October 1917, compared to the estimates of these events by Russians (prisoners of war). The circumstances that opened the possibility of forming Ukrainian divisions of prisoners of war and sending them to disposal of the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) in the first half of 1918 were clarified. The last months of V. Prokhoda's staying in the POW camps under conditions of his health deterioration, the circumstances of his returning to Ukraine after the coup of P. Skoropadskyi are presented. Keywords Vasyl Prokhoda, national and cultural activity, POW camps, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 26-32
Author(s):  
Ihor Sribnyak

The article discloses attempts by the German authorities to use certain captive Ukrainians from the Russian army to destabilize its arson during World War I. Due to the lack of relevant archival sources, it is not possible to determine the degree of informative nature of agent messages recruited by the German Ukrainian activists, as well as the extent of their importance in planning strategic or tactical military operations at the front by the German command. The author of the article assumes that the most successful Ukrainian “turns” from captivity acted in the cause of revolutionizing Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire. It should also be noted that by agreeing to cooperate with the German military authorities, not all captive Ukrainians were guided by ideological motives. Some of them were driven by the desire to use this opportunity to accelerate their return home, and they were not a priori planning to collect and transmit intelligence to the Germans and to carry out the work of revolutionary content. Finally, a small proportion of Ukrainians who were sent home by the efforts of the Union of Liberation of Ukraine and the German authorities, joined the disintegration of imperial institutes at Ukrainian lands, and also took an active part in the Ukrainian state-building in 1917–1920.


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