Ukraine politics self-obsessed as Russian army waits

Significance Poroshenko was travelling abroad last month when he became a suspect in a treason case relating to events seven years ago. He is the second powerful figure, after businessman Rinat Ahmetov, to fall foul of President Volodymyr Zelensky's administration in recent months. The Zelensky team's preoccupation with domestic opponents comes despite ongoing talk of possible invasion by a large Russian force massed on Ukraine's borders. Impacts Any attempt to detain Poroshenko will be resisted by his supporters, who may stage protests. Prosecuting Poroshenko may improve Zelensky's ratings, but only in the short term. Attacks on opponents should not greatly affect the administration's relations with the West, which has other priorities.

Military fi eld and naval therapy from the origins to the present day

The article contains brief information about the origin and development of therapeutic care in the Russian Army and Navy. The transition from the “army clinic” of prof. M.Ya. Mudrov to the medical discipline “Military fi eld therapy” (“Naval therapy”) is described.

Production of and Supply of the Army with Small Arms on the Eve of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). A Brief Overview of the Russian Military Industry

In the wake of the Crimean War, the upper military circles in Russia changed their thinking with regard to firearms. General Milyutin became Minister of War. It was the time when Alexander II reigned over Russia. In 1856, the calibre of Russian firearms was reduced to 6 inches, or 15.24 mm. The process of re-equipping the Russian army with M1856 rifles using expanding Minié bullets was launched. These rifles demonstrated that the percussion systems had reached the limit of their capacity for improvement. Nothing else could be improved in terms of their firing speed. Despite the resistance of the conservative military circles, Milyutin encouraged new inventions, and the 1860s became a period of experimentation with firearms. Some new cartridge systems were introduced. The high-quality M1856 percussion rifle was not destined to take part in war times, but the Russian army had been fully equipped with it for a short period of time. Almost all systems of the 1860s were based on this rifle. Over 10 systems of firearms with an internal needle fuse were proposed to the weapons commission. In 1866, the Englishman Karle proposed his own system with an internal needle fuse. Krnka, Berdan I, and Berdan II came next. After 1866, the Terry-Norman, Karle, and Krnka rifles entered the Russian army. These systems were developed on the basis of the 6-line M1856/58 rifle. The latter was converted into a rear-loading rifle. In 1869, the Krnka rifle was chosen as the main system, which became the main weapon of the Russian army in the following years. At the beginning of 1877, there were 613,297 Krnka rifles, 150,868 Karle rifles, 17,810 Berdan I and 325,254 Berdan II rifles in the Russian army.

Three Publications about Archaeology of a Segment of the First World War's Forgotten Eastern Front

While the horrors of the trench warfare on the Western Front in Belgium and France are part of the European cultural memory, to some degree the much more extensive and mobile Eastern Front of the 1914–1918 conflict has become the forgotten front (Die vergessene Front). Although for just over eleven months in 1914/15, the central part of a major front, some 1000 km long on which three million people died ran through the middle of what is now Poland, for a number of reasons the memory of this has there been all but erased from memory and from the cultural landscape. The reviewed three volumes are the result of a project that has attempted to address the poor state of historical memory of the momentous events and human drama that took place a century earlier on the segment of the front, 55 km west of Warsaw. Here, from mid-December 1914, the Russian Imperial army tried to hold back the eastward advance of the German troops on defences built along the Bzura and Rawka rivers. For the next seven months, the fighting here took the form of the same type of prolonged static trench warfare more familiar on the Western Front (the only place in the eastern sphere of war that this happened). The German army made every effort (including mining and several major gas attacks), to advance on Warsaw but failed to break through. It was only after the Great Retreat of the Russian army in the summer of 1915 that these defences were overrun and Warsaw fell.

Swedish baron G.M. Sprengtporten in Russian service, 1786-1809

General of the Infantry Count G.M. Sprengtporten (1740-1819) is one of the less known historical figures of the last quarter of the 18th and of the early 19th century. As a Swedish citizen, he hatched plans to turn Finland into an independent state. In the mid-1780s he saw in Catherine II a potential ally who could implement his ideas. After accepting the invitation to enter Russian service, Sprengtporten did not blend either in the Highest Court or in the Russian army. Not having shown any significant military feats during the wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, he distinguished himself in the diplomatic and lawmaking field. An important event was his mission to Europe (1800-1801), which resulted in the return of more than six thousand Russian prisoners to Russia. The draft Regulations on the Establishment of the Main Administration in New Finland, developed by Sprengtporten with some changes made by Emperor Aleksander I, became the cornerstone of Finnish autonomy within the Russian Empire over the next century. Occupying for a short time the post of Governor General, he became a link between Finland and Russia. The scientific novelty of the article lies in the comprehensive presentation of the Russian service of G.M. Sprengtporten. The article is written on the basis of published sources and unpublished documents from some central archives, which are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

Singer of the Trans-Baikal Cossacks: F. F. Tyutchev in the Russian-Japanese War

Russian Army and Border guard Colonel Fyodor Fyodorovich Tyutchev (1860–1916), a well – known chronicler of the Russian army and the border guard, served in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.The purpose of the publication is a comprehensive description of the stay in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904– 1905. The work used sources that had not been previously introduced into scientific circulation, which allowed analyzing the formation of F. F. Tyutchev as a military professional, as well as concretizing the literary and aesthetic concept of the writer. Russian-Japanese War correspondent F. F. Tyutchev, being a correspondent of the newspaper Novoe Vremya, promptly transmitted “hot” information about the affairs of the Russian army to the editorial office. The writer collecting material for future literary works talked with the participants of the Japanese campaign, valuing the opportunity to have conversations not only with the lower ranks who were on the front line but also with the generals whose decisions the outcome of hostilities sometimes depended on. According to the works by Fyodor Fedorovich, we can judge not only the events that took place in the Far East but also analyze the writer’s civil and author’s position, investigate his philosophical beliefs on what is happening, clarify his thoughts, compare the assessments given to him from what he saw and experienced in the war. The presented article develops scientific ideas and traditions in the field of national historiography, generalizing and analyzing individual, previously unknown materials about the Russian-Japanese war and its participants. F. F. Tyutchev, being on the staff of the 1st Argun regiment not only participated in the fighting but also proved himself as a talented artist of the word, conveying the truth of the Japanese campaign in his writings, creating a portrait gallery of the personnel of the regiments of the Trans-Baikal Cossack army.

RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION OF ORTHODOX RUSSIAN SOLDIERSIN THE LATE XIX - EARLY XX CENTURIES

One of the consequences of the Great Reforms of Alexander II was the radical transformation of the Russian Imperial Army. At the same time, the development of social thought in Russia created the conditions for the penetration of social democratic propaganda into the soldier’s environment. As a result, the moral and psychological state of soldiers and discipline in the Russian army began to decline steadily at the turn of the century. Understanding of this problem stimulated the military department to make significant efforts aimed at working with personnel. However, due to a number of reasons, the planned results were not fully achieved.

The Moscow hospital in the first half of the XVIII century: the beginning of the glorious path

The article highlights the formation of the Moscow Hospital, founded by the Decree of Peter I in 1706 in Lefortovo, and its activities in the first half of the XVIII century as a clinical institution, where from the first days the treatment of patients took place together with the training of the first Russian doctors – students of the Moscow Medical and Surgical School. The article tells about the first chief doctor and director of the Hospital School — Nikolai Bidloo — the author of the national “Instructio de chirurgia in theatro anatomico”, and his followers who devoted their lives to preserving the health of the Russian army.

The russian army in siberia in the 30–50 years of the XVIII century

The reforms of Peter I became the basis for the gradual restructuring of all the military forces of Siberia. The main role in the Russian military cavalry of the Peter's era was played by dragoons. Under Peter I, dragoon regiments were the only type of Russian regular cavalry. In the field army, Peter I ordered the formation of 34 dragoon regiments. In addition, garrison dragoon regiments were formed in the province in the strategically important cities of Azov, Astrakhan, Kazan, and Tobolsk. In the 3050s of the XVIII century, the number of field dragoon regiments of the Russian Empire decreased to 20. In 1744, 3 field dragoon regiments Olonetsky, Vologda and Lutsk, and 2 field infantry regiments Shirvan and Nasheburg were sent to Siberia to protect the region from the Dzungars. By the decree of the Senate of September 29, 1744, all the Russian troops of Siberia were subordinated to the chief commander of the Siberian Corps, who was subordinate to the Military College. Major-General Christian Kinderman was appointed the main commander in Siberia. In March 1756, the Russian army consisted of 3 cuirassiers, 29 dragoons, and 46 infantry regiments, totaling 78 army regiments, with 172,440 men. As a result, during the Seven Years ' War, the number of field dragoon units in Russia decreased by 3 times and by 1763 was only 7 regiments. As a result, if in 1754 the dragoons were 36,627 people (92.6 %), then by 1767 there were only 4,802 people (12.8%) from the Russian cavalry in their ranks.