A Study on the Revitalization of the Private Marine Rescue : Focusing on the Role of the Korea Coast Guard

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 67-89
Author(s):  
Byung-Doo Yun ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
Amy Debora

As Jakarta is working to resolve the South China Sea (SCS) territorial dispute through its role as an honest broker, Beijing seems to lead the SCS conflict right into the foremost defense of the Republic of Indonesia. This is indicated by the China Coast Guard (CCG) aggressive actions in guarding illegal fishing in Natuna Sea. The conflict escalation raises the question of whether Natuna will enter into the SCS territorial dispute. However, these concerns did not occur due to the appropriate response of Jakarta in maintaining the stability of the region without undermining its defense of its territorial sovereignty. Significantly strengthening the defense in Natuna does not create a security dilemma for ASEAN member countries as it is done in conjunction with the border diplomacy effort. This shows the success of border diplomacy as indirect deterrence against China. This paper will be divided into 4 sections, first the author will give an overview of the SCS conflict and the threats to maritime security in Natuna. Next will be described the concept of ‘middlepowermanship’ according to Cooper, Higgot and Nossal who states that the middle power is reflected from the characteristics of foreign policy. This paper finds that the response reflects the Indonesia’s consistency as a middle power. Proved by Indonesia’s niche diplomacy under Jokowi administration, as well as the role of Jakarta as coalition builder for ASEAN.


Polar Record ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (194) ◽  
pp. 207-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geir Hønneland

AbstractThis article demonstrates that, similar to the many cases of self-regulation of local commons, it is in certain conditions also possible to manage an international ocean-fishery without the use of direct coercion. The case study from the Svalbard Zone supports the argument of cooperative action theory: that a limited number of participants, rules at least partly designed by the users themselves, and a system of graduated punishment contribute to compliance with established rules. Based on observational data as well as in-depth interviews with Norwegian and Russian fishermen in the area, it seems particularly fruitful to conceive of the Norwegian Coast Guard not only as a state enforcement body in the Svalbard Zone, but its representatives also as constituent parts of a social system, a ‘seafaring community,’ in the area. When, due to jurisdictional dispute, it has been impossible to rely fully on external regulation in the area, the Coast Guard has taken upon itself the role of the mediator, admittedly representing state interests, but nevertheless aimed at achieving consensus with the fishing fleet on important regulation issues. Hence, the internal authority of this Arctic Ocean fisheries lies above all in the interface between fishermen's and inspector's arguments, and in the social relations accompanying the exchange of professional opinions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Anthony Lloyd ◽  
Gary Ott ◽  
Ann Hayward Walker

ABSTRACT Today, 24/7 news and social media herald, “Another Disaster!” The gap widens between public expectations – what is wanted – and what government emergency responders can deliver. Further, public trust in government evaporates when individual stakeholders fan anger, fear and frustration, through social media blogs and other media. The authors analyze current U.S. policy guidance, IOSC papers, after-action reports, and practitioner experience to identify gaps where stronger guidance, connectivity, and effort could improve emergency response and preparedness. US efforts will be contrasted with international standards published and implemented in Europe. US Coast Guard incident management doctrine now requires engagement and coordination with the broad range of community and leadership stakeholders. Meeting the concerns of that broader set of stakeholders requires: 1) a significant commitment of resources by industry and government to address the needs of stakeholders, and 2) the development of skills in crisis responders, and their leaders, that can assure the confidence (trust) of their community. The authors' recommendations focus on improving shared responsibilities for successful collaboration in the following general areas: 1) the role of government, policy and regulation, to insure proper early actions during large incidents and spills of national significance; 2) the roles of leaders, their preparedness and capabilities to manage the incident in the role of the Incident Commander; 3) plans needed to meet information management demands of large complex organizations stood up during a catastrophic incident; and 4) the development of collaborative and coordination approaches to meet the needs of stakeholders both inside and outside of the response organization.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-173
Author(s):  
Michael R. Moore ◽  
Thomas C. Miller ◽  
George L. Boone ◽  
Rendall B. Farley

ABSTRACT Salvage operations must be conducted with the utmost concern for the safety of personnel, as well as protection of the marine environment, and property. Due to the highly dynamic circumstances involved in salvage operations, there is no standard or foolproof method for responding to a casualty. Therefore, contingency planning and pre-established relationships with industry become indispensable to ensure that informed decision making, maximum responder cooperation and optimum asset coordination. Inherent in contingency planning is having an understanding that the role of the Captain of the Port (COTP) / Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) during a salvage response is multifaceted. While the COTP/FOSC has federal responsibilities to protect people, property, and the environment, it is achieved only through close coordination of multiple responding agencies, the response/salvage community and their resources. This successful coordination is greatly facilitated through an understanding of FOSC roles and proper use of the Incident Command/Unified Command (ICS/UC) System. This paper also describes the assets and authorities available to the COTP/FOSC during a salvage response, the triggers and overriding issues that would initiate full or partial federalization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-87
Author(s):  
Kazuhide Watanabe ◽  
Hajime Yoshida

1977 ◽  
Vol 1977 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
Frederick P. Schubert

ABSTRACT This paper describes the genesis, composition, and functions of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and the expanding role of this United Nations specialized agency in protection of the marine environment. Focusing on the work of IMCO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) established in the wake of the 1973 Marine Pollution Conference, the paper gives evidence of the universal concern for the oceans in the nature and scope of the family of international conventions developed under the auspices of IMCO. Also discussed is the extent to which U.S. regulations on prevention, control of, and response to marine pollution are looked at as models for international standards and, conversely, how IMCO-related activities bear upon U.S. regulations in this field. As the primary U.S. maritime regulatory and enforcement agency, the Coast Guard plays a leading role in IMCO affairs, particularly those concerned with the prevention of marine pollution. Its role in providing assistance to other IMCO member nations also is described, as are methods for mutual sharing of the latest techniques and methodologies for the prevention, control of, and response to pollution incidents.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Albertson

ABSTRACT When the oil tanker Prestige broke apart and sank off the coast of Spain in November 2002, it joined an infamous line of environmental catastrophes in maritime history. The way in which the Prestige incident unfolded and, in particular, the denial of a place of refuge for the tanker intensified existing pressures on the IMO to finalize and adopt guidelines intended to assist all concerned parties in dealing with similar circumstances. At the 23rd Assembly, the IMO answered by adopting two resolutions on the issue. These resolutions offer excellent planning, preparedness, and response guidelines and a framework for effectively dealing with the next Prestige. The IMO guidelines are compatible with the U.S. National Response System and existing laws designed to protect the environment, public health, and welfare. As such, their implementation requires neither regulation nor significant adjustments to U.S. policy. With few exceptions, the National Response System should assimilate the IMO guidelines. Specifically, Area Committees and Harbor Safety Committees should plow the IMO guidelines into current planning, preparedness, and response activities in order to ensure effective response to places of refuge scenarios. The most critical and urgent issue is to ensure the decisionmaking criteria and process for both allowing and taking a ship in need of assistance to a place of refuge is well developed, agreed upon, and exercised beforehand, so that when the real thing occurs those who need to make the decision know exactly what to do and who to contact. This paper discusses relevant aspects of the National Response System and authorities as they pertain to the IMO guidelines and the role of the U.S. Coast Guard as the federal agency charged with their implementation.


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