Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Michael Wallner
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Contemporary Debate

Abstract Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.

scholarly journals Cartography of the Phenomenon and the Phenomenon as Cartography

Phainomenon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-232
Author(s):  
Guilherme Riscali
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Attitude ◽  
The World ◽  
A Share

Abstract This paper discusses Gilbert Ryle’s image of philosophy as cartography in an attempt to explore the idea of a cartography of the phenomenon, confronting it with the sense it takes in Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Ryle tries to grasp the particularity of philosophical tasks as being about specific sorts of problems, not about specific sorts of objects. What is required both of a cartographer and of a philosopher is, according to him, to look at familiar spaces in wholly unusual terms. Husserlian phenomenology then, with its rediscovery of consciousness as an absolute, unbounded field, meets quite well this demand. The uncovered field of the phenomena is not a new region, opposing that of the objects as faced in the natural attitude. It is rather a completely different attitude, just as a map is not a share of the world, but a distinct orientation towards it. The phenomenon, therefore, would not be something that is there to be cartographed as much as a kind of cartography itself. A phenomenological cartography, however, is one that has its specific marks, different from those of the Rylean conception.

The Structure, Basic Contents and Dynamics of the Unconscious in Analytical (Jungian) Psychology and Husserlian Phenomenology: Part I1

1997 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-170
Author(s):  
Burt C. Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Jungian Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Factors ◽  
Collective Unconscious ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Marked Contrast ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Descriptive Account

AbstractThis paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious.

scholarly journals From the Husserlian Transcendental Idealism to the Question on Being

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98
Author(s):  
Anna Varga-Jani
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Edith Stein ◽  
Remarkable Similarity ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

Well known is the fact that Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy I, published in 1913, made a strong disappointment in the phenomenological circle around Husserl, and started a reinterpretation of the husserlian phenomenology. The problem of the constitution was a real dilemma for the studentship of Munich — Göttingen. More of Husserl’s students from his Göttingen years reflected in the 1930th on the transcendental idealism, which they originated from the Ideas and found fulfilled in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and Formal and transzendental Logic. The remarkable similarity between these papers is the questioning on being incorporated in the problematic of the method in the husserlian phenomenology. But this parallelism in the problem reveals the origin of the religious phenomenon in the husserlian phenomenology as well. Adolf Reinach’s religious terms as gratitude (Dankbarkeit), charity (Barmherzigkeit), etc. in his religious Notes, Heidegger’s notion of being as finiteness in Being and Time, Edith Stein’s concept about the finite and eternal being in Finite and Eternal Being are originating in the problem of constitution in the transcendental phenomenology on the one hand, but these phenomenon point at the constitution theologically. In my paper I would like to show the relationship between the critique on the husserlian transcendental idealism and the roots of the experience of religious life by the phenomenological problem of being especially at Edith Stein.

scholarly journals THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM(S) IN DESCARTES’ “MEDITATIONS” AND HUSSERL’S “CRISIS” (Part 2)

2020 ◽  
Vol - (5) ◽  
pp. 117-128
Author(s):  
Andrii Leonov
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Other ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Magnum Opus ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

The main topic of this paper is the mind-body problem. The author analyzes it in the context of Husserlian phenomenology. The key texts for the analysis and interpretation are Descartes’ magnum opus “Meditations on the First Philosophy” and Husserl’ last work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”. The author claims that already in Descartes’ text instead of one mind-body problem, one can find two: the ontological mind-body problem (mind-brain relation) and conceptual one (“mind” and “body” as concepts). In Descartes’ “Meditations”, the ontological level is explicit, while the conceptual level is implicit. In Husserl’s “Crisis”, on the other hand, the situation is different: the conceptual level of the problem (as the opposition between transcendental phenomenology and natural sciences) is explicit, while the ontological level is implicit. Nevertheless, it seems that Husserl has answers to both the “traditional” as well as the “conceptual” mind-body problems.

The Scope of Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Transformation in 1919 and Some Caveats Regarding His Interpretation of Husserl

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 194-205
Author(s):  
Jesús A. Escudero ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Development Process ◽  
Hermeneutic Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Complex Development

The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a commonplace in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection and transcendental phenomenology. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. Based on the complex development process of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology in the course of his early lectures in Freiburg, the present paper weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind.

scholarly journals To the question of evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology: the given­ness and the horizon

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-81
Author(s):  
Mikhail A. Belousov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Subsequent Transformation ◽  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Logical Investigations ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
Theory Of Evidence

The article deals with the initial context of introduction and subsequent transformation of the concept of evidence in Husserlian phenomenology. It shows that the initial context is composed of the basic differences drawn in the theory of meaning of Logical Investi­gations. These differences include the difference between experience, meaning and object as well as the correlative differences between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, on the one hand, and meaning and fulfilling sense, on the other. The proposed analysis of these distinctions allows the author to explicate the two main interpretations of the notion of evidence: the strict and the lax meaning. The second section reveals the distinction be­tween the horizon and the givenness. This distinction plays a key role in the treatment of evidence in transcendental phenomenology as a mere result of a methodical interpretation of the differences drawn in the theory of meaning and the theory of evidence in Logical Investigations. It is demonstrated that these differences imply key methodical intuitions of Husserlian phenomenology. In conclusion, the naïve origins of the principle of evi­dence in phenomenology are thematized.

Levinas's faithfulness to Husserl, phenomenology, and God

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-303
Author(s):  
THOMAS FINEGAN
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
Theological Turn ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe contemporary debate in phenomenology concerning the ‘theological turn’ raises the issue of the relationship between faith and reason. One of the foremost statements on the theological turn, that of Dominique Janicaud, is an affirmation of the faith–reason dichotomy in the context of phenomenology, specifically in relation to how thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas have abused the phenomenological project of its founder, Edmund Husserl. This article challenges the faith–reason dichotomy and shows that the role of faith in Levinas need not mark him out as a deviant from Husserlian phenomenology.

The structure, Basic Contents, and Dynamics of the Unconscious in Analytical (Jungian) Psychology and Husserlian Phenomenology: Part Ii

1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-49
Author(s):  
Burt C. Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Jungian Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Factors ◽  
Collective Unconscious ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Marked Contrast ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Descriptive Account ◽  
Previous Volume

AbstractThis paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and a phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion was published in the previous volume of this journal as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion is published here as Part II. Part I first clarified the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification it showed that, in marked contrast to the prevailing approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concluded with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II shows how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, i. e., the so-called "collective unconscious," can be phenomenologically accounted for if: (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and; (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious.

Time and subjectivity in husserlian phenomenology

PARADIGMI ◽  
2014 ◽  
pp. 117-133
Author(s):  
Nicola Zippel
Keyword(s):  
Husserlian Phenomenology

Thomas Reid on Causation and Scientific Explanation

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Barrantes ◽  
Juan M. Durán
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
The Common

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.

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