Learning McNamara's Lessons: How the War Powers Resolution Advances the Rule of Law
This essay considers Robert S. McNamara’s 1995 memoir In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. First, it explores McNamara’s Lessons to understand the dangers of military policy making conducted without genuine input from Congress. Further, it argues that the pathologies of Vietnam War decision making are not likely to be unique—that is, the realities of executive branch organization and its decision-making processes are likely to re-create those pathologies when Congress is only tenuously involved in resolving the most basic policy questions regarding any substantial military engagement. The essay asserts that the values of sound military decision-making are well served by preserving a state of ambiguity as to the allocation of military decision-making authority in all by the easiest cases. To the extent, the War Powers Resolution has helped Congress to exploit this ambiguity in leveraging its own military policy making role, it has performed a useful function.