scholarly journals Changes of mind and absolute evidence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Turner ◽  
Daniel Feuerriegel ◽  
Milan Andrejevic ◽  
Robert Hester ◽  
Stefan Bode
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Initial Response ◽  
Luminance Ratio ◽  
Noise Sources ◽  
Initial Decision ◽  
Luminance Difference ◽  
The World ◽  
Sensory Evidence

To navigate the world safely, we often need to rapidly ‘change our mind’ about decisions. Current models assume that initial decisions and change-of-mind decisions draw upon common sources of sensory evidence. In two-choice scenarios, this evidence may be ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’. For example, when judging which of two objects is the brightest, the luminance difference and luminance ratio between the two objects are sources of ‘relative’ evidence, which are invariant across additive and multiplicative luminance changes. Conversely, the overall luminance of the two objects combined is a source of ‘absolute’ evidence, which necessarily varies across symmetric luminance manipulations. Previous studies have shown that initial decisions are sensitive to both relative and absolute evidence; however, it is unknown whether change-of-mind decisions are sensitive to absolute evidence. Here, we investigated this question across two experiments. In each experiment participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli remained on screen for a brief period and participants could change their response. To investigate the effect of absolute evidence, the overall luminance of the two squares was varied whilst either the luminance difference (Experiment 1) or luminance ratio (Experiment 2) was held constant. In both experiments we found that increases in absolute evidence led to faster, less accurate initial responses and slower changes of mind. Change-of-mind accuracy decreased when the luminance difference was held constant, but remained unchanged when the luminance ratio was fixed. The initial response effects could be explained by the presence of input-dependent noise within the decision process, varying either within or across trials. However, the change-of-mind effects could not be captured by existing models, nor by two modified models which included input-dependent noise sources. This suggests that that the continued integration of sensory evidence following an initial decision operates differently to that described in existing theoretical accounts.

scholarly journals Development of a Shipment Policy for Collection Centers

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1385
Author(s):  
Irais Mora-Ochomogo ◽  
Marco Serrato ◽  
Jaime Mora-Vargas ◽  
Raha Akhavan-Tabatabaei
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Markov Decision Process ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Humanitarian Organizations ◽  
The World ◽  
Markov Decision ◽  
Unsatisfied Demand

Natural disasters represent a latent threat for every country in the world. Due to climate change and other factors, statistics show that they continue to be on the rise. This situation presents a challenge for the communities and the humanitarian organizations to be better prepared and react faster to natural disasters. In some countries, in-kind donations represent a high percentage of the supply for the operations, which presents additional challenges. This research proposes a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model to resemble operations in collection centers, where in-kind donations are received, sorted, packed, and sent to the affected areas. The decision addressed is when to send a shipment considering the uncertainty of the donations’ supply and the demand, as well as the logistics costs and the penalty of unsatisfied demand. As a result of the MDP a Monotone Optimal Non-Decreasing Policy (MONDP) is proposed, which provides valuable insights for decision-makers within this field. Moreover, the necessary conditions to prove the existence of such MONDP are presented.

scholarly journals A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Austan D. Goolsbee ◽  
Alan B. Krueger
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
General Motors ◽  
Difficult Decision ◽  
Industrial Companies ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Look Back ◽  
The World ◽  
Us Government

The rescue of the US automobile industry amid the 2008–2009 recession and financial crisis was a consequential, controversial, and difficult decision made at a fraught moment for the US economy. Both of us were involved in the decision process at the time, but since have moved back to academia. More than five years have passed since the bailout began, and it is timely to look back at this unusual episode of economic policymaking to consider what we got right, what we got wrong, and why. In this article, we describe the events that brought two of the largest industrial companies in the world to seek a bailout from the US government, the analysis that was used to evaluate the decision (including what the alternatives were and whether a rescue would even work), the steps that were taken to rescue and restructure General Motors and Chrysler, and the performance of the US auto industry since the bailout. We close with general lessons to be learned from the episode.

Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-56
Author(s):  
Michael Bergmann
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Sensory Experience ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Hypothesis ◽  
The World ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Priori Knowledge

This chapter examines multiple kinds of deductive and nondeductive anti-skeptical arguments from our sensory experience to the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs based on that evidence and finds them all wanting. In the first two sections, it briefly considers deductive anti-skeptical arguments (of the theological and transcendental variety), inductive anti-skeptical arguments from past correlations of sensory experience with true perceptual beliefs based on it, and anti-skeptical arguments based on a priori knowledge of probabilistic principles saying that our sensory evidence for our perceptual beliefs makes probable the truth of those beliefs. In the final three sections, the focus turns to abductive or inference to the best explanation (IBE) arguments, which are currently the most popular anti-skeptical arguments. IBE anti-skeptical arguments conclude that our sensory experience, or some feature of it, is best explained by the truth of our perceptual beliefs. These three sections argue that we lack good reasons for thinking that our sensory experience is better explained by a Standard Hypothesis (saying that the world is approximately as it seems) than by a skeptical hypothesis, such as the hypothesis that a deceptive demon wants to mislead us into falsely believing the world is as it seems.

A Comparative Approach to Administrative Adjudication

2020 ◽  
pp. 576-594
Author(s):  
Michael Asimow
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Entire System ◽  
Front Line ◽  
Initial Decision ◽  
The World ◽  
Administrative Adjudication

This chapter concerns administrative adjudication. The term ‘administrative adjudication’ means the entire system for individualized agency decision-making arising out of disputes between private parties and government agencies. The adjudicatory process begins with an administrative investigation of a claim or a violation and the agency’s preliminary or ‘front line’ determination, continuing through the process of an agency’s initial decision, reconsideration of that decision, and concluding with judicial review. The systems in place for resolving such disputes differ sharply around the world and are difficult to compare. This chapter highlights five models in use by various countries that should facilitate such comparisons.

scholarly journals The dynamics of decision-making and action during active sampling

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Duygu Ozbagci ◽  
Ruben Moreno-Bote ◽  
Salvador Soto-Faraco
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Object Image ◽  
Active Sampling ◽  
Relevant Model ◽  
Initial Decision ◽  
Sample Information ◽  
Information Sampling ◽  
Image Blur

AbstractEmbodied Cognition Theories (ECTs) of decision-making propose that the decision process pervades the execution of choice actions and manifests itself in these actions. Decision-making scenarios where actions not only express the choice but also help sample information can provide a valuable, ecologically relevant model for this framework. We present a study to address this paradigmatic situation in humans. Subjects categorized (2AFC task) a central object image, blurred to different extents, by moving a cursor toward the left or right of the display. Upward cursor movements reduced the image blur and could be used to sample information. Thus, actions for decision and actions for sampling were orthogonal to each other. We analyzed response trajectories to test whether information-sampling movements co-occurred with the ongoing decision process. Trajectories were bimodally distributed, with one kind being direct towards one response option (non-sampling), and the other kind containing an initial upward component before veering off towards an option (sampling). This implies that there was an initial decision at the early stage of a trial, whether to sample information or not. Importantly, in sampling trials trajectories were not purely upward, but rather had a significant horizontal deviation early on. This result suggests that movements to sample information exhibit an online interaction with the decision process, therefore supporting the prediction of the ECTs under ecologically relevant constrains.

scholarly journals Changes-of-mind in the absence of new post-decision evidence

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadim A. A. Atiya ◽  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
Martin Schoemann ◽  
Stefan Scherbaum ◽  
Denis O’Hora ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Discrimination Task ◽  
Neural Circuit ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Neural Population ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Decision Uncertainty ◽  
Motion Discrimination ◽  
Initial Decision ◽  
Sensory Evidence

AbstractDecisions are occasionally accompanied by changes-of-mind. While considered a hallmark of cognitive flexibility, the mechanisms underlying changes-of-mind remain elusive. Previous studies on perceptual decision making have focused on changes-of-mind that are primarily driven by the accumulation of additional noisy sensory evidence after the initial decision. In a motion discrimination task, we demonstrate that changes-of-mind can occur even in the absence of additional evidence after the initial decision. Unlike previous studies of changes-of-mind, the majority of changes-of-mind in our experiment occurred in trials with prolonged initial response times. This suggests a distinct mechanism underlying such changes. Using a neural circuit model of decision uncertainty and change-of-mind behaviour, we demonstrate that this phenomenon is associated with top-down signals mediated by an uncertainty-monitoring neural population. Such a mechanism is consistent with recent neurophysiological evidence showing a link between changes-of-mind and elevated top-down neural activity. Our model explains the long response times associated with changes-of-mind through high decision uncertainty levels in such trials, and accounts for the observed motor response trajectories. Overall, our work provides a computational framework that explains changes-of-mind in the absence of new post-decision evidence.Authors SummaryWe used limited availability of sensory evidence during a standard motion discrimination task, and demonstrated that changes-of-mind could occur long after sensory information was no longer available. Unlike previous studies, our experiment further indicated that changes-of-mind were strongly linked to slow response time. We used a reduced version of a previously developed neural computational model of decision uncertainty and change-of-mind to account for these experimental observations. Importantly, our model showed that the replication of these experimental results required a strong link between change-of-mind and high decision uncertainty (i.e. low decision confidence), supporting the notion that change-of-mind are related to decision uncertainty or confidence.

scholarly journals The caudate nucleus controls coordinated patterns of adaptive, context-dependent adjustments to complex decisions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takahiro Doi ◽  
Yunshu Fan ◽  
Joshua I. Gold ◽  
Long Ding
Keyword(s):  
Basal Ganglia ◽  
Caudate Nucleus ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Visual Motion ◽  
Electrical Microstimulation ◽  
Visual Evidence ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Reward Information ◽  
Adaptive Decision Making ◽  
The Brain

AbstractOur decisions often need to balance what we observe and what we desire. However, our understanding of how and where in the brain such decisions are made remains limited. A prime candidate for integrating sensory observations and desired rewards, and a focus of many modeling studies, is the basal ganglia pathway, which is known to make separate contributions to perceptual decisions that require the interpretation of uncertain sensory evidence and value-based decisions that select among outcome options 1-16. Here we report direct evidence for a causal role for a major input station of the basal ganglia, the caudate nucleus, in incorporating reward context and uncertain visual evidence to guide adaptive decision-making. In monkeys making saccadic decisions based on visual motion evidence and asymmetric reward-choice associations 17, single caudate neurons encoded information about both the visual evidence and the asymmetric rewards. Electrical microstimulation at caudate sites with task-modulated activity during motion viewing affected how the visual and reward information was used to form the decision. The microstimulation effects included coordinated changes in multiple computational components of the decision process, mimicking the monkeys’ voluntary adjustments in response to the asymmetric reward contexts. These results imply that the caudate nucleus plays key roles in coordinating the deliberative decision process that balances external evidence and internal preferences to guide adaptive behavior.

scholarly journals The dynamics of decision making and action during active sampling

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duygu Ozbagci ◽  
Ruben Moreno-Bote ◽  
Salvador Soto-Faraco
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Decision Processes ◽  
Object Image ◽  
Active Sampling ◽  
Trajectory Data ◽  
Initial Decision ◽  
Sample Information ◽  
Information Sampling ◽  
Image Blur

AbstractEmbodied Cognition Theories (ECTs) propose that the decision process continues to unfold during the execution of choice actions, and its outcome manifests itself in these actions. Scenarios where actions not only express choice but also help sample information can provide a valuable test of this framework. Remarkably almost no studies so far have addressed this scenario. Here, we present a study testing just this paradigmatic situation with humans. On each trial, subjects categorized a central object image, blurred to different extents (2AFC task) by moving a cursor toward the left or right of the display. Upward cursor movements, orthogonal with respect to choice options, reduced the image blur and could be freely used to actively sample information. Thus, actions for decision and actions for sampling were made orthogonal to each other. We analyzed response trajectories to test a central prediction of ECTs; whether information-sampling movements co-occurred with the ongoing decision process. Trajectory data revealed were bimodally distributed, with one kind being direct towards one response option (non-sampling trials), and the other kind containing an initial upward component before veering off towards an option (sampling trials). This implies that there was an initial decision at the early stage of a trial whether to sample information or not. Importantly, the trajectories in sampling trials were not purely upward, but rather had a significant horizontal deviation that was visible early on in the movement. This result suggests that movements to sample information exhibit an online interaction with the decision process. The finding that decision processes interact with actions to sample information supports the ECT under novel, ecologically relevant constrains.

scholarly journals Acquisition of visual priors and induced hallucinations in chronic schizophrenia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Valton ◽  
Povilas Karvelis ◽  
Katie L. Richards ◽  
Aaron R. Seitz ◽  
Stephen M. Lawrie ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Learning ◽  
Antipsychotic Medication ◽  
Chronic Schizophrenia ◽  
Learning Task ◽  
Detection Task ◽  
Estimation Task ◽  
Learning Deficits ◽  
The World ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
Perceptual Threshold

AbstractProminent theories suggest that symptoms of schizophrenia stem from learning deficiencies resulting in distorted internal models of the world. To further test these theories, we here use a visual statistical learning task known to induce rapid implicit learning of the stimulus statistics (Chalk et al., 2010). In this task, participants are presented with a field of coherently moving dots and need to report the presented direction of the dots (estimation task) and whether they saw any dots or not (detection task). Two of the directions were more frequently presented than the others. In controls, the implicit acquisition of the stimuli statistics influences their perception in two ways: 1-motion directions are perceived as being more similar to the most frequently presented directions than they really are (estimation biases); 2-in the absence of stimuli, participants sometimes report perceiving the most frequently presented directions (a form of hallucinations). Such behaviour is consistent with probabilistic inference, i.e. combining learnt perceptual priors with sensory evidence. We investigated whether patients with chronic, stable, treated schizophrenia (n=20) differ from controls (n=23) in the acquisition of the perceptual priors and/or their influence on perception. We found that, although patients were slower than controls, they showed comparable acquisition of perceptual priors, correctly approximating the stimulus statistics. This suggests that patients have no statistical learning deficits in our task. This may reflect our patients relative wellbeing on antipsychotic medication. Intriguingly, however, patients made significantly fewer hallucinations of the most frequently presented directions than controls and fewer prior-based lapse estimations. This suggests that prior expectations had less influence on patients’ perception than on controls when stimuli were absent or below perceptual threshold.

scholarly journals Peak-at-end rule: adaptive mechanism predicts time-dependent decision weighting

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryuto Yashiro ◽  
Isamu Motoyoshi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Process ◽  
Temporal Dynamics ◽  
Temporal Integration ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Adaptive Mechanism ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Estimation Task ◽  
Leaky Integrator ◽  
Sensory Evidence ◽  
The Brain

Abstract Humans make decisions under various natural circumstances, integrating multiple pieces of information that are distributed over space and time. Although psychophysical and physiological studies have investigated temporal dynamics underlying perceptual decision making, weighting profiles for inliers and outliers during temporal integration have yet to be fully investigated in most studies. Here, we examined the temporal weighting profile of a computational model characterized by a leaky integrator of sensory evidence. As a corollary of its leaky nature, the model predicts the recency effect and overweights outlying elements around the end of the stream. Moreover, we found that the model underweights outlying values occurring earlier in the stream (i.e., robust averaging). We also show that human observers exhibit exactly the same weighting profile in an average estimation task. These findings suggest that the adaptive decision process in the brain results in the time-dependent decision weighting, the “peak-at-end” rule, rather than the peak-end rule in behavioral economics.

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