scholarly journals Do Emotions Play an Essential Role in Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies forrationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophersargue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence ofan emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present reviewreveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidencethat emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger,sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judgingconduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recentstudies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence insupport of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus insteadon how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interactwith empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.

Behaviour ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 151 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 337-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melanie Killen ◽  
Michael T. Rizzo

Morality is at the core of what it means to be social. Moral judgments require the recognition of intentionality, that is, an attribution of the target’s intentions towards another. Most research on the origins of morality has focused on intragroup morality, which involves applying morality to individuals in one’s own group. Yet, increasingly, there has been new evidence that beginning early in development, children are able to apply moral concepts to members of an outgroup as well, and that this ability appears to be complex. The challenges associated with applying moral judgments to members of outgroups includes understanding group dynamics, the intentions of others who are different from the self, and having the capacity to challenge stereotypic expectations of others who are different from the ingroup. Research with children provides a window into the complexities of moral judgment and raises new questions, which are ripe for investigations into the evolutionary basis of morality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (8) ◽  
pp. 1308-1320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-Hui Li ◽  
Li-Lin Rao

The question of how we decide that someone else has done something wrong is at the heart of moral psychology. Little work has been done to investigate whether people believe that others’ moral judgment differs from their own in moral dilemmas. We conducted four experiments using various measures and diverse samples to demonstrate the self–other discrepancy in moral judgment. We found that (a) people were more deontological when they made moral judgments themselves than when they judged a stranger (Studies 1-4) and (b) a protected values (PVs) account outperformed an emotion account and a construal-level theory account in explaining this self–other discrepancy (Studies 3 and 4). We argued that the self–other discrepancy in moral judgment may serve as a protective mechanism co-evolving alongside the social exchange mechanism and may contribute to better understanding the obstacles preventing people from cooperation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Hubert ŁASZKIEWICZ

The paper discuss the regulatory principles which might be included into discussion on the controversy over the uses and misuses of contemporary history in Poland. The main proposals are as follow. We need greater methodological awareness that sources we are using whilst describing and interpreting the history are not refl ecting the whole past (which is simply impossible). While observing divergent versions of reconstructed past one should notice that the most divergent matt ers are connected with ethics. Three levels of ethics and moral judgments are listed: professional ethic of historian (is he a judge or observer), ethics/moral judgments of the past we investigate, moral judgment about the past. However tempting, metaphorical use of language should be limited at least at this stage of controversy, for there are not a commonly agreed set of metaphors, thus their use might only complicate the exchange of opinions.


Fabula ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 301-325
Author(s):  
Özen Nergis Dolcerocca

Abstract With few exceptions, narrative theory does not ordinarily consider the self-reflexive capacity of The Thousand and One Nights beyond its canonical instance of framing, and Arabic literary scholarship does not ordinarily engage with its narratological aspects. This article proposes a narratological approach for a systematic breakdown of story cycles through abstraction, partly by making use of computer programming language, in order to demonstrate the narrative typology in the Nights. It argues that repetitions, transpositions, substitutions, and reversals testify to tensions between the overt ideology of the text and the counter discourse that unsettles this logic, concealed in its poetics. The article thereby aims to bring some of the core concepts of narrative theory into dialogue with the Nights scholarship, and to contribute to a theoretical conversation about ideological critique in narrative analysis, particularly within the pre-modern storytelling tradition.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Hanno Sauer

The field of moral psychology has become increasingly popular in recent years. In this chapter, we focus on two interrelated questions. First, how do peoplemake moral judgments? We address this question by reviewing the most prominent theories in moral psychology that aim to characterize, explain and predict people’s moral judgments. Second, how should people’s moral judgments be evaluated in terms of their rationality? This question is approached by reviewing the debate on the rationality of moral judgments and moral intuitions, which has been strongly influenced by findings in moral psychology but also by recent advances in learning theory. To appear in: Knauff, M. & Spohn, W. (in press). The Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Sosa ◽  
Tomer David Ullman ◽  
Joshua Tenenbaum ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman ◽  
Tobias Gerstenberg

When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditionally, research in moral psychology has relied on vignette studies, in which a protagonist's actions and thoughts are explicitly communicated. While this research has revealed what variables are important for moral judgment, such as actions and intentions, it is limited in providing a more detailed understanding of exactly how these variables affect moral judgment. Using dynamic visual stimuli that allow for a more fine-grained experimental control, recent studies have proposed a direct mapping from visual features to moral judgments. We embrace the use of visual stimuli in moral psychology, but question the plausibility of a feature-based theory of moral judgment. We propose that the connection from visual features to moral judgments is mediated by an inference about what the observed action reveals about the agent's mental states, and what causal role the agent's action played in bringing about the outcome. We present a computational model that formalizes moral judgments of agents in visual scenes as computations over an intuitive theory of physics combined with an intuitive theory of mind. We test the model's quantitative predictions in three experiments across a wide variety of dynamic interactions between agent and patient.


2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
H. C. Klopper

The aim of this paper was to explore and describe a constructivist strategy for Health Science Educators. Changes in the higher education field in South Africa have impacted on the practice of health science educators. In the past, health science educators often envisaged their teaching task as  the transmission of content. This however no longer meets the needs of our practices.  In order to describe the strategy, the survey list of Dickoff, James and Wiedenbach (1968) was used to identify the core concepts. Each of the identified concepts was then described based on a literature review. The strategy advocates that health science  educators should shift from being lecturers to being learning facilitators based on the principles of constructivist learning, in order to create a context conducive to learning.


Author(s):  
Marcel Hénaff

This chapter looks at different approaches to the subject of reciprocity. Whereas many philosophers tend to understand reciprocity as a form of equivalence and a return to the self, many theorists in the social sciences—economists included—view it as a synonym of generosity or a figure of altruism. This divergence should lead one to recommend a dialogue between the two fields to avoid such misunderstandings. But above all, this invites one to recognize that the concept of reciprocity is not well defined and that there is a need to clarify its status, which is at the core of philosophical reflections on the relationships with Others, norms of morality, the social bond, and ultimately the gift itself. The chapter then considers what sociology and anthropology can say about the question, since it comes under the purview of those disciplines to investigate the nature of the relationships observed among members of social groups and attempt to define them. In particular, it assesses two authors whose analyses on this point have marked the debates of the past few decades: sociologist Alvin Gouldner, author of a seminal article on the norm of reciprocity; and anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, whose book of record Stone Age Economics dedicates an entire chapter to defining the nature of practices of reciprocity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertram F. Malle

Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments—evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 689-701 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius van Dijke ◽  
Gijs van Houwelingen ◽  
David De Cremer ◽  
Leander De Schutter

People morally evaluate norm violations that occur at various distances from the self (e.g., a corrupt politician vs. a cheating spouse). Yet, distance is rarely studied as a moderator of moral judgment processes. We focus on the influence of disgust on moral judgments, as evidence here has remained inconclusive. Based on feelings as information theory and the notion that disgust evolved as a pathogen avoidance mechanism, we argue that disgust influences moral judgment of psychologically distant (vs. near) norm violations. Studies 1 and 3 show that trait disgust sensitivity (but not trait anger and fear) more strongly predicts moral judgment of distant than near violations. Studies 2 and 4 show that incidental disgust affects moral judgment of distant (vs. near) violations and that the moderating role of distance is mediated by involvement of others (vs. the self) in the evaluator’s conceptualization of the violation.


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