Do Emotions Play an Essential Role in Moral Judgments?
The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies forrationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophersargue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence ofan emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present reviewreveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidencethat emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger,sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judgingconduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recentstudies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence insupport of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus insteadon how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interactwith empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.