scholarly journals HISTORIA NAJNOWSZA - POMIĘDZY PEWNOŚCIĄ A ZWĄTPIENIEM?

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 87-96
Author(s):  
Hubert ŁASZKIEWICZ
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Professional Ethic ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Contemporary History ◽  
The Past

The paper discuss the regulatory principles which might be included into discussion on the controversy over the uses and misuses of contemporary history in Poland. The main proposals are as follow. We need greater methodological awareness that sources we are using whilst describing and interpreting the history are not refl ecting the whole past (which is simply impossible). While observing divergent versions of reconstructed past one should notice that the most divergent matt ers are connected with ethics. Three levels of ethics and moral judgments are listed: professional ethic of historian (is he a judge or observer), ethics/moral judgments of the past we investigate, moral judgment about the past. However tempting, metaphorical use of language should be limited at least at this stage of controversy, for there are not a commonly agreed set of metaphors, thus their use might only complicate the exchange of opinions.

Moral Judgments

2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertram F. Malle
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Social Functions ◽  
Evaluative Judgments ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Status

Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments—evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.

scholarly journals POLITIK PEMAAFAN

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofia Hayati
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Past ◽  
And Control

Forgiveness is often understood as an attitude to overcome negative things and judgment of a guilty person by not denying the pain itself, but with compassion, empathy, and love for those who hurt. Some things to know from forgiveness are what and how forgiveness, stages of forgiveness and forgiveness elements. In the political context, forgiveness is not just 'forgetting' the past, but instead remembers it again and then forgives. In this process it is necessary to try to remember past facts and make honest moral judgments about past mistakes, injustices, and injuries. Forgiveness in the context of action politics does not mean freeing punishment against perpetrators of past crimes, but means free from acts of revenge . Forgiveness starts from an encouragement of 'moral judgment' and control of revenge.

scholarly journals Do Emotions Play an Essential Role in Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H.B. McAuliffe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
The Self ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychology Research ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Past ◽  
Core Concepts

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies forrationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophersargue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence ofan emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present reviewreveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidencethat emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger,sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judgingconduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recentstudies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence insupport of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus insteadon how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interactwith empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.

On The Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia

1961 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. W. Small
Keyword(s):  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Contemporary History ◽  
The Past ◽  
History Of

It is generally accepted that history is an element of culture and the historian a member of society, thus, in Croce's aphorism, that the only true history is contemporary history. It follows from this that when there occur great changes in the contemporary scene, there must also be great changes in historiography, that the vision not merely of the present but also of the past must change.

Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Psychological Profile ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Additional Support

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this thesis through a critical examination of Hume’s sentimentalism and the role of empathy in its account of moral judgment. The main objection to Hume’s account is its exclusion of people whom one can describe as making moral judgments though they have no motivation to act on them. Consideration of such people, particularly those with a psychopathic personality, argues for a distinction between different types of moral judgment in keeping with the essay’s main thesis. Additional support for the main thesis is then drawn from Piaget’s theory of moral judgment in children.

Effect of Power on Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-394
Author(s):  
Russell Hamby
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Low Power ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Factorial Design ◽  
High Power ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Need For Power ◽  
Experimenter Effects

Ambiguous effects of power on attributions of moral responsibility for an accident are interpreted to result from the intervening effects of need for power, which is aroused by the anticipation of exercising power over another. 160 subjects from introductory social psychology classes participated in a questionnaire-type experiment comparing effects of high/low carelessness, severe/minor consequences, and high/low power of the attributor in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. In a follow-up experiment 30 subjects were assigned to conditions of high or low power, and their needs for power and moral attributions were measured. High power seemed to arouse need for power, which was curvilinearly related to moral judgments. Those high and low in need for power attributed more moral responsibility to the perpetrator of an accident than those with moderate levels of need for power. The results suggest complicated models of both moral judgments and experimenter effects related to the level or arousal of motivations.

scholarly journals Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (17) ◽  
pp. 4688-4693 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Clark Barrett ◽  
Alexander Bolyanatz ◽  
Alyssa N. Crittenden ◽  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Simon Fitzpatrick ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Narrow Range ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Mitigating Circumstances

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Although these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment.

Developmental Study of Moral Judgments by Japanese Children

1991 ◽  
Vol 68 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1131-1136
Author(s):  
Hirotsugu Yamauchi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Causal Attribution ◽  
Helping Behavior ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Developmental Study ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Frequency Data ◽  
Japanese Children ◽  
Dual Scaling ◽  
Evaluative Feedback

The purpose of this study was to examine the determinants of causal attribution in the contexts of moral judgment and the developmental shifts of the determinants. Subjects were children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 ( ns = 83, 122, and 84). Moral judgments were measured by asking subjects to provide “evaluative feedback” to an hypothetical child's helping behavior. The method of dual scaling was applied to the frequency data of moral judgments. Two-dimensional solutions show that subjects judged whether the hypothetical child should be rewarded or punished and what amount of reward or punishment was given to the hypothetical child. Developmental shifts were found for moral judgment.

scholarly journals Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Person ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.

scholarly journals An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Martin ◽  
Kyleigh Leddy ◽  
Liane Young ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Developmental Trajectories ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Equal Weight ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
The Many ◽  
Insight Into

Among the many factors that influence our moral judgments, two are especially important: whether the person caused a bad outcome and whether they intended for it to happen. Notably, the weight accorded to these factors in adulthood varies by the type of judgment being made. For punishment decisions, intentions and outcomes carry relatively equal weight; for partner choice decisions (i.e., deciding whether or not to interact with someone again), intentions are weighted much more heavily. These behavioral differences in punishment and partner choice judgments may also reflect more fundamental differences in the cognitive processes supporting these decisions. Exploring how punishment and partner choice emerge in development provides important and unique insight into these processes as they emerge and mature. Here, we explore the developmental emergence of punishment and partner choice decisions in 4- to 9-year-old children. Given the importance of intentions for partner choice decisions¬–from both theoretical and empirical perspectives–we targeted the sensitivity of these two responses to others’ intentions as well as outcomes caused. Our punishment results replicate past work: young children are more focused on outcomes caused and become increasingly sensitive to intentions with age. In contrast, partner choice judgments exhibit sensitivity to intentions at an earlier age than punishment judgments, manifesting as earlier partner choice in cases of attempted violations. These results reveal distinct developmental trajectories for punishment and partner choice judgments, with implications for our understanding of the processes underlying these two responses as well as the development of moral judgment more broadly.

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