People represent mental states in terms of rationality, social impact, and valence: Validating the 3d Mind Model

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Representation ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Large Set ◽  
State Representation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Explanatory Account

Humans can experience a wide variety of different thoughts and feelings in the course of everyday life. To successfully navigate the social world, people need to perceive, understand, and predict others’ mental states. Previous research suggests that people use three dimensions to represent mental states: rationality, social impact, and valence. This 3d Mind Model allows people to efficiently “see” the state of another person’s mind by considering whether that state is rational or emotional, more or less socially impactful, and positive or negative. In the current investigation, we validate this model using neural, behavioral, and linguistic evidence. First, we examine the robustness of the 3d Mind Model by conducting a mega-analysis of four fMRI studies in which participants considered others’ mental states. We find evidence that rationality, social impact, and valence each contribute to explaining the neural representation of mental states. Second, we test whether the 3d Mind Model offers the optimal combination of dimensions for describing neural representations of mental state. Results reveal that the 3d Mind Model achieve the best performance among a large set of candidate dimensions. Indeed, it offers a highly explanatory account of mental state representation, explaining over 80% of reliable neural variance. Finally, we demonstrate that all three dimensions of the model likewise capture convergent behavioral and linguistic measures of mental state representation. Together, these findings provide strong support for the 3d Mind Model, indicating that is it is a robust and generalizable account of how people think about mental states.

scholarly journals Neural evidence that three dimensions organize mental state representation: Rationality, social impact, and valence

2015 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 194-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana I. Tamir ◽  
Mark A. Thornton ◽  
Juan Manuel Contreras ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Neural Encoding ◽  
State Representation ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Neuroimaging Data ◽  
Organizing Principles

How do people understand the minds of others? Existing psychological theories have suggested a number of dimensions that perceivers could use to make sense of others’ internal mental states. However, it remains unclear which of these dimensions, if any, the brain spontaneously uses when we think about others. The present study used multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) of neuroimaging data to identify the primary organizing principles of social cognition. We derived four unique dimensions of mental state representation from existing psychological theories and used functional magnetic resonance imaging to test whether these dimensions organize the neural encoding of others’ mental states. MVPA revealed that three such dimensions could predict neural patterns within the medial prefrontal and parietal cortices, temporoparietal junction, and anterior temporal lobes during social thought: rationality, social impact, and valence. These results suggest that these dimensions serve as organizing principles for our understanding of other people.

Mental state dynamics explain the origin of mental state concepts

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Milena Rmus ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Artificial Neural Network ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social World ◽  
The Social ◽  
Artificial Neural ◽  
Ebb And Flow

People’s thoughts and feelings ebb and flow in predictable ways: surprise arises quickly, anticipation ramps up slowly, regret follows anger, love begets happiness, and so forth. Predicting these transitions between mental states can help people successfully navigate the social world. We hypothesize that the goal of predicting state dynamics shapes people’ mental state concepts. Across seven studies, when people observed more frequent transitions between a pair of novel mental states, they judged those states to be more conceptually similar to each other. In an eighth study, an artificial neural network trained to predict real human mental state dynamics spontaneously learned the same conceptual dimensions that people use to understand these states: the 3d Mind Model. Together these results suggest that mental state dynamics explain the origins of mental state concepts.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

scholarly journals The 3d Mind Model characterizes how people understand mental states across modern and historical cultures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Sarah Wolf ◽  
Brian J. Reilly ◽  
Edward Slingerland ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
State Representation ◽  
Historical Societies ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Different Cultures

Humans rely on social interaction to achieve many important goals. These interactions rely on people’s capacity to understand others’ mental states: their thoughts and feelings. Do different cultures realize this ability in different ways, or do universal principles describe how all peoples understand mental states? Here we investigated mental state representation in 57 countries, 17 languages, and 4 historical societies. We quantified mental state meaning by analyzing large bodies of text produced by each culture. We then tested whether a theory of mental state representation – the 3d Mind Model – could explain which mental states were similar within each culture. The model explained mental state representation in all studied cultures, indicating that universal principles describe how people understand other minds.

Who Supports the Sunflower Movement? An Examination of Nationalist Sentiments

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (8) ◽  
pp. 1193-1212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang-Yu Chen ◽  
Wei-Ting Yen
Keyword(s):  
Social Impact ◽  
The Other ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Legislative Yuan ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Exchanges ◽  
History Of ◽  
National Attachment ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
The Impact

The Sunflower Movement—an occupation of the Legislative Yuan (the Congress) for 24 days—was an unprecedented moment in the history of Taiwan. We examine the social foundation of the Movement and explore an important factor that has long been missing in the literature of Taiwanese politics: nationalism. We divide nationalism into three dimensions: national attachment, national chauvinism, and feelings toward other countries. Using original survey data collected six months after the Movement, we find that national attachment (being proud of Taiwan) and anti-China feelings are unique dimensions and both lead to a higher level of support for the Sunflower Movement. National chauvinism, on the other hand, is not associated with supports for the Movement. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism is contingent on sociotropic views. People who express higher levels of nationalism are more responsive to the issue of rising income inequality when evaluating the Movement. The underlying logic is when people are more nationalistic they care more about the potential social impact of expanding socio-economic exchanges with another country. These results point to it being necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigate their effects on individuals’ political behaviors.

Validation of three dimensions of schizophrenic symptoms in a large unselected sample of patients

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eve C. Johnstone ◽  
Christopher D. Frith
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Principal Components ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
State Variables ◽  
Unselected Sample ◽  
Components Analysis ◽  
Physical Treatments ◽  
Symptoms And Signs

SynopsisA principal components analysis was conducted upon current symptoms and signs rated in a sample of 329 essentially unselected patients with schizophrenia. Three dimensions emerged clearly and closely resembled those previously described in smaller, more selected samples. The clearly defined psychotic dimensions were related in turn to: (i) other mental state variables; (ii) physical treatments administered; (iii) movement disorder; (iv) demographic and historical features; and (v) cognitive function. The correlates of the three dimensions were very different. The clarity of separation achieved in this investigation provides strong support for the view that the three psychotic dimensions of ‘poverty’, ‘hallucinations and delusions’ and ‘disorganization’ are valid and may well have different underlying pathophysiologies.

Mother–child conversation and social understanding in Pakistan

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 496-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumbal Nawaz ◽  
Charlie Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Test Performance ◽  
Adult Child ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Understanding ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mental State Language ◽  
Mental State Terms ◽  
Highly Correlated ◽  
The Mind

Two studies are presented to examine whether and why 3–5-year-olds in Pakistan display limited social understanding. Study 1 tested 71 preschoolers on Lillard and Flavell’s (1992) test of desires, pretence and beliefs, plus two false belief tasks, and showed very limited understanding across these measures even though almost half were over 5 years old. Study 2 replicated this effect with 35 preschoolers, and also conducted home observations of mother–child interaction at two time points. It tested three competing explanations of the role of adult-conversation in the preschooler’s developing understanding of the mind: the quality of the caregiver’s references to mental states, the child’s grasp of mental state language in such conversations, and the connectedness of adult–child talk. These factors are usually highly correlated in Western cultures. In Pakistan, with a delay in the acquisition of social understanding skills, Study 2 showed that maternal and child references to mental states were rare (2% of maternal and 1% of child utterances). Analyses of the relationship between mother–child conversation and the children’s test performance suggested that the measures of social understanding were not predicted uniquely by the connectedness of talk within the dyad, or maternal use of mental state terms. However, the children’s concurrent (and to a lesser extent previous) use of mental state terms was related to their grasp of mental states. Thus, the data support previous analyses, which suggests that the child’s construction of mental state terms is more crucial in their grasp of the social world.

scholarly journals Weighing Outcome vs. Intent Across Societies_preprint

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rita Anne McNamara ◽  
Aiyana Koka Willard ◽  
Ara Norenzayan ◽  
Joseph Henrich
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Social Worlds ◽  
North Americans ◽  
Moral Wrong ◽  
The Social ◽  
State Inference

Mental state reasoning has been theorized as a core feature of how we navigate our social worlds, and as especially vital to moral reasoning. Judgments of moral wrong-doing and punish-worthiness often hinge upon evaluations of the perpetrator’s mental states. In two studies, we examine how differences in cultural conceptions about how one should think about others’ minds influence the relative importance of intent vs. outcome in moral judgments. We recruit participation from three societies, differing in emphasis on mental state reasoning: Indigenous iTaukei Fijians from Yasawa Island (Yasawans) who normatively avoid mental state inference in favor of focus on relationships and consequences of actions; Indo-Fijians who normatively emphasize relationships but do not avoid mental state inference; and North Americans who emphasize individual autonomy and interpreting others’ behaviors as the direct result of mental states. In study 1, Yasawan participants placed more emphasis on outcome than Indo-Fijians or North Americans by judging accidents more harshly than failed attempts. Study 2 tested whether underlying differences in the salience of mental states drives study 1 effects by inducing Yasawan and North American participants to think about thoughts vs. actions before making moral judgments. When induced to think about thoughts, Yasawan participants shifted to judge failed attempts more harshly than accidents. Results suggest that culturally-transmitted concepts about how to interpret the social world shape patterns of moral judgments, possibly via mental state inference.

The social brain automatically predicts others’ future mental states

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Social Impact ◽  
Functional Neuroimaging ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Repetition Suppression ◽  
The Social ◽  
Pattern Similarity ◽  
The Brain

Social life requires people to predict the future: people must anticipate others’ thoughts, feelings, and actions in order to interact with them successfully. The theory of predictive coding suggests that the social brain may meet this need by automatically predicting others’ social futures. If so, when representing others’ current mental state, the brain should already start representing their future states. To test this hypothesis, we used functional neuroimaging to measure participants’ neural representations of mental states. Representational similarity analysis revealed that neural patterns associated with mental states currently under consideration resembled patterns of likely future states, more so than patterns of unlikely future states. This effect manifested in activity across the social brain network, and in medial prefrontal cortex in particular. Repetition suppression analysis also supported the social predictive coding hypothesis: considering mental states presented in predictable sequences reduced activity in the precuneus, relative to unpredictable sequences. In addition to demonstrating that the brain makes automatic predictions of others’ social futures, the results also demonstrate that the brain leverages a three-dimensional representational space to make these predictions. Proximity between mental states on the psychological dimensions of rationality, social impact, and valence explained much of the association between state-specific neural pattern similarity and state transition likelihood. Together, these findings suggest that the way the brain represents the social present gives people an automatic glimpse of the social future.

Impact of the Locus of Causality and Internal Control on the Social Utility of Causal Explanations

2010 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Perrin ◽  
Benoît Testé
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Social Utility ◽  
External Control ◽  
Job Interview ◽  
Locus Of Causality ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Professional Success ◽  
The Social ◽  
Different Types

Research into the norm of internality ( Beauvois & Dubois, 1988 ) has shown that the expression of internal causal explanations is socially valued in social judgment. However, the value attributed to different types of internal explanations (e.g., efforts vs. traits) is far from homogeneous. This study used the Weiner (1979 ) tridimensional model to clarify the factors explaining the social utility attached to internal versus external explanations. Three dimensions were manipulated: locus of causality, controllability, and stability. Participants (N = 180 students) read the explanations expressed by appliants during a job interview. They then described the applicants on the French version of the revised causal dimension scale and rated their future professional success. Results indicated that internal-controllable explanations were the most valued. In addition, perceived internal and external control of explanations were significant predictors of judgments.

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