scholarly journals Leftists possess more national consensus in Europe in one of two datasets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Anthony Aron ◽  
Megan Parker ◽  
Cristina Rodas ◽  
Megan Shaffer

A regularity in US American politics is that liberals have more policy consensus than do conservatives, and both ideological groups have more consensus than moderates (Ondish & Stern, 2018). The idea is that conservatives’ local conformity paradoxically results in less consensus than liberals at the national level. If this is the case, then the liberal consensus effect should also be observed in other countries. We test this using data from Europe. In the European Social Survey (Country N = 38, N = 376,129) we find that on average leftists have more consensus than do rightists; however, we do not find this using the Eurobarometer (Country N = 18, N = 375,830). In both data sources we also observe variation in ideological differences between countries. These results suggest that there is a liberal/leftist consensus effect that can be found in Europe and the United States, but there are also exceptions.

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110418
Author(s):  
Mark J. Brandt ◽  
Anthony Aron ◽  
Megan Parker ◽  
Cristina Rodas ◽  
Megan Shaffer

A regularity in the U.S. American politics is that liberals have more policy consensus than do conservatives, and both ideological groups have more consensus than moderates. One explanation for this is that conservatives’ local conformity paradoxically results in less consensus than liberals at the national level. If so, then the liberal consensus effect should also be observed in other countries. We test this using data from Europe. In the European Social Survey (country N = 38, participant N = 376,129), we find that on average leftists have more consensus than do rightists; however, we do not find this using the Eurobarometer (country N = 18, participant N = 375,830). In both data sources, we also observe variation in ideological differences between countries. These results suggest that there is a liberal/leftist consensus effect on average, that can be found in Europe and the United States, but there are also exceptions.


Author(s):  
Michael Hout ◽  
Andrew Greeley

This chapter discusses the link between happiness and religion. It draws on meaning-and-belonging theory to deduce that a religious affiliation heightens happiness through participation in collective religious rituals. Attendance and engagement appear key: a merely nominal religious affiliation makes people little happier. Notably, two religious foundations of happiness—affiliation with organized religious groups and attendance at services—have fallen. Softened religious engagement, then, may contribute to the slight downturn in general happiness. In fact, steady happiness is reported among those who participate frequently in religious services, but falling levels among those who are less involved. The chapter also considers the association between religion and happiness outside the United States using data from the International Social Survey Program, an international collaborative survey to which the General Social Survey contributes the American data.


Author(s):  
Daniel Scroop

Antimonopoly, meaning opposition to the exclusive or near-exclusive control of an industry or business by one or a very few businesses, played a relatively muted role in the history of the post-1945 era, certainly compared to some earlier periods in American history. However, the subject of antimonopoly is important because it sheds light on changing attitudes toward concentrated power, corporations, and the federal government in the United States after World War II. Paradoxically, as antimonopoly declined as a grass-roots force in American politics, the technical, expert-driven field of antitrust enjoyed a golden age. From the 1940s to the 1960s, antitrust operated on principles that were broadly in line with those that inspired its creation in the late 19th and early 20th century, acknowledging the special contribution small-business owners made to US democratic culture. In these years, antimonopoly remained sufficiently potent as a political force to sustain the careers of national-level politicians such as congressmen Wright Patman and Estes Kefauver and to inform the opinions of Supreme Court justices such as Hugo Black and William O. Douglas. Antimonopoly and consumer politics overlapped in this period. From the mid-1960s onward, Ralph Nader repeatedly tapped antimonopoly ideas in his writings and consumer activism, skillfully exploiting popular anxieties about concentrated economic power. At the same time, as part of the United States’ rise to global hegemony, officials in the federal government’s Antitrust Division exported antitrust overseas, building it into the political, economic, and legal architecture of the postwar world. Beginning in the 1940s, conservative lawyers and economists launched a counterattack against the conception of antitrust elaborated in the progressive era. By making consumer welfare—understood in terms of low prices and market efficiency—the determining factor in antitrust cases, they made a major intellectual and political contribution to the rightward thrust of US politics in the 1970s and 1980s. Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, published in 1978, popularized and signaled the ascendency of this new approach. In the 1980s and 1990s antimonopoly drifted to the margin of political debate. Fear of big government now loomed larger in US politics than the specter of monopoly or of corporate domination. In the late 20th century, Americans, more often than not, directed their antipathy toward concentrated power in its public, rather than its private, forms. This fundamental shift in the political landscape accounts in large part for the overall decline of antimonopoly—a venerable American political tradition—in the period 1945 to 2000.


2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Oser ◽  
Marc Hooghe

This article investigates whether the commitment to social rights as integral to a well-functioning democracy exists among Americans in comparison with their European counterparts. In our comparison of data from the European Social Survey in 2012 with a special parallel module of the U.S. Cooperative Congressional Election Survey in 2014, the findings suggest that similar conceptions of ideal democracy are found on both sides of the Atlantic. Although Americans are less likely than Europeans to consider fighting poverty and reducing income inequality as important democratic ideals, the analysis shows that the United States is not exceptional in the existence of a social rights conception of democracy. A distinct feature of U.S. public opinion is that support for social rights is more strongly associated with a left-right divide than in Europe. The observed congruence between policy and public opinion in the United States highlights the importance of investigating the direction of causality between both phenomena.


1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward R. Tufte

Thirteen major data sources for the study of American politics are examined with regard to their conceptual orientation, error structure, and inferential utility. A great deal of ephemera and measurement without theory is discovered. Few of the documents contain any serious discussion of error structure, although some do report “standard errors” based on naive sampling models. In addition to suggestions for improving the compilation of political statistics, recommendations for a basic minimum library of data sources for American politics are made: The Almanac of American Politics and the Statistical Abstract of the United States, followed by the Guide to U.S. Elections.


2003 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Juola Exline

In situations involving impending death or bereavement, afterlife beliefs may become salient. Although prior studies have examined afterlife beliefs, little attention has been devoted to the specific constructs of Heaven and Hell. Using data from United States Christians in the 1998 General Social Survey, the current analysis revealed that the majority believed in both Heaven and Hell. Fundamentalist Protestants reported greater belief in Heaven and Hell than Catholics, Mainline Protestants, or Liberal Protestants. Regardless of denomination, greater religious participation was associated with greater belief in an afterlife, Heaven, and Hell. Clinical implications are discussed. For example, whereas thoughts of Heaven should comfort those facing death, the possibility of Hell could intensify distress around the loss. When practitioners work with individuals facing death—either the client's own impending death or the death of another person—it may be helpful to carefully assess the client's specific beliefs about the afterlife.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 237802311990006
Author(s):  
Michael Lee Wood

The figure plots self-reports of religious attendance using data from the General Social Survey (1972–2018), contributing to current debates about how religiosity is changing in the United States by clearly showing the relative increase or decrease of each level of religious attendance over time. The main new insight is that the observed decline in religious attendance in the United States has been driven primarily by a large increase in people reporting never attending religious services and a corresponding decrease in people reporting weekly attendance, rather than uniform changes across different levels. Some categories, such as attendance once a month, have seen virtually no change. More generally, the figure may be used as a template for plotting other ordinal measures over time, such as political attitudes or ideology.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 237802312110180
Author(s):  
Sean Bock

Scholars have pointed to “political backlash” as a key reason for why people leave religion in the United States. This study adds to the growing body of work that emphasizes backlash to localized conditions, rather than national-level phenomena, by demonstrating the importance of conflict on salient issues within churches. Using data from the Baylor Religion Survey, the author exploits a unique set of items to analyze what he calls “conflicted religionists”—those who experience attitudinal conflict with their churches—and measures conflict on two salient issues: same-sex marriage and abortion. The author finds that there is a considerable proportion of conflicted religionists and that the probability of experiencing conflict varies drastically across different groups in the sample. In line with past work, he demonstrates that experiencing conflict is significantly associated with lower church attendance. He concludes with a discussion of the possible pathways available to conflicted religionists.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 237802311879595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Upenieks ◽  
Steven L. Foy ◽  
Andrew Miles

Studies using data from the United States suggest religious organizational involvement is more beneficial for health than secular organizational involvement. Extending beyond the United States, we assess the relative impacts of religious and secular organizational involvement on self-rated health cross-nationally, accounting for national-level religious context. Analyses of data from 33 predominantly Christian countries from the 2005–2008 World Values Survey reveal that active membership in religious organizations is positively associated with self-rated health. This association’s magnitude is higher than the magnitude of associations between many memberships in secular organizations and health. The positive association between involvement in religious organization and self-rated health is moderated by national levels of religious pluralism such that positive associations are primarily found in nations high in religious diversity. These results replicated in a sample of 21 majority-Christian nations from the 2010–2014 World Values Survey.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas John Cooke ◽  
Ian Shuttleworth

It is widely presumed that information and communication technologies, or ICTs, enable migration in several ways; primarily by reducing the costs of migration. However, a reconsideration of the relationship between ICTs and migration suggests that ICTs may just as well hinder migration; primarily by reducing the costs of not moving.  Using data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, models that control for sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity indicate a strong negative effect of ICT use on inter-state migration within the United States. These results help to explain the long-term decline in internal migration within the United States.


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