scholarly journals Understanding ‘Why’: How implicit questions shape explanation preferences

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sehrang Joo ◽  
Sami Ryan Yousif ◽  
Frank Keil
Keyword(s):  
Human Cognition ◽  
Blue Color ◽  
Direct Link ◽  
Semantic Ambiguity ◽  
Mechanistic Explanations ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Why Questions

‘Why’ questions are semantically ambiguous. A question like “Why is the sky blue?” can be rephrased as either a ‘how’ (“How did the sky get its blue color?”) or a ‘purpose’ question (“What is the purpose of the sky being blue?”). This semantic ambiguity allows us to seek many kinds of information with the same ‘why’ question. As a result, ‘why’ questions have often been used to investigate people’s explanation preferences. From such work, we know that people will often prefer teleological over mechanistic explanations—a tendency that has been linked to many broader theories of human cognition. But are ‘why’ questions pragmatically ambiguous? You may, for instance, have a specific expectation about what “Why is the sky blue?” was really meaning to ask. Here, we show that (a) people have clear, domain-specific expectations about what specific questions are implied by ambiguous ‘why’ questions; (b) people have clear preferences for certain kinds of questions over others; and (c) there is a direct link between implicit questions and explanation preferences. Thus not only is “why” pragmatically unambiguous, but these specific expectations may shape known explanation preferences. To test this view, we finally show that people endorse teleological answers even when they are explicitly non-explanatory. In other words, people may sometimes prefer teleological answers because they interpret ‘why’ questions as ‘purpose’ questions (rather than as ‘how’ questions) and teleological explanations may simply better address these questions. We discuss how understanding ‘why’ may reshape our understanding of people’s explanation preferences and their consequences.

Human Cognitive Processes

2009 ◽  
pp. 1-33
Author(s):  
Slava Kalyuga
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Domain Specific Knowledge ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Memory Knowledge ◽  
High Level

One of the major components of our cognitive architecture, working memory, becomes overloaded if more than a few chunks of information are processed simultaneously. For example, we all experience this cognitive overload when trying to keep in memory an unfamiliar telephone number or add two four-digit numbers in the absence of a pen and paper. Similar in nature processing limitations of working memory represent a major factor influencing the effectiveness of human learning and performance, particularly in complex environments that require concurrent performance of multiple tasks. The learner prior domain-specific knowledge structures and associated levels of expertise are considered as means of reducing these limitations and guiding high-level knowledge-based cognitive activities. One of the most important results of studies in human cognition is that the available knowledge is a single most significant learner cognitive characteristic that influences learning and cognitive performance. Understanding the key role of long-term memory knowledge base in our cognition is important to the successful management of cognitive load in multimedia learning.

Constraint, cognition, and written numeration

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 552-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Chrisomalis
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Study ◽  
Mathematical Cognition ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Writing Systems ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Cross Cultural Study ◽  
Numeral Systems ◽  
Numerical Notation

The world’s diverse written numeral systems are affected by human cognition; in turn, written numeral systems affect mathematical cognition in social environments. The present study investigates the constraints on graphic numerical notation, treating it neither as a byproduct of lexical numeration, nor a mere adjunct to writing, but as a specific written modality with its own cognitive properties. Constraints do not refute the notion of infinite cultural variability; rather, they recognize the infinity of variability within defined limits, thus transcending the universalist/particularist dichotomy. In place of strictly innatist perspectives on mathematical cognition, a model is proposed that invokes domain-specific and notationally-specific constraints to explain patterns in numerical notations. The analysis of exceptions to cross-cultural generalizations makes the study of near-universals highly productive theoretically. The cross-cultural study of patterns in written numbers thus provides a rich complement to the cognitive analysis of writing systems.

scholarly journals Attention mediates the influence of numerical magnitude on temporal processing

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuj Shukla ◽  
Raju S. Bapi
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Processing ◽  
Processing System ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Numerical Magnitude ◽  
Comparison Task ◽  
Domain Interaction ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Magnitude Processing ◽  
Cross Domain ◽  
Numerical Magnitudes

AbstractThe processing of time and numbers has been fundamental to human cognition. One of the prominent theories of magnitude processing, a theory of magnitude (ATOM), suggests that a generalized magnitude system processes space, time, and numbers; thereby, the magnitude dimensions could potentially interact with one another. However, more recent studies have found support for domain-specific magnitude processing and argued that the magnitudes related to time and number are processed through distinct mechanisms. Such mixed findings have raised questions about whether these magnitudes are processed independently or share a common processing mechanism. In the present study, we examine the influence of numerical magnitude on temporal processing. To investigate, we conducted two experiments using a temporal comparison task, wherein we presented positive and negative numerical magnitudes (large and small) in a blocked (Experiment-1) and intermixed manner (Experiment-2). Results from experiment-1 suggest that numerical magnitude affects temporal processing only in positive numbers but not for negative numbers. Further, results from experiment-2 indicate that the polarity (positive and negative) of the numbers influences temporal processing instead of the numerical magnitude itself. Overall, the current study seems to suggest that cross-domain interaction of magnitudes arises from attentional mechanisms and may not need to posit a common magnitude processing system.

The naturalness of (many) social institutions: evolved cognition as their foundation

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
PASCAL BOYER ◽  
MICHAEL BANG PETERSEN
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Social Exchange ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Common Features ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Exogenous Factors

Abstract:Most standard social science accounts only offer limited explanations of institutional design, i.e. why institutions have common features observed in many different human groups. Here we suggest that these features are best explained as the outcome of evolved human cognition, in such domains as mating, moral judgment and social exchange. As empirical illustrations, we show how this evolved psychology makes marriage systems, legal norms and commons management systems intuitively obvious and compelling, thereby ensuring their occurrence and cultural stability. We extend this to propose under what conditions institutions can become ‘natural’, compelling and legitimate, and outline probable paths for institutional change given human cognitive dispositions. Explaining institutions in terms of these exogenous factors also suggests that a general theory of institutions as such is neither necessary nor in fact possible. What are required are domain-specific accounts of institutional design in different domains of evolved cognition.

scholarly journals Computational models of category-selective brain regions enable high-throughput tests of selectivity

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Apurva Ratan Murty ◽  
Pouya Bashivan ◽  
Alex Abate ◽  
James J. DiCarlo ◽  
Nancy Kanwisher
Keyword(s):  
Computational Models ◽  
Functional Organization ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Face Area ◽  
Extrastriate Body Area ◽  
Cortical Regions ◽  
The Brain

AbstractCortical regions apparently selective to faces, places, and bodies have provided important evidence for domain-specific theories of human cognition, development, and evolution. But claims of category selectivity are not quantitatively precise and remain vulnerable to empirical refutation. Here we develop artificial neural network-based encoding models that accurately predict the response to novel images in the fusiform face area, parahippocampal place area, and extrastriate body area, outperforming descriptive models and experts. We use these models to subject claims of category selectivity to strong tests, by screening for and synthesizing images predicted to produce high responses. We find that these high-response-predicted images are all unambiguous members of the hypothesized preferred category for each region. These results provide accurate, image-computable encoding models of each category-selective region, strengthen evidence for domain specificity in the brain, and point the way for future research characterizing the functional organization of the brain with unprecedented computational precision.

scholarly journals The evolution of general intelligence

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith M. Burkart ◽  
Michèle N. Schubiger ◽  
Carel P. van Schaik
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Intelligence ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Critical Importance ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Nonhuman Animals ◽  
Variable Content ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Intelligence Approach

AbstractThe presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometricgfactor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.

Habit-change, heightened consciousness, and agential “crises”: impersonal mechanisms, personal agents, and their complex entanglement

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-28
Author(s):  
Vincent Colapietro
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Mechanistic Explanations ◽  
Integral Role ◽  
Personal Agents

Abstract The author begins by highlighting Peirce’s claim that every kind of consciousness is more or less like a cognition. He concludes by making a plea for a cognitive semiotics in which both mechanistic explanations and accounts framed in terms of personal agents are necessary for an adequate account of human cognition. The topics of habit-taking and the form of consciousness associated with this process are what link Peirce’s cognitivist approach to consciousness and an inclusive, non-reductionist vision of cognitive semiotics. Impersonal mechanisms play an integral role in even the most sophisticated forms of human cognition. But the self-critical endeavors of personal agents, especially ones susceptible to “crises” such as doubt, play no less an important role.

scholarly journals The cognitive functions of language

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 657-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Theoretical Consideration ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Human Thinking

This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is de facto the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include the view that language is necessary for the acquisition of many human concepts and the view that language can serve to scaffold human thought processes. The paper also discusses the thesis that language may be the medium of conscious propositional thinking, but argues that this cannot be its most fundamental cognitive role. The idea is then proposed that natural language is the medium for non-domain-specific thinking, serving to integrate the outputs of a variety of domain-specific conceptual faculties (or central-cognitive “quasi-modules”). Recent experimental evidence in support of this idea is reviewed and the implications of the idea are discussed, especially for our conception of the architecture of human cognition. Finally, some further kinds of evidence which might serve to corroborate or refute the hypothesis are mentioned. The overall goal of the paper is to review a wide variety of accounts of the cognitive function of natural language, integrating a number of different kinds of evidence and theoretical consideration in order to propose and elaborate the most plausible candidate.

The Existential Theory of Mind

2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse M. Bering
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Life Events ◽  
Explanatory Models ◽  
Explanatory Model ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Behavior Theory ◽  
Folk Physics ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Existential Theory

The primary causal explanatory model for interpreting behavior, theory of mind, may have expanded into corridors of human cognition that have little to do with the context in which it evolved, questioning the suitability of domain-specific accounts of mind reading. Namely, philosophical–religious reasoning is a uniquely derived explanatory system anchored in intentionality that does not clearly involve behavior. The presence of an existential theory of mind (EToM) suggests that individuals perceive some nondescript or culturally elaborated (e.g., God) psychological agency as having encoded communicative intentions in the form of life events, similar to a person encoding communicative intentions in deictic gestures. The emergence of EToM is discussed from ontogenetic and phylogenetic perspectives; autism is examined to determine whether alternate core explanatory models (e.g., folk physics) are used by those with deficits in theory of mind to derive existential meaning.

scholarly journals Structural and semantic ambiguity of why-questions: An overlooked case of weak islands in English

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Cassandra Chapman ◽  
Ivona Kučerová
Keyword(s):  
Syntactic Structure ◽  
Attachment Site ◽  
Semantic Ambiguity ◽  
Semantic Type ◽  
Selectional Restriction ◽  
Attachment Sites ◽  
Negative Islands ◽  
Reported Data ◽  
Weak Islands ◽  
Why Questions

We argue that English why-questions are systematically ambiguous between a purpose and a reason interpretation, similarly to Mandarin, Russian, and Polish (contra Stepanov & Tsai 2008). We argue that the distinct semantic interpretations correspond to two distinct base-generated positions of why. While reason why is base-generated within CP (Rizzi 2001, Ko 2005), purpose why is adjoined to vP (Stepanov & Tsai 2008). Furthermore, we show that English purpose why, similarly to previously reported data from Mandarin, is only compatible with dynamic predicates with agentive subjects. We argue that this selectional restriction follows from two properties: (i) why semantically requires a proposition as its argument, and (ii) only dynamic predicates with agentive subjects have a syntactic structure that accommodates two adjunction sites of the relevant semantic type, i.e., they contain two distinct propositional levels (Bale 2007) and therefore two attachment sites for why. In contrast, propositionally simple predicates only have one propositional level and hence only one possible attachment site, which corresponds to the reason interpretation of why. Evidence for this proposal comes from the observation that only the lower why - associated with the purpose reading - is sensitive to negative islands, which suggests that its attachment site is below negation (vP), whereas the higher why is insensitive to island effects of this sort, which suggests that its base generated position is above negation (CP).

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