scholarly journals Resolving the Progressive Paradox: The Effects of Moral Reframing on Support for Economically Progressive Candidates

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Joe Mernyk ◽  
Robb Willer

While progressive economic policies are popular, economically progressive candidates rarely win elections in the U.S., a pattern we call the “progressive paradox.” In the current paper, we examine whether the electoral disadvantage of economically progressive candidates results in part from the moral rhetoric these candidates commonly use to frame their policy platforms. Using a Moral Foundations Theory perspective, we combine previously validated machine learning based measures of economic ideology and new text-based measures of candidates’ moral rhetoric to analyze transcripts of 137 primary and general election presidential debates since 2000. We find economically progressive candidates, compared to economically conservative candidates, rely less on “binding” moral foundations (loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) relative to “individualizing” foundations (care and fairness). In addition, we conducted two experiments (total n = 4,138), including one nationally representative, pre-registered experiment, to test whether economically progressive candidates can build support beyond their liberal base by framing their economic policy platform in terms of binding moral values. Results show that a presidential candidate who used binding framing for his progressive economic platform as opposed to individualizing or a neutral framing, was supported significantly more by conservatives and, unexpectedly, by moderates as well. These results suggest that moral reframing offers an under-utilized solution to the longstanding puzzle regarding the gap between support for economically progressive policies and candidates.

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Sterling ◽  
John T. Jost

Abstract We analyzed Twitter language to explore hypotheses derived from moral foundations theory, which suggests that liberals and conservatives prioritize different values. In Study 1, we captured 11 million tweets from nearly 25,000 U.S. residents and observed that liberals expressed fairness concerns more often than conservatives, whereas conservatives were more likely to express concerns about group loyalty, authority, and purity. Increasing political sophistication exacerbated ideological differences in authority and group loyalty. At low levels of sophistication, liberals used more harm language, but at high levels of sophistication conservatives referenced harm more often. In Study 2, we analyzed 59,000 tweets from 388 members of the U.S. Congress. Liberal legislators used more fairness- and harm-related words, whereas conservative legislators used more authority-related words. Unexpectedly, liberal legislators used more language pertaining to group loyalty and purity. Follow-up analyses suggest that liberals and conservatives in Congress use similar words to emphasize different policy priorities.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across five studies (total N = 1104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgression (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic r’s: .07 ̶ .27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrizia Milesi

Based on the view of morality proposed by the Moral Foundations Theory, this paper investigates whether voting intention is associated with moral foundation endorsement in not perfectly bipolar electoral contexts. Three studies carried out in Italy from 2010 to 2013, showed that controlling for ideological orientation, moral foundation endorsement is associated with voting intention. In Study 1 and 3, in fictitious and real national elections, intention to vote for right-wing political groups rather than for left-wing rivals was associated with Sanctity, confirming previous results obtained in the U.S. Furthermore, as a function of the specific competing political groups in each of the examined contexts other moral foundations predicted voting intention. In Study 1, Care and Authority predicted voting intention for the major political groups rather than for an autonomist party that aimed at decreasing central government’s fiscal power in favor of fiscal regional autonomy. In Study 3, Loyalty predicted the intention to vote for the major parliamentarian parties rather than for a movement that aimed at capturing disaffection towards traditional politics. In Study 2, at real regional elections, Loyalty predicted voting intention for the incumbent right-wing governor rather than for the challengers and Fairness predicted voting intention for left-wing extra-parliamentarian political groups rather than for the major left-wing party. Thus multiple moral concerns can be associated with voting intention. In fragmented and unstable electoral contexts, at each election the context of the competing political groups may elicit specific moral concerns that can contribute to affect voting intention beyond ideological orientation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 194855062092385
Author(s):  
Andrew E. Monroe ◽  
James B. Wyngaarden ◽  
E. Ashby Plant

In 2017, Colin Kaepernick drew global attention by kneeling during the national anthem before a football game. The protest divided the country into two groups: those who supported Kaepernick’s stand against inequality and those who believed it was disrespectful. The current study investigates whether differences in moral values (i.e., fairness vs. respect for authority) predict an individual’s opinion of the protestors and whether priming one of those values influences opinions on social justice protests more broadly. Our data support the moral trade-off hypothesis by demonstrating that when values are in conflict, the degree to which individuals value fairness versus authority predicts their opinions of the protesters. These differences in fairness versus authority also extended to judgments of other kinds of social justice protests. These findings support the moral foundations theory as a useful tool for investigating the influence of moral values on perceptions of social issues and subsequent behavior.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Atari ◽  
Jesse Graham ◽  
Morteza Dehghani

Most moral psychology research has been conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. As such, moral judgment, as a psychological phenomenon, might be known to researchers only by its WEIRD manifestations. Here, we start with evaluating Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and follow up by building a bottom-up model of moral values, in Iran, a non-WEIRD, Muslim-majority, understudied cultural setting. In six studies (N = 1,945) we examine the structural validity of the Persian translation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, compare moral foundations between Iran and the US, conduct qualitative interviews regarding moral values, expand the nomological network of “Qeirat” as a culture-specific set of moral values, and investigate the pragmatic validity of “Qeirat” in Iranian culture. Our findings suggest an additional moral foundation in Iran, above and beyond the five foundations identified by MFT. Specifically, qualitative studies highlighted the role of “Qeirat” values in Iranian culture, which are comprised of guarding and protectiveness of female kin, romantic partners, broader family, and country. Significant cultural differences in moral values are argued in this work to follow from the psychological systems that, when brought to interact with particular socio-ecological environments, produce different moral structures. This evolutionarily-informed, cross-cultural, mixed-methods research sheds light on moral concerns and their cultural, demographic, and individual-difference correlates in Iran.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
Paul G. Lewis

Moral foundations theory (MFT) suggests that individuals on the political left draw upon moral intuitions relating primarily to care and fairness, whereas conservatives are more motivated than liberals by authority, ingroup, and purity concerns. The theory of conservatism as motivated social cognition (CMSC) suggests that conservatives are more attuned than liberals to threat and to negative stimuli. Because evidence for both accounts rests on studies of mass publics, however, it remains unclear whether political elites of the left and right exhibit these inclinations. Thus, this analysis uses the 2015-16 United States presidential primary season as an occasion to explore partisan differences in candidates’ moral rhetoric. The analysis focuses on verbal responses to questions posed during party primary debates, a setting that is largely unscripted and thus potentially subject to intuitive influences. The Moral Foundations Dictionary is employed to analyze how frequently candidates used words representing various moral foundations, distinguishing between positive and negative references to each. Consistent with CMSC, the Republican candidates were more likely to use negative-valence moral terminology, describing violations of moral foundations. The direction of some partisan differences contradicts the expectations of MFT. Donald Trump, a novice candidate, was an exception to the typical Republican pattern, making markedly lower overall use of moral-foundations vocabulary.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (11) ◽  
pp. 1503-1518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
E. J. Masicampo

Three studies examined the relationship between people’s moral values (drawing on moral foundations theory) and their willingness to censor immoral acts from children. Results revealed that diverse moral values did not predict censorship judgments. It was not the case that participants who valued loyalty and authority, respectively, sought to censor depictions of disloyal and disobedient acts. Rather, censorship intentions were predicted by a single moral value—sanctity. The more people valued sanctity, the more willing they were to censor from children, regardless of the types of violations depicted (impurity, disloyalty, disobedience, etc.). Furthermore, people who valued sanctity objected to indecent exposure only to apparently innocent and pure children—those who were relatively young and who had not been previously exposed to immoral acts. These data suggest that sanctity, purity, and the preservation of innocence underlie intentions to censor from young children.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Elliott Monroe ◽  
James B. Wyngaarden ◽  
E. Ashby Plant

In 2017, Colin Kaepernick drew global attention by kneeling during the national anthem before a football game. The protest divided the country into two groups: those who supported Kaepernick’s stand against inequality, and those who believed it was disrespectful. The current study investigates whether differences in moral values (i.e., fairness vs. respect for authority) predict an individual’s opinion of the protestors, and whether priming one of those values influences opinions on social justice protests more broadly. Our data support the moral tradeoff hypothesis by demonstrating that when values are in conflict, the degree to which individuals value fairness versus authority predicts their opinions of the protesters. These differences in fairness vs. authority also extended to judgments of other kinds of social justice protests. These findings support the Moral Foundations Theory as a useful tool for investigating the influence of moral values on perceptions of social issues and subsequent behavior.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Mark John Brandt

Research suggests that liberals and conservatives use different moral foundations to reason about moral issues (moral divide hypothesis). An alternative prediction is that observed ideological differences in moral foundations are instead driven by ingroup-versus-outgroup categorizations of competing political groups (political group conflict hypothesis). In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 958), using experimentally manipulated measures of moral foundations, we test strong versions of both hypotheses and find partial support for both. Supporting the moral divide hypothesis, conservatives endorsed the binding foundations more strongly than liberals even when a moderate target group was explicitly specified. Supporting the political group conflict hypothesis, both conservatives and liberals endorsed moral foundations more when moral acts targeted ingroup versus outgroup members. These results have implications for improving measures of moral values and judgments and point to ways to enhance the effectiveness of strategies aimed at building bridges between people from different political camps.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 851-863 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Mark J. Brandt

Research suggests that liberals and conservatives use different moral foundations to reason about moral issues (moral divide hypothesis). An alternative prediction is that observed ideological differences in moral foundations are instead driven by ingroup-versus-outgroup categorizations of competing political groups (political group conflict hypothesis). In two preregistered experiments (total N = 958), using experimentally manipulated measures of moral foundations, we test strong versions of both hypotheses and find partial support for both. Supporting the moral divide hypothesis, conservatives endorsed the binding foundations more strongly than liberals even when a moderate target group was explicitly specified. Supporting the political group conflict hypothesis, both conservatives and liberals endorsed moral foundations more when moral acts targeted ingroup versus outgroup members. These results have implications for improving measures of moral values and judgments and point to ways to enhance the effectiveness of strategies aimed at building bridges between people from different political camps.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document