scholarly journals The Effect of Ideological Identification on the Endorsement of Moral Values Depends on the Target Group

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Mark John Brandt
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Target Group ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Partial Support ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Total N ◽  
Political Group ◽  
Political Groups

Research suggests that liberals and conservatives use different moral foundations to reason about moral issues (moral divide hypothesis). An alternative prediction is that observed ideological differences in moral foundations are instead driven by ingroup-versus-outgroup categorizations of competing political groups (political group conflict hypothesis). In two pre-registered experiments (total N = 958), using experimentally manipulated measures of moral foundations, we test strong versions of both hypotheses and find partial support for both. Supporting the moral divide hypothesis, conservatives endorsed the binding foundations more strongly than liberals even when a moderate target group was explicitly specified. Supporting the political group conflict hypothesis, both conservatives and liberals endorsed moral foundations more when moral acts targeted ingroup versus outgroup members. These results have implications for improving measures of moral values and judgments and point to ways to enhance the effectiveness of strategies aimed at building bridges between people from different political camps.

scholarly journals The Effect of Ideological Identification on the Endorsement of Moral Values Depends on the Target Group

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 851-863 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Mark J. Brandt
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Target Group ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Partial Support ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Total N ◽  
Political Group ◽  
Political Groups

Research suggests that liberals and conservatives use different moral foundations to reason about moral issues (moral divide hypothesis). An alternative prediction is that observed ideological differences in moral foundations are instead driven by ingroup-versus-outgroup categorizations of competing political groups (political group conflict hypothesis). In two preregistered experiments (total N = 958), using experimentally manipulated measures of moral foundations, we test strong versions of both hypotheses and find partial support for both. Supporting the moral divide hypothesis, conservatives endorsed the binding foundations more strongly than liberals even when a moderate target group was explicitly specified. Supporting the political group conflict hypothesis, both conservatives and liberals endorsed moral foundations more when moral acts targeted ingroup versus outgroup members. These results have implications for improving measures of moral values and judgments and point to ways to enhance the effectiveness of strategies aimed at building bridges between people from different political camps.

scholarly journals Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fieke Maria Antoinet Wagemans ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Personality Characteristics ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Moral Condemnation

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across five studies (total N = 1104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgression (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic r’s: .07 ̶ .27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues.

scholarly journals Incitement to Genocide against a Political Group: The Anti-Communist Killings in Indonesia

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Annie Elizabeth Pohlman
Keyword(s):  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Political ◽  
Social Death ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
Political Group ◽  
Genocide Studies ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Political Groups

Genocide and mass atrocities can be seen as the culminative result of extreme social exclusion. Two of the critical steps on the path to genocidal persecution are the isolation and exclusion of a particular group and the mobilisation and incitement of perpetrators. This paper examines the case of the 1965-1966 massacres in Indonesia in light of these two incipient stages of genocide. First, I discuss the Indonesian killings of 1965-1966 by situating them within the conceptual and legal understandings of genocide and argue that those persecuted belonged predominantly to a defined political group, that is, members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). I argue that the exclusion of political groups from the legal definition of genocide given in the UN Convention on Genocide is unsupportable when examined both within the context that it was created and the greater conceptual understandings of genocide studies. To support this argument, I then outline the political situation in Indonesia prior to the 1 October 1965 coup and explain how the country went through a process of political pillarisation, effectively creating the conditions for the creation and then eradication of the Left in Indonesia. In the final part of the paper, I examine how these killings were incited. I argue that hate propaganda was used against the PKI and its supporters by the main perpetrators of the massacres, the Indonesian military, to incite a popular, genocidal campaign. As a result of this hate-propaganda campaign, Leftists in Indonesia experienced extreme forms of dehumanisation and social death which, in turn, facilitated their eradication.

scholarly journals Moving Morality Beyond the In-Group: Liberals and Conservatives Show Differences on Group-Framed Moral Foundations and These Differences Mediate the Relationships to Perceived Bias and Threat

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon D. Stewart ◽  
David S. M. Morris
Keyword(s):  
Implicit Bias ◽  
General Pattern ◽  
Negative Attitude ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Target Group ◽  
Perceived Threat ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Target Groups ◽  
Moral Principles

Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and purity. However, the question remains about how conservatives and liberals differ in relation to group-level moral principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target group being either abstract or specific ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals showed more endorsement of Individualizing foundations (Harm and Fairness foundations) with an outgroup target, while conservatives showed more endorsement of Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations) with an ingroup target. This general pattern was found when the framed, target-group was abstract (i.e., ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ in Study 1) and when target groups were specified about a general British-ingroup and an immigrant-outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In Studies 2 and 3, both Individualizing-Ingroup Preference and Binding-Ingroup Preference scores predicted more Attitude Bias and more Negative Attitude Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), more Implicit Bias (Study 3), and more Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). We also demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less Attitude Bias and less Negative Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), less Implicit Bias (Study 3), and less Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different patterns of mediation of these effects.

scholarly journals Resolving the Progressive Paradox: The Effects of Moral Reframing on Support for Economically Progressive Candidates

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Joe Mernyk ◽  
Robb Willer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Presidential Debates ◽  
Total N ◽  
Moral Rhetoric ◽  
Economic Ideology ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The U.S

While progressive economic policies are popular, economically progressive candidates rarely win elections in the U.S., a pattern we call the “progressive paradox.” In the current paper, we examine whether the electoral disadvantage of economically progressive candidates results in part from the moral rhetoric these candidates commonly use to frame their policy platforms. Using a Moral Foundations Theory perspective, we combine previously validated machine learning based measures of economic ideology and new text-based measures of candidates’ moral rhetoric to analyze transcripts of 137 primary and general election presidential debates since 2000. We find economically progressive candidates, compared to economically conservative candidates, rely less on “binding” moral foundations (loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) relative to “individualizing” foundations (care and fairness). In addition, we conducted two experiments (total n = 4,138), including one nationally representative, pre-registered experiment, to test whether economically progressive candidates can build support beyond their liberal base by framing their economic policy platform in terms of binding moral values. Results show that a presidential candidate who used binding framing for his progressive economic platform as opposed to individualizing or a neutral framing, was supported significantly more by conservatives and, unexpectedly, by moderates as well. These results suggest that moral reframing offers an under-utilized solution to the longstanding puzzle regarding the gap between support for economically progressive policies and candidates.

Economic Issues Are Moral Issues: The Moral Underpinnings of the Desire to Reduce Wealth Inequality

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew S. Franks ◽  
Kyle C. Scherr
Keyword(s):  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Psychological Disorders ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Political Spectrum ◽  
Relevant Factors

Economic inequality is a pervasive and growing source of social problems such as poor health, crime, psychological disorders, and lack of trust in others. U.S. citizens across the political spectrum both underperceive the extent of economic inequality and would prefer to live in a society with much less inequality than both exist in reality and in their subjective estimations. Across multiple studies, we examined the ability of “moral foundations” to predict people’s desire to reduce economic inequality (while also replicating research showing widespread desire for a more equal society). Moral foundations endorsements consistently predicted desire to reduce inequality even when controlling for other relevant factors (e.g., political orientation). In addition, requests for donations to an organization focused on reducing economic inequality were able to elicit more money when the requests largely appealed to the type of moral foundations endorsed by participants.

France Reopens the Constitutional Debate

1952 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-437
Author(s):  
Roy Pierce
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Third ◽  
Political Group ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
Fourth Republic ◽  
First Time ◽  
Political Groups

Less than six years have passed since the Constitution of the Fourth Republic was put into operation, yet every political group in France with the exception of the Communist Party, which has its own special plans for France's future, is currently participating in a movement for constitutional revision. Since July, 1950, no candidate for the post of Prime Minister has neglected to assert in his ministerial declaration the need for constitutional reform. The parties of the Third Force majority of the first legislature of the Fourth Republic set into motion for the first time, in November, 1950, the machinery for the amendment of the Constitution. The momentum which the revisionist movement had already gathered was given greater impetus by the elections of June, 1951, which reinforced markedly the political groups opposed to the Constitution at its inception. These groups had been able to muster only 106 votes in the Second Constituent Assembly of 1946. Later, in the first legislature but after the formation of a Gaullist parliamentary group, their strength rose to approximately 160 seats. And as a result of the elections of June, 1951, the same groups now command 300 seats in the second legislature.

Political orientation and moral foundations

2019 ◽  
Vol 118 (11) ◽  
pp. 365-371
Author(s):  
J Dorasamy ◽  
Mr Jirushlan Dorasamy
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
North America ◽  
American Studies ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Open Approach ◽  
Online Questionnaire ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
The North

Studies, especially in the North America, have shown a relationship between political orientation and moralfoundation. This study investigated whether moral judgements differ from the political orientation of participantsin South Africa moral judgment and the extent to which moral foundations are influenced by politicalorientation.Further, the study investigated the possibility of similar patterns with the North AmericanConservative-Liberal spectrum and the moral foundation. There were 300participants, 78 males and 222 females,who completed an online questionnaire relating to moral foundation and political orientation. The results partiallysupported the hypothesis relating to Liberal and Conservative orientation in South Africa. Further, this studypartially predicted the Liberal-Conservative orientation with patterns in the moral foundation, whilst showingsimilar findings to the North American studies. A growing rate of a neutral/moderate society is evidenced in SouthAfrica and abroad, thereby showing the emergence of a more open approach to both a political and generalstance.”””

Political Inclusion Reduces Political Prejudice

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan G. Voelkel ◽  
Dongning Ren ◽  
Mark John Brandt
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Discussion ◽  
Total N ◽  
Cohen’S D ◽  
Promising Strategy ◽  
Political Inclusion ◽  
Cohen's D ◽  
Political Divide ◽  
Scenario Study ◽  
Fair Chance

The political divide is characterized by liberals and conservatives who hold strong prejudice against each other. Here we introduce one possible strategy for reducing political prejudice: political inclusion. We define political inclusion as receiving a fair chance to voice one’s opinions in a discussion of political topics with political outgroup members. This strategy may reduce political prejudice by inducing perceptions of the political outgroup as fair and respectful; however, such a strategy may also highlight conflicting attitudes and worldviews, thereby further exacerbating prejudice. In three preregistered studies (total N = 799), we test if political inclusion reduces or increases prejudice toward the political outgroup. Specifically, political inclusion was manipulated with either an imagined scenario (Study 1) or a concurrent experience in an ostensible online political discussion (Studies 2 & 3). Across all studies, participants who were politically included by political outgroup members reported reduced prejudice toward their outgroup compared to participants in a neutral control condition (Cohen’s d [-0.27, -0.50]). This effect was mediated by perceptions of the political outgroup as fairer and less dissimilar in their worldviews. Our results indicate that political discussions that are politically inclusive do not cause additional prejudice via worldview conflict, but instead give others a feeling of being heard. It is a promising strategy to reduce political prejudice.

Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists?

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-605
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Political Orientations ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Political Left ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Representative Samples

Extremist political groups, especially “extreme” Republicans and conservatives, are increasingly charged with believing misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories to a greater extent than moderates and those on the political left by both a burgeoning scholarly literature and popular press accounts. However, previous investigations of the relationship between political orientations and alternative beliefs have been limited in their operationalization of those beliefs and political extremity. We build on existing literature by examining the relationships between partisan and nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs and symbolic and operational forms of political extremity. Using two large, nationally representative samples of Americans, we find that ideological extremity predicts alternative beliefs only when the beliefs in question are partisan in nature and the measure of ideology is identity-based. Moreover, we find that operational ideological extremism is negatively related to nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs. Our findings help reconcile discrepant findings regarding the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs.

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