Separating kindhood from naturalness: Kinds are diverse in causal structure
[UPDATED 3/11/2020] This paper proposes that the richness of a category (i.e., high inductive potential, non-accidental properties, and generalizable causal structure) is conceptually distinct from its being natural or socially constructed. To test this account, we explore beliefs related to the classic distinction between natural kinds and nominal categories. Specifically, we subjected these beliefs, across diverse categories, to exploratory factor analysis (Studies 1 and 2), examined the inferential connections between these beliefs using experimental manipulations of novel categories (Study 3), and tested the discriminant and predictive validity of these beliefs in the context of real-world social categories (Studies 4 and 5). We find consistent support that rich structure (kindhood) is conceptually distinct from that structure being natural or social (naturalness). We argue that ‘psychological essentialism’ is best understood as a circumscribed set of beliefs related to naturalness, and that referring to kindhood as a type of essentialist belief is inaccurate.