Przesłanka interesu publicznego w działaniach Prezesa URE i Prezesa UOKiK na rynku energetycznym

2021 ◽  
pp. 78-107
Author(s):  
Filip Elżanowski

Every action of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection [PL: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów] must be taken in the public interest – the primary purpose of the antimonopoly regulation is to protect the business of entrepreneurs and consumers in the public interest. The President of the Energy Regulatory Office [PL: Urząd Regulacji Energetyki] is also governed by public interest activities. Under the applicable law, he is responsible for the development of competition, and one of his duties is to counteract the adverse effects of natural monopolies and balance the business of energy companies and fuel and energy consumers. In the Act on competition and consumer protection [PL: ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów], the notion of public interest is defined very generally. However, the Act on Energy Law [PL: ustawa – Prawo energetyczne] precisely specifies which elements shall be taken into account by the President of the Energy Regulatory Office each time when making a decision. A number of his activities aim to balance the business of energy security with the protection of energy companies’ business and consumers’ business, including issuing decisions on approval of tariffs. The President of the Energy Regulatory Office ensures the implementation of the public interest in this respect, and such interest cannot be understood differently by another regulatory authority under another act. Otherwise, a violation of the axiological coherence of the legal system occurs. In this particular context (in terms of the implementation of the public interest), priority should be given to the utility regulatory authority (the President of ERO) and not to the antimonopoly authority. However, in this case, we are not dealing with a contradiction of the wording of the provisions but with a potential contradiction in terms of the understanding and application of the public interest premise. Therefore, the provisions of utility acts constitute a lex specialis in this respect to the Act on competition and consumer protection – taking into account this particular approach, such contradiction does not occur. Consequently, it should be concluded that if a given action of the President of ERO (an administrative decision issuance) implemented the public interest by the Act (and was maintained in legal transactions, was not repealed, etc.), it thus excludes the possibility of taking action by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection which was based on the need to protect this public interest.

Author(s):  
Glen Davis

Serious misconduct, or breaches of duty by a company or its directors affecting the company’s relationships with members of the public, may trigger an investigation by the Secretary of State into the manner in which the company’s business has been conducted, or even the appointment of inspectors and publication of a formal report. In an appropriate case, the Secretary of State or a regulatory authority may petition the court to wind the company up on the basis that it is ‘just and equitable’ to do so in the public interest. Such a liquidation need not be predicated on insolvency. A winding-up order terminates the directors’ powers of management and is the logical response to misconduct or mismanagement by directors which is revealed by an inspector’s report.


2018 ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
Pekka Sulkunen ◽  
Thomas F. Babor ◽  
Jenny Cisneros Örnberg ◽  
Michael Egerer ◽  
Matilda Hellman ◽  
...  

This chapter explores gambling regulation regimes, looking at the different control structures used, and their effectiveness in serving the public interest. Gambling has always been regulated by public policy, and in whichever way the industry is developing, government regulation is always involved. Regimes of gambling regulation involve both public and private actors and institutions. Public monopolies may be stronger in the area of consumer protection than restrictive licensing, associations-based operations or competitive markets. In considering the choice of regulation regime, policymakers would be well advised not to weigh the pros and cons or the costs and benefits of legal gambling in itself but to consider whether it is the best way to achieve the public interest goals compared to the alternatives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Mohammed Rashid Hassan Al jaff ◽  
Sarbast Taha Sharif

in this research we will examine the legal dimensions of this contemporary crime in Iraqi consumer protection law which was ordered in 2010 .then we will focus on the criminal framework of the mentioned crime clarifying its elements , in addition to that we will make controversial discussion regarding the determination of the crime . in this research we will make a presumption by which we will spouse that the commercial advertisements must be suitable with the public interest criteria and human dignity. thus by increasing of this commercial practices without controlling, consequently the legislator must enact the proportionate rules with depending on legal certainty. At al we will strive to clarify all these problematic issues in this research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-30
Author(s):  
Desi Apriani

The business world is something that cannot be separated from business competition. There are business actors who compete in a fair competition  and there are also business actors who compete in a unfair competition. This is where the importance of the presence of business competition law in a country. In Indonesia, business competition law is contained in Law Number 5 of 1999 which prohibits monopolistic practices and unfair business competition. In relation to consumer protection, Law Number 5 Year 1999 has the aim of protecting the public interest and seeking public welfare. The prohibitions in the law indirectly have a protected effect on consumer interests. Need consistency in enforcement of business competition law so that the goal of protecting consumers can be achieved optimally.


Africa ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 620-640 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek R. Peterson

AbstractUnder Idi Amin's government, institutions that served the public interest were dramatically under-resourced. An array of self-nominated, self-important, self-righteous people were empowered to take on administrative tasks that, in an earlier dispensation, had been the work of professionals. Businesses and institutions that had formerly been under the regulatory authority of credentialled experts were thrown open all at once for commoners to operate. Everywhere there were campaigns, as the new regime made obscure and technical issues into urgent problems demanding a resolution. Ugandans were called upon to defend cultures, to struggle against imperialism and racism, and to transform the architecture of the economy. That is how people came to see themselves as proprietors of public life. Their work allowed commoners to claim equity over resources and infrastructures. In their investments in the operations of public institutions, people became custodians, proprietors and petty authoritarians. Their proprietary sense of responsibility was a powerful inducement to self-sacrifice. It was also the fuel for demagoguery.


ICL Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Birgit Hollaus

AbstractIn the present case, the Constitutional Court found that in having considered climate change as public interest opposing the permitting of a third runway at Vienna International Airport, the deciding court had comprehensively misjudged the applicable law and thus acted arbitrarily. ‘Climate change’, the public interest in climate protection respectively, is not a public interest reflected in the Austrian Aviation Act, which the deciding court relied upon; interpreting the Act in light of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act on Sustainability cannot newly found such a public interest. Highly anticipated, the judgment of the Constitutional Court surprises with its line of reasoning in arriving at this conclusion.


Author(s):  
French Derek

The chapter deals with the powers of the Secretary of State and other public officers and bodies to petition for a company to be wound up in the public interest. A petition for winding up in the public interest can only be presented by a person who is authorized to do so by statute. If it appears to the Secretary of State, from the results of any of various investigatory processes, that it is expedient in the public interest that a company should be wound up, petition for that company to be wound up by the court. A decision to present or not present a public interest petition is subject to judicial review. The fact that a regulatory authority has acted to prevent continuation of a company’s objectionable behaviour is not a reason for refusing a winding-up order in the public interest.


Author(s):  
Ewelina DANEL

Aim:The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the nature of decisions issued by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection regarding the imposition of penalty payments on entrepreneurs for infringements of the Protection of Competition and Consumers Act of February 26, 2007, which is one of the indications of restrictions on economic freedom. Special attention has been paid to the criteria applied by the President of the OCCP for imposing penalty payments while indicating the changes introduced by amendments to the Act  which came into force on January 18, 2015. Design / Research methods:Legal historical method, systematic and teleological interpretation, comparative law Conclusions / findings:Both the rules and the criteria required to be applied by the President of the OCCP when inflicting punishment are included in a catalogue of directives in Article 111 of CCPA. In the catalogue, the legislator attaches particular importance to the premise consisting in a breach of provisions of the law and a previous breach of the same legal act while other elements, separate for each type of breach, are specified later on, imposing on the President of the OCCP the obligation to consider both attenuating circumstances and aggravating circumstances when deciding on the degree (amount) of the penalty. Irrespective of the above, due to the open catalogue of circumstances affecting the gravity of the penalty, the President of the OCCP may also consider some circumstances indirectly implied in the act and developed by the judiciary decisions, which include the type of non-compliance or breach, the degree of violating the public interest, intentional or unintentional action orduration of the breach. Originality / value of the article:To signal criteria changes applied by the President of the OCCP for imposing penalty payments while indicating the changes introduced by amendments to the Act, which came into force on 18 January 2015.


Author(s):  
Michał RADUŁA

Aim: The notion of a public interest in administrative law science and in the administration science occupies the central position in the notion chart. Consequently, it is also the main notion of public protection of competition. The legislator has not decided to present a definition of "the public interest" in the Competition and Consumer Protection Law Act. As a result, interpretation of the concept is largely dependent on the judicature. The aim of the paper is to analyse the notion of a public interest and its interpretation both in science and in practice of law application. Design / Research methods: The author's conclusions are based on analysing the pubic interest interpretation made by representatives of the doctrine and the judicature. Conclusions / findings: In consequence, the author is of very good opinion on how the notion of a public interest in the public protection of competition evolves, adapting to the current social and market condition and to the development of the competition law science. Originality / value of the article: Originality of the topic comes from the legal analysis of the controversial presentation of a correctly operating competition on the medicinal product sales market, unprecedented in the judicature, as a mechanism allowing patients to obtain health services in line with the current status of medical knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 305-318
Author(s):  
Bartosz Smółka

The commented judgment is a fundamental source of information on the protection of consumer rights and interests from the point of view of actions taken by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, as well as the courts. The essence of the issued ruling focuses not only on the proper procedure implementing the assumptions of consumer protection policy, but also refers to key concepts for consumers. In particular, to the concept of an average consumer model or the public interest in the process of consumer protection. The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, following the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, also made significant considerations on the significance of the judgment issued as a result of the abstract control of contract templates.


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