VAN PROKHANOV’S CRITICISM OF THE MOSCOW CAESAROPAPISM

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-129
Author(s):  
N. Maryukhno ◽  

The article examines the socio-political theology of Ivan Prokhanov as a prominent Russian religious and social figure of the early twentieth century, chairman of the All-Russian Union of Evangelical Christians. His critique of the сaesaropapism as structure in the Russian state-church relations of the imperial period is studied. It is proved that Ivan Prokhanov sharply denounced the negative manifestations of caesaropapism, and above all the resistance of the Russian Orthodox Church to constructive reform in accordance with Christian evangelical values. The positions on the church-religious life of the evangelical theologian Ivan Prokhanov and the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the leader of the reactionary resistance to any changes, the ideologue of the counter-reforms Alexander III, were compared. In his sharp critique of caesaropapism, he relied on the Christian doctrine of man and society, believing that the legal precondition for overcoming its negative consequences was the separation of church and state, and the need for evangelical awakening of the Russian Orthodox people to gain spiritual freedom.

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 60-64
Author(s):  
Evguenia Alexandrovna Belyaeva ◽  
Elena Aleksandrovna Venidiktova ◽  
Dilbar Valievna Shamsutdinova

Purpose: the aim of the undertaken study is to consider the dynamics of the church-state relationship in the context of Russian new cultural tendencies at the turn of the century. Methodology: Thus, The methodological basis of the research was formed by philosophical analysis of the church-state relationship, historicism and comparison principles. The following tasks were being solved: defining the interaction ways between the religious organizations and the state on the modern stage of the Russian society development; pointing out the prospects of consolidation of both the сhurch and the state around the democratic civil society fostering program in XXI century; revealing the need to promote respectful attitude towards human values as an integral part of spiritual culture. Result: The authors achieved the following results within the study: A wider notions of church and state were introduced demonstrating the similarity of some of their functions: offering moral guidance for social well-being; historic doctrinal models “caesaropapism”, “papocaesarism” and “symphony(concordance) of powers” were identified and characterized alongside with their secular counterparts - separation and cooperation models of church-state relationship. In conclusion of the article the urgent need for the transition of church-state relationship from political to social and cultural spheres was justified. Applications: This research can be used for the universities, teachers, and students. Novelty/Originality: In this research, the model of Socio-Cultural Interaction Forms of Church and State on the Example of the Russian Orthodox Church is presented in a comprehensive and complete manner.


1985 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. L. Freeze

The history of the Russian Orthodox Church, especially in the modern imperial period (1700–1917), has been a woefully neglected field of scholarly research. That neglect antedates the collapse of the ancien regime in 1917, for pre-revolutionary historiography on the Church was neither abundant nor sophisticated; rarely did it produce more than myopic diocesan histories, fatuous accounts of the local seminary, or hagiographic paeans devoted to some prominent clergyman. The reasons for this neglect of so fundamental an institution in ‘Holy Rus’ are many – restricted access to ecclesiastical archives, difficulties in publication because of vigilant censors, but above all the intelligentsia's indifference to an apparently moribund and state-controlled institution. Paradoxically enough, Catholic polemicists, Orthodox Slavophiles, anticlerical intellectuals and reform-minded clergy all concurred – from different motives, for different reasons – in believing that the Church had become a mere instrument of the secular state, and that this change derived from ‘revolutionary’ and ‘Westernizing’ reforms in the Church imposed by Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century.


2007 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-540
Author(s):  
Matthew P. Romaniello

Muscovy's active period of eastward expansion began with the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ in 1552. By the seventeenth century, one observer claimed that the conquest of Kazan’ was the event that made Ivan IV a tsar and Muscovy an empire. With this victory, the tsar claimed new lands, adding to his subjects the diverse animistic and Muslim population of Turkic Tatars and Chuvashes, and Finno-Ugric Maris, Mordvins, and Udmurts. The conquest of Kazan’ provided both the Metropolitan of Moscow and Ivan IV (the Terrible) an opportunity to transform the image of Muscovy into that of a victorious Orthodox power and to justify the title of its Grand Prince as a new caesar (tsar). Since the conquest was the first Orthodox victory against Islam since the fall of Constantinople, commemorations of it were immediate, including the construction of the Church of the Intercession by the Moat (St. Basil's) on Red Square.The incorporation of the lands and peoples of Kazan’ has served traditionally to date the establishment of the Russian Empire. Accounts of the conquest have emphasized the victory of Orthodoxy against Islam, with the Russian Orthodox Church and its Metropolitan as the motive force behind this expansion. The conversion of the Muslims and animists of the region is portrayed frequently as automatic, facing little resistance. More recently, scholars have criticized this simplistic account of the conquest by discussing the conversion mission as a rhetorical construct and have placed increasing emphasis on the local non-Russian and non-Orthodox resistance to the interests of the Church and state.


2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Detelina Tocheva

AbstractThe liberalisation of religious practice after the fall of the Soviet regime and the support by the Russian state to the Russian Orthodox Church have contributed to the enormous growth of the church economy. Controversies within and without the Church interrogate commercial and gifting practices. The relationship between the expansion of church commerce and the operation of moral boundaries, underlined by critical stances, has been determined by culture and history, with the post-Soviet transformation having played a key role in shaping popular notions of selflessness and profit-seeking. Moreover, as people participate in the church economy they mobilise perceptions of the differential moral valence of gift and commerce in order to communicate concerning the power of the Church, its controversial image, Russia’s social stratification, and to deploy ethics of equity and honesty.


Author(s):  
Ростислав Ярема ◽  

This article reveals the contribution of the Kingdom to the Holy Trinity Sergius Lavra through the prism of personal relations between the Orthodox Church and the highest state authorities, and thus reveals the role of the Emperors and the Church in the history of Russian art, as well as in the preservation of Russian national culture and identity. Russian monarchs’ pilgrimage and contribution to the monastery of St. Sergius of Radonezh is considered an important factor in strengthening ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Monarchy, as well as the entire Russian society, supporting its national idea. Russian art was formed in the spiritual paradigm of Christianity, immediately after the adoption of the unified faith (unity of faith) up to the seventeenth century. The analysis of gifts and contributions, as well as their artistic value, allows to conclude that the contributions of the sovereigns constitute the summit of achievements of modern Russian art culture. From this point of view, the Church, in particular the Holy Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, against the background of known political upheavals in the country in the twentieth century, became the keeper of an invaluable cultural and artistic treasury and spiritual core of Great Russia, showing not only a model of serving the Orthodoxy, its people and country, but also a saving perspective for the Russian State of historical survival in the new epoch.


Slavic Review ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-662
Author(s):  
Gregory L. Freeze

The eighteenth century marked a crucial new period in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. In Muscovy the church had been an institution of paramount importance: it possessed enormous wealth, exercised considerable influence on the theocratic politics of Muscovy, and held a virtual monopoly over culture and art. During the eighteenth century, however, this awesome power and wealth all but vanished. The secularized state wrought fundamental changes in the church: it replaced the patriarch with a more tractable Synod, gradually exploited and finally sequestered the church's lands and peasants, and in general transformed the church into an “integral part of the Russian state structure and administration.” The church's ascendancy was correspondingly weakened in both society and culture. The ecclesiastical leadership made little headway against the abiding problems of superstition and paganism, and it failed to stem the spread of the Old Belief and of secular culture throughout the population.


Author(s):  
Maria Avanesova ◽  
Vladimír Naxera

This paper is devoted to the topic of relations between the Russian state, Russian society, and the Orthodox Church after the year 2008, when Patriarch Kirill was elected head of the Church. Such relations in Russia have gone through a significant transformation since the beginning of the Post-Soviet period. In the era of Patriarch Alexy II, the Church gradually began to claim a larger political role, the culmination of which was marked by Kirill’s election. At present, the Russian Orthodox Church operates to a certain degree as an institution of Russian political power. Its representatives, led by Kirill, often play a role that is more political than religious. By drawing from primary sources, official documents, media reports, and also speeches made by religious and political representatives, this article attempts to highlight the main issues and areas of cooperation between the state and the Church (e.g. the education system, elections in 2011 and 2012) and explain the ways in which this alliance is advantageous for both parties in relation to the Russian public. The last part of the article deals with how this connection between church and state is perceived by various sections of the Russian public, which is illustrated using several examples from previous years, e.g. the scandal surrounding the members of the feminist punk rock protest group Pussy Riot.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
David K. Goodin

This essay brings Douglas John Hall’s engagement with the theology of the cross for a post-Christendom context into dialogue with the political theology of Russkii mir by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Russkii mir is a theology that claims to be Christendom reborn. It signals a new alliance between the ROC and the Russian Federation by sanctioning military conquest of foreign lands, including Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. This essay documents the emergence of this new political theology in terms of its historical precedents and how this history is being distorted, and even invented, to justify the claims to Christendom. Particular attention is given to the architecture and militaristic symbolism for the newly christened Cathedral for the Russian Armed Forces, dedicated on June 14th, 2020. Finally, these claims are critically examined using Hall’s theology of the cross as a disestablishment for all such “theologies of glory” in light of scripture, tradition, and the true mission of the church. I also bring Hall’s work into dialogue with similar thought from the Orthodox East.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
David K. Goodin

This essay brings Douglas John Hall’s engagement with the theology of the cross for a post-Christendom context into dialogue with the political theology of Russkii mir by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Russkii mir is a theology that claims to be Christendom reborn. It signals a new alliance between the ROC and the Russian Federation by sanctioning military conquest of foreign lands, including Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. This essay documents the emergence of this new political theology in terms of its historical precedents and how this history is being distorted, and even invented, to justify the claims to Christendom. Particular attention is given to the architecture and militaristic symbolism for the newly christened Cathedral for the Russian Armed Forces, dedicated on June 14th, 2020. Finally, these claims are critically examined using Hall’s theology of the cross as a disestablishment for all such “theologies of glory” in light of scripture, tradition, and the true mission of the church. I also bring Hall’s work into dialogue with similar thought from the Orthodox East.


Author(s):  
A. A. Gorina

This paper as illustrated by Nizhny Novgorod province in the first half of the twenties of the XX century presents one of the most tragic pages of the relationship between church and state. The purpose of the Soviet government, which declared the creation of the first-ever atheistic state, was a complete elimination of church and religion as cultural, social and world outlook phenomenon. Hunger in 1921-1922 was an initial stage and constituted a ground for all further hardline policy of the Soviet state in its stance toward a church. In consequence of which a huge number of different objects of our Motherland’s historical and cultural heritage were done away with, also during repressions, a large number of believers and priests died. Many years in the Soviet historiography, there was a dominant statement that the Russian Orthodox Church opposed transferring the church values, which was intended for the relief aid. All actions of the church and appeals of the Patriarch Tikhon were subjected to obfuscation. A wide variety of sources, which earlier were strictly confidential, and nowadays they become available for researchers, allow objectively analyzing the charity of Russian Orthodox Church for the relief aid in 1921-1922. On the basis of regional archive documents, which contain statistical data, clergies and lay members records of meetings. The article provides more insight on through the campaign for a seizure of churches’ values in the Nizhny Novgorod province, also outlines the quantity of the seizure values: how many from them went for the relief aid. The clergies and lay members’ records of meetings of the Nizhny Novgorod province make it clear that their desire for relief aid was the optional choice. Printed copies have allowed to establish specific aspects of the campaign for a seizure of a church property, to fully consider the process of transition from the donation of values for the relief aid before the forced seizure of churches’ values in the region, and also to determine a problem of the collaboration of the government and the Nizhny Novgorod Diocese.


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