scholarly journals A Model for Artificial General Intelligence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy E Williams

A Functional Modeling Framework (FMF) for defining and comparing models of consciousness and cognition has recently been developed. This framework proposes to have the capacity to represent the complete set of the functionality of human consciousness and cognition, which if true, would suggest that all models of consciousness and cognition can be represented within the framework. The framework also proposes to define the criteria for a model of cognition to have the potential for the general problem solving ability commonly recognized as true human intelligence. The FMF provides a single framework for defining models of consciousness and cognition that is human-centric in that the functions can be validated through experiments that can be performed within innate human self-awareness rather than being dependent on assumptions made by any specific model. This human-centric functional modeling approach is intended to enable different models of AGI to be more easily compared so research can reliably converge on a single understanding, enabling the possibility of massively collaborative interdisciplinary projects to research, and implement models of consciousness or cognition where such massive collaborationhas not proved possible before. The FMF defines requirements for all the functional components defined by the framework, but leaves specific models to define their own implementations. This paper summarizes a model of cognition developed within this framework that is proposed to meet the criteria of an AGI as defined within this framework. This description is expanded in a number of other papers.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy E Williams

A recently developed Functional Modeling Framework (FMF) for defining models of consciousness and cognition proposes to have the capacity to represent all models of consciousness and cognition and proposes to define the criteria for a model of consciousness to have the potential for self awareness. The FMF provides a single mathematical framework for defining models of consciousness that is human-centric in being independent of assumptions made by any specific model. This human-centric approach enables different models to be more easily compared so research on consciousness can reliably converge on a single understanding, enabling the possibility of massively collaborative interdisciplinary projects to research, and implement a model of consciousness and cognition where not possible before. Some functional components of the FMF remain to be validated. However even without validating the entire framework using some subset of the framework is still useful as a common basis for comparing models of consciousness. This paper demonstrates the comparison of three leading model of consciousness within the subset of this framework that has been validated by many years of tradition.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy E Williams

Borrowing techniques from complex systems and software engineering, this paper defines a Functional Modeling Framework to provide a simple common mechanism for representing models of consciousness or cognition that is independent of assumptions made by any specific model. All models of consciousness or cognition should of course fit into the complete set of functions of what consciousness, or cognition can do. Through attempting to represent all such functions (both computable and non-computable), this framework attempts to gain the capacity to represent all models of consciousness or cognition, even where the implementation mechanisms of those functions are unknown. Enabling different models of consciousness or cognition to be more easily compared is intended to enable research on consciousness and cognition to more reliably converge on a single understanding, even across massively collaborative research projects spanning multiple disciplines. Furthermore, if biological functionality can be considered as dynamically stable where it is persistent, then in aiming to provide a common approach for representing and comparing the functionalities of consciousness or cognition as dynamically stable systems, this framework provides a set of features through which it may be possible to see commonality between the functional components of a wide range of other dynamically stable biological or non-biological systems. If such commonality does exist, and if, as proposed, that commonality reflects deeper underlying physical and mathematical principles, then representing any researcher’s model of consciousness or cognition within this framework might help reveal applications of that researcher’s model across a wide range of other domains of study.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adil M. Jamil

This study examines the phases of human consciousness revealed in the poetry of indigenous people in the light of some prominent psychologists and philosophers mainly Bucke, Schleiermacher, William James, Hegel, and Moores. Bucke and Schleiermacher cited three forms of consciousness: Animal or Brutish Self-awareness, Sensual or Self-Consciousness, and Cosmic Consciousness. While examining the poetry of indigenous people, Palestinians and Native Americans, we find out that the majority moves within the confines of the Sensual or Self-Consciousness in their reaction to the brutish consciousness of the oppressors who deny their unalienable rights for life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Unlike others, Mahmoud Darwish, the Palestinian, and Joy Harjo, the Native American, attempt to transcend the sensual consciousness and adopt a broader universal vision or cosmic consciousness; however, their peaceful vision is often shattered by bitter realities and frustrated by the inhuman conduct of their oppressors. In their verses, the particular or the sensual is not completely overlooked or concealed. It is always there, yet alleviated by a universal vision held by the two poets


Author(s):  
Yoshinobu Kitamura ◽  
Riichiro Mizoguchi

AbstractThe authors have been involved in ontological modeling of function for over 15 years. As an instance of the revisionary approach discussed in Vermaas's position paper, we have proposed an ontological definition of function and a modeling framework based on it, which has been deployed in industry. In addition, as an instance of the overarching approach, we have proposed a reference ontology of function that explains some kinds, definitions, and practical expressions of functions. In this paper, we explain our methodology in an overarching approach based onperspectives for capturing functions. When one captures a function of an artifact, one focuses on a specific aspect of the artifact from a specific perspective. In this paper, we conceptualize such perspectives behind the reference ontology. In addition, based on our experiences in deployment in an industrial setting, we report some solutions, such as ontological modeling guidelines, for overcoming some of the difficulties faced in the practical functional modeling approach described in Eckert's position paper. Our findings suggest that such solutions will help engineers to describe consistent functional models compliant with a single definition of function.


PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e9290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Schmiedek ◽  
Martin Lövdén ◽  
Timo von Oertzen ◽  
Ulman Lindenberger

Over a century of research on between-person differences has resulted in the consensus that human cognitive abilities are hierarchically organized, with a general factor, termed general intelligence or “g,” uppermost. Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this body of evidence is informative about how cognition is structured within individuals. Using data from 101 young adults performing nine cognitive tasks on 100 occasions distributed over six months, we find that the structures of individuals’ cognitive abilities vary among each other, and deviate greatly from the modal between-person structure. Working memory contributes the largest share of common variance to both between- and within-person structures, but the g factor is much less prominent within than between persons. We conclude that between-person structures of cognitive abilities cannot serve as a surrogate for within-person structures. To reveal the development and organization of human intelligence, individuals need to be studied over time.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Schmiedek ◽  
Martin Lövdén ◽  
Timo von Oertzen ◽  
Ulman Lindenberger

Over a century of research on between-person differences has resulted in the consensus that human cognitive abilities are hierarchically organized, with a general factor, termed general intelligence or “g,” uppermost. Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this body of evidence is informative about how cognition is structured within individuals. Using data from 101 young adults performing nine cognitive tasks on 100 occasions distributed over six months, we find that the structures of individuals’ cognitive abilities vary among each other, and deviate greatly from the modal between-person structure. Working memory contributes the largest share of common variance to both between- and within-person structures, but the g factor is much less prominent within than between persons. We conclude that between-person structures of cognitive abilities cannot serve as a surrogate for within-person structures. To reveal the development and organization of human intelligence, individuals need to be studied over time.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Alexander Thiele ◽  
Joshua Faskowitz ◽  
Olaf Sporns ◽  
Kirsten Hilger

Intelligence describes the general cognitive ability level of a person. It is one of the most fundamental concepts in psychological science and is crucial for effective adaption of behavior to varying environmental demands. Changing external task demands have been shown to induce reconfiguration of functional brain networks. However, whether neural reconfiguration between different tasks is associated with intelligence has not yet been investigated. We used fMRI data from 812 subjects to show that higher scores of general intelligence are related to less brain network reconfiguration between resting state and seven different tasks as well as to network reconfiguration between tasks. This association holds for all functional brain networks except the motor system, and replicates in two independent samples (N = 138, N = 184). Our findings suggest that the intrinsic network architecture of individuals with higher general intelligence scores is closer to the network architecture as required by various cognitive demands. Multi-task brain network reconfiguration may, therefore, reflect the neural equivalent of the behavioral positive manifold, i.e., the essence of the concept of general intelligence. Finally, our results support neural efficiency theories of cognitive ability and reveal insights into human intelligence as an emergent property from a distributed multi-task brain network.


Author(s):  
Florian Schmiedek ◽  
Martin Lövdén ◽  
Timo von Oertzen ◽  
Ulman Lindenberger

Over a century of research on between-person differences has resulted in the consensus that human cognitive abilities are hierarchically organized, with a general factor, termed general intelligence or “g,” uppermost. Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this body of evidence is informative about how cognition is structured within individuals. Using data from 101 young adults performing nine cognitive tasks on 100 occasions distributed over six months, we find that the structures of individuals’ cognitive abilities vary among each other, and deviate greatly from the modal between-person structure. Working memory contributes the largest share of common variance to both between- and within-person structures, but the g factor is much less prominent within than between persons. We conclude that between-person structures of cognitive abilities cannot serve as a surrogate for within-person structures. To reveal the development and organization of human intelligence, individuals need to be studied over time.


2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy Johnson ◽  
Irving I. Gottesman

Blair presumes the validity of the fluid-crystallized model throughout his article. Two comparative evaluations recently demonstrated that this presumption can be challenged. The fluid-crystallized model offers little to the understanding of the structural manifestation of general intelligence and other more specific abilities. It obscures important issues involving the distinction of pervasive learning disabilities (low general intelligence) from specific, content-related disabilities that impede the development of particular skills.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document