scholarly journals Logic, truth, and metaphysics: from Leibniz to Heidegger

2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Dung Ngoc Duong

This essay explores the ontological foundations of logic and truth from Heidegger’s philosophical perspective. It focuses, in particulat, on Heidegger’s interpretation of Leibniz’s theory of judgment. This case study aims at looking back at the history of philosophy from Heidegger’s position on truth understood as unconcealment or disclosure (aletheia).

Author(s):  
James Dodd

This chapter sketches the trajectory of Jan Patočka’s philosophical development against the background of the conflicts and crises that marked the history of the twentieth century, and which profoundly affected the Czech philosopher. The relevant period spans from the 1930s, when Patočka studied under Edmund Husserl in Freiburg, to the philosopher’s activities as a dissident in 1970s Czechoslovakia. Particular attention is paid to Patočka’s deep reading of the history of philosophy; the complexities of his appropriation of the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger; and the philosophy of history developed late in his career. The chapter ends with a consideration of Patočka’s influence on contemporary phenomenological philosophy, suggesting that his most promising contribution lies in his challenging engagement with the problem of Europe, above all his call for a post-European philosophical perspective.


Author(s):  
Andrea Reichenberger

The following article describes a pilot study on the possible integration of digital historiography into teaching practice. It focuses on Émilie Du Châtelet’s considerations of space and time against the background of Leibniz’s program of analysis situs. Historians have characterized philosophical controversies on space and time as a dichotomy between the absolute and relational concepts of space and time. In response to this, the present case study pursues two aims: First, it shows that the common portrayal simplifies the complex pattern of change and the semantic shift from absolute-relational concepts of space and time to invariance and conservation principles. Second, against this background, I present the Online Reading Guide on Émilie Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics, a teaching and research project designed to help navigate Du Châtelet’s Institutions physiques (1740/42). This project makes Du Châtelet’s important text visible to a broad audience and allows for a more critical and deeper view on classical topics of the history of philosophy and science in a more accessible way than traditional introductions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 156-172
Author(s):  
Nawzad Jamal Faraj

This paper tries to answer a main question: what is critics and criticism? It is obvious that Kant’s philosophy marked by “Criticism” which is defined as a philosophical turn in the history of philosophy. In Kant’s philosophy critic is not just a title of his three main books, but it is his way of look at philosophy and the role of philosopher. In other words, the main task of philosophy and philosophizing, it is not defending or interpreting a single philosophical perspective, but it is to judge and criticize all kinds of philosophical enquires. This mean that since Kant’s approach, philosophical inquiry has taken another direction: toward the critic of philosophical subjects. Philosophy have to start with critic of reason and its scope. And reason alone is in charge of criticizing. In other words, reason is the suspicious guilty one and the defender in the court of reason.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Sytsma ◽  
Jonathan Livengood ◽  

One view of philosophy that is sometimes expressed, especially by scientists, is that while philosophers are good at asking questions, they are poor at producing convincing answers. And the perceived divide between philosophical and scientific methods is often pointed to as the major culprit behind this lack of progress. Looking back at the history of philosophy, however, we find that this methodological divide is a relatively recent invention. Further, it is one that has been challenged over the past decade by the modern incarnation of experimental philosophy. How might the reincorporation of empirical methods into philosophy aid the process of making philosophical progress? Building off of the work of Sytsma (2010), we argue that one way it does so is by offering a means of resolving some disputes that arise in philosophy. We illustrate how philosophical disputes may sometimes be resolved empirically by looking at the recent experimental literature on intuitions about reference.


Author(s):  
Matt Waldschlagel

This paper examines an important episode in the history of early modern physics – the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence of 1715-16, an exchange that occurred at the intersection of physics, metaphysics and theology – before turning to questions of interpretation in the historiography of physics.  Samuel Clarke, a disciple of Isaac Newton, engaged in a dispute over Newton’s commitment to absolute space and absolute time with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who criticized Newton’s views and advanced a rival account.  I clarify the positions at stake in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, define a variety of terms – absolute space, absolute time, substantivalism, and relationalism – endogenous to the exchange, and reconstruct key elements in the philosophical dimension of the dispute.  I then use the Leibniz-Clarke exchange as a springboard from which to examine interpretive considerations in the historiography of physics.  I argue that the history of physics can benefit from reassessing its historiographical commitments by borrowing or appropriating some of the intellectual resources used by philosophers working in the history of philosophy.  This historiographical reassessment, I contend, will not only shed new light on the Leibniz-Clarke exchange but may also reinvigorate the history of physics.


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