An Asian era with the Euro-Atlantic civilization as a background?

2017 ◽  
pp. 140-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. W. Kolodko

For years, the view has been repeated that Asia’s age is coming, and thus the position of both Europe and the United States is declining. The main factor behind these tectonic shifts in relative economic power and the associated geopolitical situation is the nearly four decades of rapid growth of Chinese economy. The achievements of other Southeast Asian countries, especially India, with robust growth are also meaningful with this regard. The article verifies these views and analyzes the different aspects of China’s confrontation with Europe and North America. The Asian dominance era is not coming, yet a relatively stronger position of the East at the cost of a weakening position of the West is emerging. Hence, a new multi-polar arrangement of forces in the global economy, without a hegemon, is being created.

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-57
Author(s):  
Andrea Benvenuti ◽  
David Martin Jones

A generation of scholars has depicted the premiership of Labor Party leader Gough Whitlam as a watershed in Australian foreign policy. According to the prevailing consensus, Whitlam carved out a more independent and progressive role in international affairs without significantly endangering relations with Western-aligned states in East and Southeast Asia or with Australia's traditionally closest allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. This article takes issue with these views and offers a more skeptical assessment of Whitlam's diplomacy and questions his handling of Australia's alliance with the United States. In doing so, it shows that Whitlam, in his eagerness to embrace détente, reject containment, and project an image of an allegedly more progressive and independent Australia, in fact exacerbated tensions with Richard Nixon's Republican administration and caused disquiet among Southeast Asian countries that were aligned with or at least friendly toward the West.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Luke Patey

China views the decline of the United States and the West as signal to advance its interests, norms, and values on the world stage. But sentiments that one superpower will replace another miss the bigger picture. China’s rise to the commanding heights of the global economy and world affairs is not preordained. Its potential evolution into a global superpower, with a deep presence and strong influence over economic, political, military, and culture abroad, will rather be conditioned by how China behaves toward the rest of the world, and how the world responds. The world’s other large economies, major militaries, technology leaders, and cultural hubs will be significant in shaping the future world. For developed and developing countries alike, there is recognition that economic engagement with China produces strategic vulnerabilities to their own competitiveness and foreign policy and defense autonomy. China will struggle to realize its political, economic, and military global ambitions.


Author(s):  
Kenton Clymer

The U.S. relationship with Southeast Asia has always reflected the state of U.S. interactions with the three major powers that surround the region: Japan, China, and, to a lesser extent, India. Initially, Americans looked at Southeast Asia as an avenue to the rich markets that China and India seemed to offer, while also finding trading opportunities in the region itself. Later, American missionaries sought to save Southeast Asian souls, while U.S. officials often viewed Southeast Asia as a region that could tip the overall balance of power in East Asia if its enormous resources fell under the control of a hostile power. American interest expanded enormously with the annexation of the Philippines in 1899, an outgrowth of the Spanish-American War. That acquisition resulted in a nearly half-century of American colonial rule, while American investors increased their involvement in exploiting the region’s raw materials, notably tin, rubber, and petroleum, and missionaries expanded into areas previously closed to them. American occupation of the Philippines heightened tensions with Japan, which sought the resources of Southeast Asia, particularly in French Indochina, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia). Eventually, clashing ambitions and perceptions brought the United States into World War II. Peeling those territories away from Japan during the war was a key American objective. Americans resisted the Japanese in the Philippines and in Burma, but after Japan quickly subdued Southeast Asia, there was little contact in the region until the reconquest began in 1944. American forces participated in the liberation of Burma and also fought in the Dutch Indies and the Philippines before the war ended in 1945. After the war, the United States had to face the independence struggles in several Southeast Asian countries, even as the Grand Alliance fell apart and the Cold War emerged, which for the next several decades overshadowed almost everything. American efforts to prevent communist expansion in the region inhibited American support for decolonization and led to war in Vietnam and Laos and covert interventions elsewhere. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, relations with most of Southeast Asia have generally been normal, except for Burma/Myanmar, where a brutal military junta ruled. The opposition, led by the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi, found support in the United States. More recently American concerns with China’s new assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, have resulted in even closer U.S. relations with Southeast Asian countries.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Wen-Qing Ngoei

This introduction presents an overview of the book’s study of imperial transition in Southeast Asia from the colonial order through Anglo-American predominance to U.S. empire. It explains that the book examines two Southeast Asian countries—Malaya and Singapore—marginalized by major studies of U.S. policy to illuminate regional developments in U.S.-Southeast Asian relations otherwise overlooked by the predominant focus of historians on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Using this wide-angle view of Southeast Asia, the book reveals how the bases of U.S. Cold War policy draw from longstanding Euro-American anxieties about race, specifically the perceived threat of China and its diaspora to western power. From this insight, the book is able to reveal that Britain, the United States and their indigenous anticommunist allies crafted a pro-West nationalism underpinned by region-wide anti-Chinese prejudice, a process that ensconced most Southeast Asian regimes within the American orbit even as U.S. policy failed in Vietnam.


Author(s):  
А.А. Zabella ◽  
◽  
E.Yu. Katkova ◽  

The article defines the basic postulates of China's peripheral diplomacy and its features. The authors analyze the basics of China's foreign policy, as well as its policy towards the ASEAN. The authors focus on the "One belt, one road" initiative and the Indo-Pacific strategy, as well as the struggle between China and the United States for the loyalty of Southeast Asian countries.


Author(s):  
Yukon Huang

Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997 marked the end of an era and provides the starting point for a discussion about public perceptions. Today’s China emerged from his reforms, which opened the country to the outside world. Views of outsiders have shifted markedly over the past several decades. The majority of Americans see China’s rise as a threat to their country’s global stature, but Europeans are less preoccupied with power politics. Both groups wrongly see China as the leading economic power contrary to the rest of the world which see the United States. Popular feelings toward China vary widely across and within regions; they are influenced by proximity and colored by history and ideology. This chapter discusses the geopolitical factors that shape these opinions in the West, among the BRICS, in the developing world, and among China’s neighbors, as well as China’s efforts to influence these opinions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Putri Auliya ◽  
Yohanes Sulaiman

Why Indonesia remains committed to maintain centrality of ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy as a way to deter conflicts, especially in light of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s famous proclamation of “Global Maritime Fulcrum?” The main thrust of “Global Maritime Fulcrum” doctrine is that facing shifting geopolitical and economic power from the West to Asia, Indoneia needed to face the challenge by putting Indonesia’s interest back to the forefront of global political and economic discourse. Yet, by the end of the day, Indonesia remained committed in pushing for the centrality of ASEAN especially in dealing with potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region. By stressing the centrality of ASEAN, meaning that Indonesia is attempting to strengthen cooperation between the members of ASEAN and crafting a cooperative regional framework, Indonesia and ASEAN as a whole may be able to reduce the tension due to the clashing interest of the United States and China in Indo-Pacific region.


Worldview ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 23-27
Author(s):  
Fumio Matsuo

The main problem in Southeast Asia is economic development, a problem the United States and Japan are largely responsible for. Southeast Asia, the U.S., and Japan are all involved, therefore, in determining how to achieve economic viability in Southeast Asia—where a new era of peaceful coexistence has begun after decades of war.Leaders in Southeast Asian countries, including the Socialist states in Indochina, agree that the most pressing problem is how to overcoihe extreme hardships and difficulties in order to achieve economic and social development.


2020 ◽  
pp. 179-238
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This chapter explores how the ten Southeast Asian countries each try their best to navigate between the two big powers of China and the United States. Not a single country in the region is entirely under either Chinese or American influence. Most Southeast Asian states “hedge” between the two big powers; they seek to maintain their independence and freedom of choices and action; most seek benefits from each while avoiding dependency; and all have to simultaneously navigate bilaterally with each power, trilaterally with both powers, and multilaterally with other significant regional powers and within the framework of “ASEAN centrality.” Among the ten states, the chapter reveals one notable overarching characteristic: pervasive ambivalence. That is, all ten countries exhibit ambivalence about both powers—not fully trusting either.


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