La polětica de no intervenciňn en la guerra civil espanola

2009 ◽  
pp. 155-176
Author(s):  
Enrique Moradiellos

- The policy of Non-Intervention agreed by all the Europeans Powers with regards to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 was a serious obstacle to the war effort of the Republican Government and it was also very favourable to the Francoist side. Under the cover of the European arms embargo, Germany and Italy supported General Franco's Insurgent forces from the beginning, while the Western Democracies refused to intervene in the conflict at all. The timely arrival of Soviet help to the Republic was enough to avoid early defeat but not to obtain victory. The consequent system of aids and inhibitions was therefore a vital factor in the course and final outcome of the Spanish struggle.Key words: Spanish civil war, Non Intervention, 1936-1939, appeasement policy, Italo-German Axis, Soviet collective security.Parole chiave: guerra civile spagnola, non intervento, 1936-1939, politica di appeasement, Asse italo-germanica, sicurezza collettiva sovietica.

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200942199789
Author(s):  
David A. Messenger

The bombardment of civilians from the air was a regular feature of the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939. It is estimated some 15,000 Spaniards died as a result of air bombings during the Civil War, most civilians, and 11,000 were victims of bombing from the Francoist side that rebelled against the Republican government, supported by German and Italian aviation that joined the rebellion against the Republic. In Catalonia alone, some 1062 municipalities experienced aerial bombardments by the Francoist side of the civil war. In cities across Spain, municipal and regional authorities developed detailed plans for civilian defense in response to these air campaigns. In Barcelona, the municipality created the Junta Local de Defensa Passiva de Barcelona, to build bomb shelters, warn the public of bombings, and educate them on how to protect themselves against aerial bombardment. They mobilized civilians around the concept of ‘passive defense.’ This proactive response by civilians and local government to what they recognized as a war targeting them is an important and under-studied aspect of the Spanish Civil War.


Author(s):  
Guadalupe Adámez Castro

RESUMEN Tras la derrota republicana en la Guerra Civil fueron muchos los españoles que tuvieron que huir y comenzar una nueva vida. La gran mayoría se asentó en Francia aunque muchos otros optaron por pedir asilo en el continente americano, especialmente en México. Su presidente, Lázaro Cárdenas, puso como condición principal para esta acogida que las instituciones de ayuda a los refugiados, creadas con los fondos de la República española, financiaran los viajes de estos hacia el país azteca, así como su manutención y alojamiento durante los primeros meses de su estancia en dicho lugar. Para llevar a cabo esta tarea se creó el Comité Técnico de Ayuda a los Republicanos Españoles (CTARE) capitaneado por José Puche, delegación del Servicio de Evacuación de los Republicanos Españoles (SERE) en México. A este Comité llegaron miles de peticiones de ayuda en las que los refugiados mostraban cuáles eran sus necesidades y preocupaciones más urgentes. El análisis de una parte de estas súplicas es el eje central de este trabajo, que pretende demostrar cuál fue el camino que siguieron estas cartas desde su escritura hasta su concesión o negación y qué huellas administrativas pueden encontrarse en las mismas, así como señalar cuáles son sus características esenciales. Gracias al análisis de estas peticiones podremos conocer el funcionamiento interno del Comité y recuperar la historia de los exiliados anónimos, generalmente marginados en buena parte de las obras escritas sobre esta temática.   PALABRAS CLAVE: cartas de súplica, exilio republicano español, México, siglo XX, Comité Técnico de Ayuda a los Republicanos Españoles (CTARE)   ABSTRACT After the defeat of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War many were forced to flee and begin a new life. Although the bulk of refugees fled to France, many others sought asylum in America, primarily in Mexico. As the main condition for receiving them the President of Mexico at that time, Lázaro Cárdenas, required the aid institutions, created with funds from the Spanish Republic, to pay for the travel, maintenance and accommodation of the refugees during their first months in Mexico. For that reason, the Servicio de Evacuación de los Republicanos Españoles (SERE) decided to create a delegation in Mexico, the Comité Técnico de Ayuda a los Republicanos Españoles (CTARE), led by José Puche. This Committee received thousands of requests for assistance with what the refugees considered their most urgent necessities. This paper seeks to analyze part of these requests. First, we show the administrative route of the request, leading either to its acceptance or rejection, as well as the administrative traces left by this process on the letters. Second, we analyze the main characteristics of the request. Thanks to the analysis of these requests we gain knowledge of the internal functioning of the Committee and recover the history of the anonymous exiles, generally excluded in a large percentage of the work written on this subject.   KEY WORDS: writing culture, letters of pleading, Spanish Republican exile, Mexico, aid agencies, Comité Técnico de Ayuda a los Republicanos Españoles (CTARE)


Oceánide ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 29-35
Author(s):  
Luis Alberto Lázaro Lafuente

The Spanish Civil War sparked a heated debate in the recently created Irish Free State, as the Republic of Ireland was then called. A country that had also gone through an eleven-month civil war after the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was again divided between those who supported the left-wing democratic Spanish Republican government and those who favoured Franco’s “crusade” against atheists and Marxists. In fact, some Irish volunteers joined the International Brigades to confront Fascism together with the Spanish Republican forces, while other more conservative Irish Catholics were mobilised to fight with Franco’s army against those Reds that the media claimed to be responsible for killing priests and burning churches. Both sections were highly influenced by the news, accounts and interpretations of the Spanish war that emerged at that time. Following Lluís Albert Chillón’s approach to the relations between journalism and literature (1999), this article aims to analyse the war reportages of two Irish writers who describe the Spanish Civil War from the two opposite sides: Peadar O’Donnell (1893–1986), a prominent Irish socialist activist and novelist who wrote Salud! An Irishman in Spain (1937), and Eoin O’Duffy (1892–1944), a soldier, anti-communist activist and police commissioner who raised the Irish Brigade to fight with Franco’s army and wrote The Crusade in Spain (1938). Both contributed to the dissemination of information and ideas about the Spanish conflict with their eyewitness accounts, and both raise interesting questions about the relations between fact, fiction and the truth, using similar narrative strategies and rhetorical devices to portray different versions of the same war.


Μνήμων ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 157
Author(s):  
ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΚΑΤΣΟΥΔΑΣ

<p>Konstantinos Katsoudas, "<em>A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August</em></p> <p>The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their <em>Estado Nuevo, </em>while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a <em>raison d'etre </em>of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 692-713
Author(s):  
Sofía Rodríguez López ◽  
Antonio Cazorla Sánchez

Pro-Franco or, if the reader prefers, Nationalist women, were supposed to be the antithesis of the only women who, it has been assumed, were really active in the war: Republican women. Pro-Franco women are assumed to have supported both established social and gender traditions, having collaborated in the war effort without transgressing these roles. This article argues that historians have underestimated pro-Franco women’s participation in anti-Republican underground activities, in part because they have tended to make a false distinction between a ‘real’ Fifth Column, where men were clearly predominant, and ‘merely’ supportive roles, where women were crucial and often in the majority. On the contrary, this article argues that Nationalist women played a key, active role in intelligence activities in the Fifth Column, in acts of resistance against the Republic and also when posted abroad conducting espionage activities, or working in information gathering behind Francoist lines.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 324-368
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Grantseva ◽  

For many years, representatives of Soviet and then Russian historical science paid special attention to the period of the Second Spanish Republic and, especially, to the events of 1936-1939. The Spanish Civil War was and remains a topic that attracts the attention of specialists and influences the development of a multifaceted Russian-Spanish cultural dialogue. There are significantly fewer works on the peaceful years of the Republic, which is typical not only for domestic science, but also for the historiography of this period as a whole. Four key periods can be distinguished in the formation of the national historiography of the Spanish Republic. The first is associated with the existence of the Republic itself and is distinguished by significant political engagement. The second opens after 1956 and combines the continuity with respect to the period of the 1930s. and, at the same time, striving for objectivity, developing methodology and expanding the source base. The third stage is associated with the period of the 1970s-1980s, the time of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Spain, as well as the active interaction of historians of the two countries. The fourth stage, which lasted thirty years, was the time of the formation of the Russian historiography of the Second Republic, which sought to get rid of the ideological attitudes that left a significant imprint on the research of the Soviet period. This time is associated with the active archival work of researchers and the publication of sources, the expansion of topics, interdisciplinary approaches. Among the studies of the history of the Second Republic outside Spain, Russian historiography has a special place due to the specifics of Soviet-Spanish relations during the Civil War, and the archival funds in our country, and the traditions of Russian historical Spanish studies, and the preservation of republican memory.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-240
Author(s):  
Linda Palfreeman ◽  
Jon Arrizabalaga

When a failed military coup provoked civil war in Spain in July 1936, the Spanish government made a worldwide plea for assistance. More than 2500 British men answered the call, taking up arms in defence of the democratically-elected Republican government. While this show of international solidarity has been widely documented, much less attention has been given to the massive response made by British women. Thousands of women organized nationwide campaigns to send aid to Spain. One of these women was Frida Stewart (1910–96), a young musician with a strong social conscience. As is the case with so many other women, Frida’s recollections, her memoir and correspondence, upon which the following essay is closely based, constitute a valuable historical resource for the analysis of women’s experiences during the war and give voice to those whose stories have previously gone unheard.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (7) ◽  
pp. 1028-1058 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore McLauchlin ◽  
Álvaro La Parra-Pérez

Violence within armed groups in civil wars is important and understudied. Linking literatures on civil war violence and military politics, this article asks when this fratricidal violence targets soldiers who try to defect, and when it does not. It uses a unique data set of executions of officers on the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War. The article finds that while much of the violence appeared to target those who actually tried to defect, many nondefectors were likely shot too, due most likely to a pervasive stereotype that officers in general were disloyal to the Republic. This stereotype was used as an information shortcut and was promoted by political actors. Accordingly, unlikely defectors were likelier to be shot in locations in which less information was available about loyalties and in which political forces that were suspicious of officers as a group were locally stronger.


1985 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-109
Author(s):  
Bill Bailey

Bill Bailey was working as a union organizer in Hawaii in 1936 when the Spanish Civil War broke out. Fascist troops led by Franco rebelled against Spain's democratically elected Republican government. The U.S. government declared a policy of nonintervention that prohibited the shipment of arms to the Republican Loyalists and banned travel to Spain. This policy contributed to the Fascist cause and outraged many Americans, including Bailey. Early in 1937, Bailey joined a group of American volunteers forming the Abraham Lincoln Battalion, an unpaid and nonprofessional troop of men and women who chose to fight with the International Brigade alongside the Republican Loyalists. In this article, the complexity of internationalism is expressed through Bailey's commitment to support the Spanish democracy, a decision in which he places the international cause of fighting fascism above his nation's choice not to participate. Bailey shares his memories of that period and describes his reasons for choosing the path that led him to Spain.


1963 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 383-403
Author(s):  
Joe Robert Juárez

Civil War broke out in Spain in 1936. Following eight years of dictatorship by General Primo de Rivera, who had acted with the approval of King Alfonso XIII, elections were held in June, 1931, for a constituent assembly. The election returns brought in a republican-socialist majority, which forbade the king’s return, confiscated his property, and proclaimed Spain a republic. The republic had enemies on both the right and the left. The large landholders, the army, and the Church had vested interests which the republic proceeded to attack. On the left, the anarchists and socialists became more /radical, competing for the loyalty of the Spanish workers. The republic’s problems were compounded by the traditional separatist movements of Catalans, Basques, and Gallegans. Power shifted from the left in 1931 to the right in 1933, and, finally, in February, 1936, to a “popular front “government. The Popular Front, however, proved to be a coalition for election purposes only. Largo Caballero, the leader of the left wing of the socialists, declined to serve in the moderate Azaña cabinet. In July, 1936, army, monarchist, clerical, and Carlist groups joined with the Falange to bring about a counter-revolutionary coup under the leadership of General Francisco Franco. The Civil War had started. It was to last for three brutality-filled years.


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