What does Heidegger?s discussion of authenticity of Dasein, as presented in
Sein und Zeit (1927), contribute to the completion of his program of
fundamental ontology (aiming at the sense of being as such)? Aiming to answer
to this question the author examines the way authenticity is constructed. The
author specifically emphasizes the fact that the authenticity is completed
within what is given in ?the One? (?das Man?), in the process by which Dasein
realizes within its way of being his own specification or concretization.
Furthermore Heidegger claims, on the one hand, that it is not possible to
rank authenticity and inauthenticity as being something of ?higher? and
?lower? order, and, on the other hand, that the world has a transcendental
status with primary role of the One (das Man). Therefore Dasein understands
all from the world, builds its understanding by taking it from the world and
constructing out of it its own specification. This has two important
consequences: the first is the realization that authenticity has no
significance for fundamental ontology, for the understanding of the Being
that the Dasein has acquired is equally valuable whether it is authentic or
not; and the second is that authenticity is of negligible significance, for
the understanding that the Dasein has is obtained from the One, and because
the world has a transcendental status, hence it is a priori as far as the
understanding of all Being goes. Why then Heidegger deals with authenticity?
Reason is to be found not in preparing work for fundamental onthology but in
Heidegger?s anticartesianism. As he sketched the concept of Dasein in
contrast to Descartes? subject, he created a problem for himself. Just as
Descartes had a problem with finding the way to bring the subject to the
world, Heidegger is facing a problem: How can the Dasein, as something
integrated into the world as beingin- the-world and being-with-Others, come
to itself? Finding the answer to this question does not engage fundamental
ontology, for it must be obtained as a precondition for creating the starting
point for it. Finally, the author discusses a problem that emerges from this
perspective: What is the source of Heidegger?s turn (Kehre)? Emphasized as
reasons are Heidegger?s anthropocentrism and remnants of the subject-object
relation. Anthropocentrism, however, was already overcomed in SuZ with the
thesis about the trancendentalty of the world and by de-centering the subject
given the primacy of understanding as contained in the One. As for the
subject-object relation, it was overcome through the very discussion of
authenticity on the basis of the thesis that the Dasein and the world are in
original unity. It follows, then, that Heidegger did not offer the real
reasons for his turn, hence the question remains: Why Heidegger did not
remain satisfied with those results? That remains to be uncovered by further
analyses of his philosophy!
Authenticity and fundamental onthology
