scholarly journals A Study on the Government Subsidies for CR Express Based on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiwen Du ◽  
Xianliang Shi
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Transportation Cost ◽  
Social Benefit ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Belt And Road ◽  
The Government ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
The Relationship

CHINA RAILWAY Express (CR express) refers to the international container train running in the East Asian Economic Circle and the developed European Economic Circle, and it is an important link in the development of “The Belt and Road”. However, as CR Express is still in the early stages of development, it is still on the way to fully market-oriented operations, and also has some problems such as high overall transportation cost, disorderly competition and other issues. From the perspective of government subsidies, this paper by searching the relationship in incomplete information dynamic game between local government and local relevant enterprises, gets the optimal subsidy amount for the government to obtain the maximum social benefit. The results can provide a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable subsidy policy and for the CR express to realize market-oriented.

The Energy-Saving Management System Design of Major Projects in Implementation

2014 ◽  
Vol 919-921 ◽  
pp. 1739-1743
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Ming Yuan Ma ◽  
Hong Tu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Management System ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Rational Management ◽  
The Government ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

The energy-saving management system of major projects in implementation has always been in a state of imperfect. On the basis of combining energy-saving management status of major projects in implementation, referring to the research results of the management mechanism design theory at home and abroad, this paper aims at the primary interest-related subjects of the major projects energy-saving, uses economic mechanism designing theory and incentive theory, designs the energy-saving management mechanism; It does the theoretical analysis of the government and major projects owner with the complete information dynamic game model, then, provides decision evidence for the government to formulate the rational management intensity and maximize the interests of all parties. At last, the paper provides the suggestions to solve the existing problems of major projects energy-saving management.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yanqing Jiang ◽  
Jian Yuan ◽  
Mengmeng Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Information Dynamic

There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

Multi-UAV Air-Combat Strategy Research Base on the Incomplete Information Dynamic Game in Uncertain Environment

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1755-1759
Author(s):  
Xia Chen ◽  
Ming Ming Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Research ◽  
Uncertain Environment ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Information Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Multi Uav

This paper established the multi UAV incomplete information dynamic game model under uncertain environment based on incomplete information dynamic game theory and the problem of multi UAV attack-defend; for the interval information payment matrix under the uncertain environment, solve the incomplete information dynamic game Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution and get the optimal UAV combat strategy sequence. The simulations results show that the model could apply to the problem of UAV attack-defends campaign under uncertain environment reasonably and have better application value.

scholarly journals Three-Stage Dynamic Games of Government-Park-Visitor in Visitor Education Intervention

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongping Wei ◽  
Shouwen Wen ◽  
Diabate Ardjouman ◽  
Yizeng Chen
Keyword(s):  
Education System ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Behavior Intervention ◽  
Education Intervention ◽  
Positive Interaction ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
The Government ◽  
Set Up

The government-park-visitor three-stage multiplayers dynamic gameG(S1m,S2n,S3k,RG,R,U)is established to solve the significant problem regarding the investment in the visitor education. The game reveals that the visitor education intervention should form a positive interaction mechanism of government leading, tourism enterprise implementing, and tourist participating. The visitor education system in the tourism market has not been established at the initial stage. Stakeholders are hesitant to invest resources to push the establishment of visitor education system. The government should set up an induction fund which can encourage the parks and tourism companies to invest money on visitor education. When visitor education system develops to a certain stage with the help of government induction fund, it can run autonomously without the external factors. And the win-win-win situation of the government, parks, and visitors is obtained when the Nash equilibrium state of the game is reached. Furthermore, the game also reveals that visitor education mainly includes the behavior intervention and knowledge services which are important for the park’s visitor education.

scholarly journals The Relationship between the Core and the Modified Cores of a Dynamic Game

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 1023
Author(s):  
Artem Sedakov ◽  
Hao Sun
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Time Consistency ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Relationship

The core as a solution to a cooperative game has the advantage that any imputation from it is undominated. In cooperative dynamic games, there is a known transformation that demonstrates another advantage of the core—time consistency—keeping players adhering to it during the course of the game. Such a transformation may change the solution, so it is essential that the new core share common imputations with the original one. In this paper, we will establish the relationship between the original core of a dynamic game and the core after the transformation, and demonstrate that the latter can be a subset of the former.

On the Complementarity between Law and Social Norms

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Tsuneki ◽  
Yoshinobu Zasu
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Social Benefit ◽  
Enforcement Cost ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Legal Sanctions ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Community Sanctions ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article aims to clarify the relationship between the law and social norms and examine how they interact – whether the law completely replaces, or coexists with, the pre-existing social norms. We model a close-knit society consisting of injurers and victims, assuming that both the law and social norms maximize social welfare and that the costs of enforcing legal penalties are greater than those of enforcing social norms. We find that social norms completely replace the law, even in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium; we then develop exceptions to this result. In particular, when community sanctions for violating social norms are calibrated without consideration of its marginal social benefit due to a reduction in law enforcement cost, our model can have multiple equilibria, including cases in which legal sanctions persist even in the long run, in spite of their inefficiently high enforcement costs. However, we also show that this possibility of an inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium can be eliminated if the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader for the formation of social norms.

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