scholarly journals Determinanty normalizacji polityki monetarnej Europejskiego Banku Centralnego

Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń

Due to the implementation of non-standard monetary policy by the European Central Bank, concentrated in the first part of the financial crisis mainly on the unconventional open market operations, and in the second on the Quantitative Easing policy, the exit strategies and monetary policy normalization have become the subject of intensified discussion. The concept of a return to "normal" monetary policy of the ECB will require the implementation of two aspects: raising of interest rates and reduction of the size of central bank balance sheet. However, it is undisputed that the exit strategies of the ECB could be implemented only after completing of the asset purchase program and stabilization of euro area public finances. It seems that at this moment the monetary policy of Eurozone will have to wait. The main aim of the study is to identify the determinants of the monetary policy normalization of the European Central Bank. Particular attention will be paid to the conditions of normalization relating to the support for creation of economic recovery in the euro area, the increase of inflation towards the inflation target, stimulation of dynamics of lending activity and the situation on the financial market. The following research methods will be used: the literature studies, including domestic and foreign literature, case studies, cause and effect analysis, observation analysis as well as synthesis analysis. 

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (01) ◽  
pp. 57-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
AD VAN RIET

Since the start of the global financial crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has faced exceptional challenges in fulfilling its price stability mandate, marking the start of a new era of monetary policy-making for the eurozone. This paper reviews the ECB’s evolving response from mid-2007 to early-2015, showing how it combined the standard tool of adjusting its policy interest rates with non-standard passive and active balance-sheet measures, accompanied by a forward guidance of its intended monetary stance. Altogether, the ECB stayed focused on price stability while fulfilling the two classical roles of lender of last resort to resolve money market tensions and market maker of last resort to repair monetary transmission. Addressing the many challenges was complicated by the nexus between fragile banks and vulnerable governments, the ensuing financial fragmentation and the complex institutional and political structure of the eurozone. Looking ahead, the new reinforced European financial architecture could make the ECB’s monetary policy task of maintaining price stability for the eurozone easier to accomplish.


2019 ◽  
Vol 239 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 797-840 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ad van Riet

Abstract This article reviews how the European Central Bank (ECB) implemented its monetary policy for the euro area from 1999 to 2018 from two perspectives. Taking a Keynesian point of view, the euro area economy was beset for a long time by secular stagnation and required the ECB to ensure a protracted period of relatively low interest rates to provide continuous support to aggregate demand at the level of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). By contrast, the Austrian School of Economics argues that the low-interest rate bias of the ECB caused financial excesses and prevented a more rapid reallocation of unviable resources necessary for a sustainable expansion of aggregate supply. Both the Keynesian and the Austrian paradigm appear relevant when examining the monetary and financial aspects of the euro area business cycle and the secular decline of interest rates over the past 20 years. For most of the time, ECB monetary policy was the ‘only game in town’ and the EMU architecture was unable to deliver the balanced macroeconomic and financial policy mix required for a sustainable path of the euro area economy.


e-Finanse ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-63
Author(s):  
Natalia Białek

Abstract This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions-the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank-were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Hartwell

Abstract Worries about Italy and the unresolved issue of euro governance – coupled with uncertainty surrounding Brexit – means that the European Central Bank (ECB) may already be facing its next crisis in the euro area. Unfortunately, the ECB is still fighting the last war, deploying the tools of unconventional monetary policy to address lingering problems while unable institutionally to address needed structural change. This paper looks at the ECB as an institution amongst institutions and shows how even more unconventional approaches will not help to bolster the economy of the euro area. Indeed, given the complexity of money, the effects of expectations, and continued uncertainty, expanding the ECB’s unconventional arsenal is likely to have deleterious consequences across Europe.


Author(s):  
Sylwia Gwoździewicz ◽  
Dariusz Prokopowicz ◽  
Daniel Szybowski

The development of market financial system in Poland was determined to a large extent, globally operating processes of the situation on the financial markets and the processes of adaptation to the normative standards and technological European Union. As part of anti-crisis measures leading central banks, Anglo-Saxon and European financial system have launched a high-budget system, interventionist assistance programs. Finally, the cost of rescuing the financial system was thrown to the proverbial John Doe ie. Most numerous segment of bank customers. Currentlyperformed research carried out in previous years, interventionist government programs to rescue the anti-crisis measures of the key players of the economy from bankruptcy financial and activation of demand, investment, production and liquidity in the credit market. In terms of development-oriented activities of government intervention, the European Central Bank continues to apply mild monetary policy of low interest rates in order to improve liquidity in the financial system and offering cheap money for the development of pro-investment share of credit of commercial banks operating in the European Union.


1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Nölling

AbstractWith the beginning of EMU there will be only one monetary policy with a single short term interest rate. In order for common monetary policy to be successful EMU member states have to react similarly to monetary signals from the European Central Bank (ECB). Because of its unique sensitivity to short term interest rates, this would not be the case for the UK. If, for example, the ECB would raise the short term interest rates by an amount which is appropriate for countries like France and Germany, the UK might sink into recession. This shows that besides political reasons there is also an economic reason for the UK’s opting-out from EMU.


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