37. Lessons Learned from a Comprehensive Selfassessment of ES&H Management Systems at a Small Department of Energy (DOE) Contractor Laboratory

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Withers
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 3638
Author(s):  
Jan Kaselofsky ◽  
Marika Rošā ◽  
Anda Jekabsone ◽  
Solenne Favre ◽  
Gabriel Loustalot ◽  
...  

Managing energy use by municipalities should be an important part of local energy and climate policy. The ISO 50001 standard constitutes an internationally recognized catalogue of requirements for systematic energy management. Currently, this standard is mostly implemented by companies. Our study presents an approach where consultants supported 28 European municipalities in establishing energy management systems. A majority (71%) of these municipalities had achieved ISO 50001 certification by the end of our study. We also conducted two surveys to learn more about motivations and challenges when it comes to establishing municipal energy management systems. We found that organizational challenges and resource constraints were the most important topics in this regard. Based on the experiences in our study we present lessons learned regarding supporting municipalities in establishing energy management systems.


Author(s):  
June W. Lau ◽  
Rachel F. Devers ◽  
Marcus Newrock ◽  
Gretchen Greene

An evaluation of the feasibility and the requirements associated with a facility-wide deployment of a laboratory information management system (LIMS) at an electron microscopy facility was conducted. 4CeeD, an open-source LIMS, was selected for the focus study. This report summarizes data infrastructure prerequisites, critical and desirable features, and lessons learned from using and interacting with 4CeeD, and broader LIMS adoption recommendations for this facility.


Author(s):  
Brent Haroldsen ◽  
Jerome Stofleth ◽  
Mien Yip ◽  
Allan Caplan

Code Case 2564 for the design of impulsively loaded vessels was approved in January 2008. In 2010 the US Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program, with support from Sandia National Laboratories, procured a vessel per this Code Case for use on the Explosive Destruction System (EDS). The vessel was delivered to the Army in August of 2010 and approved for use by the DoD Explosives Safety Board in 2012. Although others have used the methodology and design limits of the Code Case to analyze vessels, to our knowledge, this was the first vessel to receive an ASME explosive rating with a U3 stamp. This paper discusses lessons learned in the process. Of particular interest were issues related to defining the design basis in the User Design Specification and explosive qualification testing required for regulatory approval. Specifying and testing an impulsively loaded vessel is more complicated than a static pressure vessel because the loads depend on the size, shape, and location of the explosive charges in the vessel and on the kind of explosives used and the point of detonation. Historically the US Department of Defense and Department of Energy have required an explosive test. Currently the Code Case does not address testing requirements, but it would be beneficial if it did since having vetted, third party standards for explosive qualification testing would simplify the process for regulatory approval.


Author(s):  
Mikal A. McKinnon ◽  
Leroy Stewart

Abstract Research studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) established the technical and operational requirements necessary to enable the onsite cask-to-cask dry transfer of spent nuclear fuel. Use of the dry transfer system has the potential to permit shutdown reactor sites to decommission pools and provide the capability of transferring assemblies from storage casks or small transportation casks to sealed transportable canisters. Following an evaluation by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Academy of Sciences, a cooperative program was established between DOE and EPRI, which led to the cost-shared design of a dry transfer system (DTS). EPRI used Transnuclear, Inc., of Hawthorne, New York, to design the DTS in accordance with the technical and quality assurance requirements of the code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 72 (10CFR72). EPRI delivered the final design report to DOE in 1995 and the DTS topical safety analysis report (TSAR) in 1996. DOE submitted the TSAR to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for review under 10CFR72 and requested that the NRC staff evaluate the TSAR and issue a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that could be used and referenced by an applicant seeking a site-specific license for the construction and operation of a DTS. DOE also initiated a cold demonstration of major subsystem prototypes in 1996. After careful assessment, the NRC agreed that the DTS concept has merit. However, because the TSAR was not site-specific and was lacking some detailed information required for a complete review, the NRC decided to issue an Assessment Report (AR) rather than a SER. This was issued in November 2000. Additional information that must be included in a future site-specific Safety Analysis Report for the DTS is identified in the AR. The DTS consists of three major sections: a Preparation Area, a Lower Access Area, and a Transfer Confinement Area. The Preparation Area is a sheet metal building where casks are prepared for loading, unloading, or shipment. The Preparation Area adjoins the Lower Access Area and is separated from the Lower Access Area by a large shielded door. The Lower Access Area and Transfer Confinement Area are contained within concrete walls approximately three feet thick. These are the areas where the casks are located and where the fuel is moved during transfer operations. A floor containing two portals separates the Lower Access Area and the Transfer Confinement Area. The casks are located below the floor, and the fuel transfer operation occurs above the floor. The cold demonstration of the DTS was successfully conducted at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) as a cooperative effort between the DOE and EPRI. The cold demonstration was limited to the fuel handling equipment, the cask lid handling equipment, and the cask interface system. The demonstration included recovery operations associated with loss of power or off-normal events. The demonstration did not include cask receiving and lid handling; cask transport and lifting; vacuum/inerting/leak test; canister welding; decontamination; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning; and radiation monitoring. The demonstration test was designed to deliberately challenge the system and determine whether any specific system operation could adversely impact or jeopardize the operation or safety of any other function or system. All known interlocks were challenged. As in all new systems, there were lessons learned during the operation of the system and a few minor modifications made to ease operations. System modifications were subsequently demonstrated. The demonstration showed that the system operated as expected and provided times for normal fuel transfer operations. The demonstration also showed that recovery could be made from off-normal events.


Author(s):  
Nany Tuor ◽  
Allen Schubert

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site is a former nuclear weapons production facility owned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Located in central Colorado near Denver, the facility produced nuclear and non-nuclear components for weapons from 1953 to 1989. During this period, Rocky Flats grew to more than 800 facilities and structures situated on 2,500 hectares. Production activities and processes contaminated a number of facilities, soil, groundwater and surface water with radioactive and hazardous materials. In 1989, almost all radioactive weapons component production activities at Rocky Flats were suspended due to safety and environmental concerns related to operations, and the site was placed on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Priorities List (also known as the Superfund list). In 1992, the nuclear weapons production role at Rocky Flats officially ended and the mission changed from weapons production to one of risk reduction. In 1995, Kaiser-Hill, LLC (Kaiser-Hill) was awarded a five-year contract to reduce the urgent health and safety risks at the site, as well as begin the cleanup. At that time, the U.S. government estimated that it would cost more than $36 billion and take more than 70 years to cleanup and close Rocky Flats. Beginning in the summer of 1995, Kaiser-Hill developed a series of strategic planning models which demonstrated that accelerated cleanup of the site could be achieved while dramatically reducing cleanup costs. Within a few years, Kaiser-Hill developed a cleanup plan or lifecycle baseline that described how cleanup could be accomplished by 2010 for about $7.3 billion. Additionally, between 1995 and 2000, Kaiser-Hill made significant progress toward stabilizing special nuclear materials, cleaning up environmental contamination, demolishing buildings and shipping radioactive and hazardous waste for disposal. This initial contract was completed for approximately $2.8 billion. In January 2000, based its record of successes, Kaiser-Hill was awarded DOE’s first “closure contract” to close the site no later than December 2006, at a target cost of $3.96 billion. To date, some of the key enablers of the accelerated closure project concept and successful closure project execution include: • Shared vision of the end state; • Flexible, consultative regulatory agreement; • Credible project plan and robust project management systems; • Closure contract; • Empowered and motivated workforce; • Commitment to safety; • Closure-enhancing technologies. The scope of the closure project encompasses the following key completion metrics: • Disposition of 21 metric tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials; • Treatment of more than 100 metric tons of high-content plutonium wastes called residues; • Processing of 30,000 liters of plutonium and enriched uranium solutions; • Demolition of more than 800 facilities and structures totaling more that 325,000 square meters — many of which are contaminated with radioactive and/or hazardous materials; • Offsite shipment of more than 250,000 cubic meters of radioactive waste; • Disposition of approximately 370 environmental sites.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Klymyshyn ◽  
Pavlo Ivanusa ◽  
Kevin Kadooka ◽  
Casey Spitz

Abstract In 2017, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) collaborated with Spanish and Korean organizations to perform a multimodal transportation test to measure shock and vibration loads imparted to used nuclear fuel (UNF) assemblies. This test used real fuel assembly components containing surrogate fuel mass to approximate the response characteristics of real, irradiated used nuclear fuel. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was part of the test team and used the data collected during this test to validate numerical models needed to predict the response of real used nuclear fuel in other transportation configurations. This paper summarizes the modeling work and identifies lessons learned related to the modeling and analysis methodology. The modeling includes railcar dynamics using the NUCARS software code and explicit dynamic finite element modeling of used nuclear fuel cladding in LS-DYNA. The NUCARS models were validated against railcar dynamics data collected during captive track testing at the Federal Railroad Administration’s Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, CO. The LS-DYNA models of the fuel cladding were validated against strain gage data collected throughout the test campaign. One of the key results of this work was an assessment of fuel cladding fatigue, and the methods used to calculate fatigue are detailed in this paper. The validated models and analysis methodologies described in this paper will be applied to evaluate future UNF transportation systems.


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