scholarly journals Can We Make All Legal Norms into Legal Syllogisms and Why is That Important in Times of Artificial Intelligence?

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Goda Strikaitė-Latušinskaja

Background: The term ‘hard cases’ trace back to Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart who was one of the first legal philosophers who directly used it in his works and Ronald Myles Dworkin to whom the development and establishment of this concept in legal language is linked. Even though these two legal philosophers in one of the most famous - The Hart–Dworkin – legal debate couldn’t agree on certain things, they both agreed that when dealing with hard cases, there is a need to act creatively in order to resolve such a case properly. The division of cases into easy ones and hard ones gradually lost its popularity, even in legal theory, but perhaps it can be resurrected and used these challenging times to help meet the challenges prompted by technology? Methods: This paper analyses the dichotomy of hard and easy cases as well as circumstances relating to the courts’ decision-making processes in such cases. The essay examines whether the solutions proposed by legal positivism (such as applying syllogisms and precedents) are sufficient to deal with easy cases. The paper also examines what factors analysed by legal realists have an impact on judges while making decisions in hard cases (for example, psychological factors, such as hindsight bias, intuition, hunches, the anchor effect, laziness, unwillingness to take responsibility, or the gambler’s fallacy, as well as social factors, like upbringing, life experience, social relations, gender, age, education, etc.). Given that the article is theoretical in nature, logical, systemic, teleological methods dominate. Both descriptive method and scientific research method were used as well. Results and Conclusions: The author concludes that easy cases should eventually be delegated to artificial intelligence to resolve, whereas hard cases will remain in the competence of human judges, at least until technological development reaches a certain level.

2020 ◽  
pp. 20-34
Author(s):  
O.A. Fiofanova

The article analyzes the methodological principles of organizing educational master’s and post-graduate programs for the preparation of teachers and researchers taking into account the requirements of new professional standards. The article analyzes the programs of training scientific and pedagogical personnel for universities that implement scientific and personnel policies in the 4: 0 University model (research / entrepreneurial university) in the logic of the state Strategy for scientific and technological development, in the logic of ensuring the development of global world-class research and educational centers. The organizational principles of educational programs of the new generation are described, implemented in the form of scientific and production cooperation, integration of research, teaching and management activities to accelerate the cycle of knowledge update and to create on the basis of new knowledge as a result of research projects — entrepreneurial projects of universities. The article analyzes the possibility of organizing a multi-disciplinary research master’s and post-graduate programs. Organizational and methodological principles for achieving competency-based results in the organization of research master’s and postgraduate programs are characterized. The article reveals how the formation of a new system of legal norms, social relations and organizational mechanisms initiates the implementation of new approaches to the development of scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel and the development of a new type of knowledge society culture.


2011 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Priel

In this essay I argue that in order to understand debates in jurisprudence one needs to distinguish clearly between four concepts: validity, content, normativity, and legitimacy. I show that this distinction helps us, first, make sense of fundamental debates in jurisprudence between legal positivists and Dworkin: these should not be understood, as they often are, as debates on the conditions of validity, but rather as debates on the right way of understanding the relationship between these four concepts. I then use this distinction between the four concepts to criticize legal positivism. The positivist account begins with an attempt to explain the conditions of validity and to leave the question of assessment of valid legal norms to the second stage of inquiry. Though appealing, I argue that the notion of validity cannot be given sense outside a preliminary consideration of legitimacy. Following that, I show some further advantages that come from giving a more primary place to questions of legitimacy in jurisprudence.


Legal Theory ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 225-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Priel

Many contemporary legal positivists have argued that legal theory is evaluative because it requires the theorist to make judgments of importance. At the same time they argue that it is possible to know “what the law is” without resort to evaluative considerations. I distinguish between two senses of “what the law is”: in one sense it refers to legal validity, in another to the content of legal norms, and I argue that legal positivism is best understood (as indeed some legal positivists have explicitly said) as a claim about legal content. Understood this way, however, it is open to the objection that knowing the content of legal norms requires evaluative considerations for reasons similar to those offered by positivists for thinking that legal theory is requires evaluative considerations. I then distinguish between evaluative considerations in general and moral considerations and argue that because of the subject-matter of legal norms, there are good reasons for thinking that it is moral considerations, and not just any other evaluative considerations, that are required for knowing the content of legal norms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Mamychev Alexey Yurievich ◽  
Kim Alexander ◽  
Miroshnichenko Olga Igorevna ◽  
Ostrovsky Vladimir Aleksandrovich ◽  
Tereshchenko Victor Viktorovich

The article problematizes the functioning, on the one hand, of traditional value-normative regulators, ensuring socio-cultural integrity and social and political dynamics, and on the other, the development of standards for the development and application of digital algorithms, autonomous robotic systems and artificial intelligence. It discusses various approaches and theoretical and practical positions that argue and model the development of a socio-political organization in the digital era, and describe fundamental changes in political communication, law and order, public-power interaction, etc. The authors argue that the introduction of digital algorithms and robotic technologies radically changes the basic sociocultural meanings and the socio-political landscape, the formation of new types of social relations, where people, things, machines together form special modes of functioning, specific relations. The work proves that these cardinal changes require fundamentally new theoretical and methodological approaches to research, and new tools for political modeling and forecasting. The problems of legislative and ethical regulation of the processes of informatization and technological development of the society are discussed separately. The final part of the research shows that modernity poses the fundamental problem of correlating digital and socio-cultural trends in the development of political space, their contradictions and the inevitable convergence of socio-cultural, traditional socio-political dominants of development with digital trends and life forms. The article proves that harmonization of existing value-normative regulators and standards of digital algorithms and artificial intelligence systems being developed is necessary, since the latter can be a key guarantee for the formation of an effective system of social system development and its stability in the digital age.


Author(s):  
Svetlana Sergeevna Gorokhova

The subject of this article is the social relations established in the process of scientific and technological development in IT sphere that support the work of artificial intelligence systems and relate to scientific discussion on the role of artificial intelligence, robots and objects of robotics in the legal field. The author examines the relevant questions of identification of artificial intelligence systems as a subject, object or other legal phenomenon within the structure of legal relations. The research problem consists in the fact outstripping that the scientific-technological progress outstripped legal regulation of interaction between an individual, society and artificial intelligence, which justifies the need for creation a cyber-law theory. The opinions on the matter in foreign and national literature are analyzed. The article outlines the trends and prospects of implementation of artificial intelligence in various social and economic spheres; determines the contrast of opinions regarding the problems of identification of artificial intelligence systems, as well as incorporation of artificial intelligence into the established legal reality. The author presents and substantiates an original conceptual version of inclusion of artificial intelligence into the legal field, based on the principle of assignment of partial legal capacity to strong and super strong artificial intelligence. The positions on legal responsibility in relations complicated by the presence of artificial intelligence are defined.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin

The most compelling account of jus cogens is that it flows from natural law and constitutes the “ethically minimum” content of international law. Although natural law was once considered an acceptable and obvious approach to jurisprudence, its significance has waned at the expense of legal positivism. However, the hierarchical quality of jus cogens is best explained by some element of natural law—and its explicit invocation of moral content—rather than anything one might find in legal positivism.Of course, international lawyers have persistently refused to recognize the latent naturalism within jus cogens. While rueful from the point of view of legal theory, the obfuscation was nonetheless essential for jus cogens to succeed. In an alternate world where jus cogens was correctly viewed as a vestige of natural law, modern international lawyers would never have accepted it.One might lament the failure to recognize the natural law origins of jus cogens because it hampered the development of standards for identifying which legal norms counted as jus cogens. However, no account of jus cogens offers compelling, unambiguous criteria, and second, the lack of clarity on its criteria was a good price to pay in exchange for the legal category’s widespread adoption. In the end, the notion that jus cogens is consistent with international law’s legal positivism was a useful fiction, a “noble lie” that gave us modern human rights law.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Ahmed Akgunduz

AbstractIslamic Law is one of the broadest and most comprehensive systems of legislation in the world. It was applied, through various schools of thought, from one end of the Muslim world to the other. It also had a great impact on other nations and cultures. We will focus in this article on values and norms in Islamic law. The value system of Islam is immutable and does not tolerate change over time for the simple fact that human nature does not change. The basic values and needs (which can be called maṣlaḥa) are classified hierarchically into three levels: (1) necessities (Ḍarūriyyāt), (2) convenience (Ḥājiyyāt), and (3) refinements (Kamāliyyāt=Taḥsīniyyāt). In Islamic legal theory (Uṣūl al‐fiqh) the general aim of legislation is to realize values through protecting and guaranteeing their necessities (al-Ḍarūriyyāt) as well as stressing their importance (al‐ Ḥājiyyāt) and their refinements (taḥsīniyyāt).In the second part of this article we will draw attention to Islamic norms. Islam has paid great attention to norms that protect basic values. We cannot explain all the Islamic norms that relate to basic values, but we will classify them categorically. We will focus on four kinds of norms: 1) norms (rules) concerned with belief (I’tiqādiyyāt), 2) norms (rules) concerned with law (ʿAmaliyyāt); 3) general legal norms (Qawā‘id al‐ Kulliyya al‐Fiqhiyya); 4) norms (rules) concerned with ethics (Wijdāniyyāt = Aḵlāqiyyāt = Ādāb = social and moral norms).


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Nenad Živanović ◽  
Petar Pavlović ◽  
Veroljub Stanković ◽  
Zoran Milošević ◽  
Nebojša Ranđelović ◽  
...  

Summary The end of the 20th and the first decade of the 21st century are characterized by a technological development which could be described as having revolutionary speed. If we were to look back on the revolutionary events during the 17th and 18th century, in the domain of great scientific changes, changes in industry, agriculture, economy, the organization of social relations (democracy and socialism), we could say that we are witnesses to this sixth technological revolution. All these civilizational leaps forward have conditioned, quite expectedly, big changes in our profession. This has been reflected in the goals which have been imposed by social changes initiated by numerous revolutionary changes. Even though man and his need for physical exercise, as the nourishing food necessary for his being, have remained the same, the circumstances which have imposed different living conditions have required changes in our profession. Naturally, this was reflected in our science as well (which we refer to by different names today). The time we live in, caught up in this new sixth technological revolution, requires a different approach to man and his personality. Now, the question is not only how to “drag” him out of a sedentary culture, but also how to fight the increasingly present physical and intellectual inactivity. Through perfectly guided marketing activities which have been made possible by the implementation of new technological aids, man has been drawn into the hedonistic waters of his own inactivity. And unfortunately, he cannot free himself from this skillfully set trap. That is why physical culture and science must be included in finding a means of helping man find his way out of this hedonistic labyrinth and return to his roots.


Information and telecommunication technologies have radically changed all social relations. This required corresponding changes in the information legislation. System of legal norms regulating information relations has been updated and increased. However, this changes did not improve legal regulation of information relations. Scientists emphasize that imperfection of information legislation depends on inadequacy of legal norms. Legal scholarship discover different defects of legal norms: antilogy, deficiency of law, inadequacy in logic, duplications and declarativity of norms. Legislation on information dissemination is also characterized by these defects. They entailed problems of application by the courts. Scientific immaturity of legal regulation of information relations is noted. The necessity for creating special legal act, which will regulate relations on information dissemination, is justified.


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