Barthes without Althusser: A Different Style of Marxism

Paragraph ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEAN-JACQUES LECERCLE

The first section of the essay assesses the similitude and differences between the Althusserian concept of ideology and Barthes's concept of ‘ideosphere’, as developed in the seminar on the Neutral. The second section rehearses the different stages of Barthes's complex relation to Marxism and suggests that, in spite of the explicit rejection of the doctrine, there remains a Marxist substratum to Barthes's thought. The third section compares the two theories of ideology and shows that Barthes's insistence on the centrality of language allows him to offer a more comprehensive account of ideology: what begins in a form of allusion to Marxism ends up at a certain distance. The last section wonders what contribution Barthes's theory of ideosphere can make to a Marxist philosophy of language: one unexpected aspect of the answer makes use of the concept of style.

Author(s):  
Paolo Crivelli

Ideas in and problems of philosophy of language surface frequently in Plato’s dialogues. Some passages briefly formulate, or presuppose, views about names, signification, truth, or falsehood; others are extended discussions of important themes of philosophy of language. This chapter focuses on three topics. The first is the linguistic dimension of the theory of Forms; the second is the discussion of names in the Cratylus, Plato’s only dialogue almost completely dedicated to linguistic themes; the third is the examination of semantic and ontological issues in the Sophist, whose linguistic section (259d9‒264b10) presents Plato’s most mature reflections on statements, truth, and falsehood.


Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee

2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 1267-1306
Author(s):  
Nemesio García-Carril Puy

I defend in this paper the thesis that there is a complex relation between minimalist musical works and the metaphysics of time, involving ontological, epistemological and axiological issues. This relation is explained by means of three sub-theses. The first one is that minimalist musical works literally exemplify –in Goodman’s sense– the properties ascribed to time by the metaphysical static view: 1) minimalist works intrinsically possess those properties by being composed according to the technique of minimal repetition; 2) they extrinsically refer to those properties in virtue of pragmatic processes of accommodation of disagreements on what is taken to be common ground in a particular musical context. The second sub-thesis is that, in exemplifying those properties, minimalist musical works are valuable from two perspectives: a formalist one, according to which minimalist works purify the concept of what a musical work is; and a cognitive one, insofar they allow us to obtain phenomenal knowledge of what it is like to experience time as the static view conceives it. The third sub-thesis is that each particular minimalist musical work is valuable insofar it achieves either the formalist or the cognitive goals in an original way.


The article focuses on the scientific heritage of Alexander Potebnja as one of the founders of Kharkiv linguistic school. Potebnja’s seminal books and articles that among many other issues address language origin, human consciousness, and semantics of linguistic units are considered as milestones in the development of state-of-the-art humanities. The article reads his three tenets in terms of philosophy of language and cognitive linguistics. The first tenet concerns correlation between language and thought as a way of accounting for language origin and linguistic abilities of the human. The latter that uses language to communicate his world perceptive experience is ascribed a two-facet nature as both an individual and a nation. This tenet is viewed as one anticipating the underpinning principles of cognitive linguistics and theory of the national construal of the world. The second tenet concerns mental evolution of humanity. Potebnja sees it as a contiguity of image and meaning that diverge evolving in myth, poetry and prose. This tenet is considered as an anticipation of Popper’s Evolutionary Epistemology and Westman’s theory of the ontogenesis of the psyche. The third Potebnja’s tenet focuses on the symbolism of linguistic units. The exclamation and the word are juxtaposed in terms of their internal and external forms. The word and the exclamation are analyzed as signs that render meaning by way of, correspondingly, either indicating to it or symbolizing it. These features suggest conceptual parallelism with Pierce’s semiotic trichotomy of icon, index and symbol.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Martin Feige

Abstract The paper aims to clarify the aesthetic as well as artistic status of videogames by placing it in a broader context of considerations in philosophical aesthetics. It develops those perspectives in three steps. The first step (i) aims to show that, contrary to what one might think, it is not possible to classically define videogames in terms of solely necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, because such a definition treats singular videogames as mere cases of the general concept of video games and thus abandons a genuinely aesthetic perspective. The second step (ii) analyses the aesthetics of videogames in terms of its complex relation to other aesthetic mediums and shows how aesthetically significant videogames negotiate what it means to be a videogame at all. The third step (iii) finally discusses the possibility of videogames being works of art and argues that some video games are works of art by affording a reflection on ourselves in and through the process of playing such a videogame.


Diplomatica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-290
Author(s):  
Monika Baár

The article argues that more thorough scholarly engagement with the United Nations’ international days has the potential for expanding the scope of diplomatic histories. It first provides a taxonomy of UN years by illuminating their repertoire, dynamics and peculiarities. Next, it discusses instances of how UN days are communicated to the public, emphasizing the role of media and celebrity diplomacy. Subsequently, the article demonstrates the crucial contribution of ngos, policy makers, and professionals who, as “outside-insiders” form the “Third UN.” Lastly, the article advances the argument that in order to obtain a more comprehensive account of UN days, another group of actors should be identified. These are comprised of organizations and individuals who are complete outsiders, but nevertheless contribute to the UN’s “marketplace of ideas” – a group that may be designated the “Fourth UN.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-224
Author(s):  
Paul Sambre

Abstract This paper examines how recent cognitive linguistic work on conceptualization and intersubjectivity (Verhagen 2005, 2008; Langacker 2008) echoes Merleau-Ponty’s older reflection on the notion of intersubjectivity, a key factor in embodiment and language. Three topics are explored in this respect. First, the largely implicit references to Merleau-Ponty in Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) are related more explicitly to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh. Second, the discursive status of usage events is shown to be directly connected to the linguistic consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporality, as it brings together living bodies in intersubjective experiences. The third objective is methodological: the focus is not only on Merleau-Ponty’s often quoted Phenomenology of Perception 1945, 1958), but shows lines of continuity with the explicit philosophy of language in his later work, like Eloge de la philosophie (1960,1963), Signes (1960, 1968b), Conscience et acquisition du langage (1964, 1973a) and La prose du monde (1969, 1973b). This discussion includes Merleau’s relation to Saussurean linguistics, and gives rise, perhaps surprisingly, to a dynamic view on language as a locus of intersubjective creativity, which reaches beyond the individual basis of perception, gesture and incorporated language.


2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Jacques Lecercle ◽  
Gregory Elliott

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-78
Author(s):  
D.J.S. Cross

Abstract This article analyzes the complex relation of phenomenology and literature in the work of Husserl and Derrida. In the first part, I show that the limited ideality of the literary object necessarily situates it in a derivative region of phenomenology. In the second part, however, I problematize the regional status of literature by elaborating a brief but important footnote in which Husserl broadens the concept of literature to embrace all cultural products whatsoever. Yet, because even this broadened concept of literature ultimately remains secondary for the phenomenologist, it only redoubles and ratifies the submission of literature to the more ideal objectivities of mathematical disciplines like geometry. The third part, finally, mobilizes Derrida’s notion of “dissemination,” prepared in and unintelligible apart from his early engagement with Husserlian phenomenology, in order to broach a notion of literature that the phenomenologist can neither circumscribe nor describe.


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