The Johnson White House and Foreign Policy

Author(s):  
Jonathan Colman
Keyword(s):  
1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-13
Author(s):  
John F. Clark

Both continuity and change capture the evolving role of the Clinton White House in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Elements of continuity are reflected in a familiar pattern of relationships between the White House and the principal foreign policy bureaucracies, most notably the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and more recently the U.S. Department of Commerce. As cogently argued in Peter J. Schraeder’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era, the White House has tended to take charge of U.S. African policies only in those relatively rare situations perceived as crises by the president and his closest advisors. In other, more routine situations—the hallmark of the myriad of U.S. African relations—the main foreign policy bureaucracies have been at the forefront of policy formulation, and “bureaucratic dominance” of the policymaking process has prevailed. Much the same pattern is visible in the Clinton administration, with the exception of President Clinton’s trip to Africa in 1998. Until that time, events in Somalia in 1993 served as the only true African crisis of the administration that was capable of focusing the ongoing attention of President Clinton and his closest advisors. Given that the United States is now disengaged from most African crises, Africa has remained a “backwater” for the White House and the wider foreign policymaking establishment.


2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-795
Author(s):  
Claude Cadart

« From the Sino-Soviet strategic project to the Sino-American strategic project » is a purposely schematic interpretative essay on the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1979 with emphasis on, the latter phase of that evolution, that of the 1969—1979 period, and more particularly on the last year of that decade, 1979. The project, both defensive and offensive, of American and Chinese co-leadership of the planet that Mao had undertaken to carry out in 1971-1972 with the encouragement of Nixon had to be more or less put aside from 1973 to 1978 because of the seriousness of the domestic crises that were successively shaking both China and the United States during those years. In 1978—79, it was able to be reactivated by Deng Xiaoping who sought, with the benediction of the White House, to add an economic and a cultural dimension to Us diplomatic and strategic dimension. It is unlikely however in the near future that the United States will consider China as other than an auxiliary aspect of the fundamental game of their relations with the most powerful of their adversary-partners, the U.S.S.R. As in the case of the Sino-Soviet strategic project that China promoted from 1949 to 1959, the Sino-American strategic project that China has sought to « sell » the United States since 1969 has not, therefore, much chance of success.


Author(s):  
Theresa Keeley

This chapter examines the murders of the churchwomen and how Reagan officials' critiques, which revealed that intra-Catholic conflict had become an integral part of United States–Central America policy with Reagan's ascension to the White House. It looks at remarks that bolster the Salvadoran junta's reputation or diminish the murders' impact on the protest movement against U.S. policy. It also discusses that the murdered churchwomen symbolized the church's championing of the poor and a U.S. foreign policy that was morally corrupt and politically unsound for training and arming their killers. The chapter cites that two murdered Maryknollers were members of a Catholic order and represented a dangerous trajectory for U.S. foreign policy and the church. It elaborates how the U.S. government aligned with conservative U.S. and Central American Catholics and amplified their perspective.


Author(s):  
Michael Cox ◽  
Doug Stokes

This work examines how domestic politics and culture shape US foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the role of institutions and processes. It considers the ways in which pressure groups and elites determine influence what the United States does abroad, the importance of regional shifts and media and their impact on the making of US foreign policy, and US relations with Europe, the Middle East, Russia, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, and Africa. The text also discusses key issues relevant to American foreign policy, such as global terrorism, the global environment, gender, and religion. It argues that whoever resides in the White House will continue to give the military a central role in the conduct of US foreign policy, and that whoever ‘runs’ American foreign policy will still have to deal with the same challenges both at home and abroad.


2021 ◽  
pp. 16-41
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet

This chapter looks closely at Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama’s leadership styles and worldviews. It asks how presidents from different backgrounds and life experiences ended up in the White House embracing a similar centrist approach to foreign policy. It explores how these leaders saw themselves, tracing how their worldview evolved. It speculates on what experiences shaped them, looking particularly at Eisenhower’s work in Panama in the 1920s, Bush’s tenure as US Ambassador to China in the 1970s, and Obama’s early childhood in Indonesia in the 1960s. It also explores some of the shared attributes of their leadership worldview, specifically pragmatism, empathy, and tragedy.


Subject The State Department. Significance The US State Department’s third-ranking official and most senior career diplomat, Tom Shannon, announced his departure on February 1. While the 60-year old Shannon said he was stepping down for personal reasons, he is only the latest in a stream of senior career diplomats who have left since Donald Trump became president a year ago and appointed Rex Tillerson as secretary of state with a mandate to downsize the department. Impacts Minimising the benefits of diplomacy in favour of military action could exacerbate foreign policy crises and conflicts. White House heel-dragging on filling posts both 'streamlines' State and avoids congressional confirmation scrutiny of political nominees. Concerned that State wields little influence with the White House, Congress will be more assertive in the foreign policy process. Other powers -- particularly US allies -- will seek and have increased direct influence on the White House, cutting out State.


Author(s):  
Tetiana Klynina

The article is devoted to one of the United States Secretaries of State, Edward Stettinius, a political figure who is well known and ambiguous in American society and less well known in Ukraine. The author first reports on E. Stettinius’ emergence as a financier and a person involved in American business, and emphasizes that the victories in the business have attracted the attention of political circles in Washington and the White House. It is stated that with the outbreak of World War II, the United States introduced a land-lease program, administered at the request of Washington by Edward Stettinius. Following his successful experience in conducting a land-lease, US President Franklin Roosevelt began to think of involving E. Stettinius in leadership positions at the State Department, which could not cope with his functions due to the challenges of wartime. In addition, F. Roosevelt’s «personal diplomacy» and distrust of «foggy bottom» workers contributed to the decline in the authority and importance of the State Department in shaping the country’s foreign policy. It was for this purpose – to streamline the activities of the State Department and to put things in order inside of the structure – F. Roosevelt appointed E. Stettinius to the post of Deputy Secretary of State, and after the next fourth victory in the presidential election, he replaced then Secretary of State Cordell Hull. It is emphasized that E. Stettinius «correctly» understood his place in the issues of forming the foreign policy of the country. He did not interfere with F. Roosevelt’s «personal diplomacy», but at the same time he was always close and put his ideas into practice (as an example, the creation of the UN). And while the president was shaping the course of the country, he, E. Stettinius, was shaping the course for reorganizing the State Department.


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