scholarly journals Russia living from its past

2019 ◽  
pp. 171-183
Author(s):  
Isabela de Andrade Gama

Since the end of the Cold War Russia has been treated as a defeated state. Western countries usually perceive Russia not only as a defeated state but also relating it to Soviet Union. Beyond that the West has Orientalized Russia, segregating it from the “western club” of developed states. But Russia’s recovery from the collapse of the 90’s made it more assertive towards the West. It’s proposed here that this assertiveness is due to it’s orientalization, it’s inferior status perceived by the West. The inferior perception by the West has triggered a process of identity’s reconstruction which will be analyzed through a perspective of ontological security. The more Russia has it’s great power status denied, the more aggressive it becomes regarding it’s foreign policy. As the international hierarchy continues to treat Russia as that of “behind” the modern states, and the more it feels marginalized, it will double down on efforts to regain its great power status it will have to dispose power. Russia’s ontological insecurity might lead it to a path of aggressiveness.

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Samet Dalipi

The Cold War, characterized by its bipolar ideological rivalry, did not resolve centuries-old hostilities between the West and Russia. In order to regain the lost influence and reincarnation of regional hegemony, President Putin wanted a casus-belli. The international humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and the latter’s declaration of independence were Russia’s weak justifications for resuming the old clashes. Interventions in the territories of the former Soviet Union inhabited by Russian speakers, the annexation of Crimea, and direct involvement in the interethnic disputes in the eastern part of Ukraine and the Syrian wars show that Russia is determined to challenge and test the Western commitment to the spread of democracy. The similarities between Kosovo and Crimea, loudly echoed by Russia and their supporters, cannot be academically binding, except in some aspects of tertiary nature.The brutal prevention of Chechnya’s independence in the 1990s and failure to recognize Kosovo while applauding the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia present Putin’s political inconsistency and Real politic orientation. The Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and threats to destabilize countries that “do not respect” the rights and interests of Russians wherever they are, exemplify Putin’s policy.The article aims to analyze the volatility of Russian foreign policy by comparing the case of Kosovo’s independence to the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s paternalist intentions abroad. 


Author(s):  
K. Demberel ◽  

The article deals with the issue of Mongolia's foreign policy during the Cold War. This period is divided into two parts. The first period, 1945-1960s, is a period of conflict between two systems: socialism and capitalism. In this first period of the Cold War Mongolia managed to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries of Eastern Europe, as the “system allowed”. The second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, is the period of the conflict of the socialist system, the period of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. During this period Mongolia's foreign policy changed dramatically and focused on the Soviet Union. This was due to the Soviet investment «boom» that began in 1960s and the entry of Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia in 1967. The Soviet military intervention into Mongolia was one of the main reasons for cooling the Soviet-Chinese relations. And military withdrawal contributed to the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations until the mid-1980s and one of the conditions for improving relations with their neighbors. The internal systemic conflict had a serious impact on Mongolia's foreign policy over those years.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 1423-1441
Author(s):  
Dong Jung Kim

Abstract Economic containment has garnered repeated attention in the discourse about the United States' response to China. Yet, the attributes of economic containment as a distinct strategy of Great Power competition remain unclear. Moreover, the conditions under which a leading power can employ economic containment against a challenging power remain theoretically unelaborated. This article first suggests that economic containment refers to the use of economic policies to weaken the targeted state's material capacity to start military aggression, rather than to influence the competitor's behaviour over a specific issue. Then, this article suggests that economic containment becomes a viable option when the leading power has the ability to inflict more losses on the challenging power through economic restrictions, and this ability is largely determined by the availability of alternative economic partners. When the leading power cannot effectively inflict more losses on the challenging power due to the presence of alternative economic partners, it is better off avoiding economic containment. The author substantiates these arguments through case-studies of the United States' responses to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The article concludes by examining the nature of the United States' recent economic restrictions against China.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-154
Author(s):  
Oscar Sanchez-Sibony

Using recently declassified documents from Moscow, this article recounts Anastas Mikoyan's trip to Japan in the summer of 1961. The trip served as an inflection point in the commercial relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan—a relationship that by the end of the decade had become the most extensive between the Soviet Union and a country of the “free world.” The article indicates that narratives focusing on ideologies of great-power rivalry during the Cold War tend to miss the kinds of global ideological currents that shaped many states’ behavior after 1945. Mikoyan's discussions with political and business elites in Japan suggest that an ideology of economic growth increasingly underlay concepts of political governance on both sides and ultimately allowed for the kind of cooperation that characterized Soviet-Japanese relations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 269-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson ◽  
Alexei Shevchenko

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia’s new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia’s reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert English

This article recounts the origins of Soviet “new thinking” as a case study of how Soviet intellectuals sought to redefine national identity in response to the West. It demonstrates that new thinking was fundamentally normative, not instrumental, insofar as it was developed in a period (1950s–1960s) when “socialism” was thought to be materially outperforming capitalism. It also demonstrates that new thinking decisively affected Soviet policy in the second half of the 1980s. Putting forth a socialization argument to show how newthinking ideas originated in the post-Stalin period within a community of intellectuals, the article charts the growing influence of these intellectuals through the 1970s and 1980s. In the mid-1980s, when Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party and empowered many of the new thinkers as advisers, their liberal, Westernizing ideas played an indispensable role in shaping his reforms. The analysis focuses on mechanisms of identity change at two levels: that of the community of reformist intellectuals, and that of the Soviet Union itself. The analysis challenges realist and rationalist views that new thinking was largely instrumental. Until the Gorbachev era, Soviet reformers advocated new-thinking ideas often at the risk of their personal, professional, and institutional interests.


1992 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Houbert

Decolonisation was a policy of the West, as well as a process reflecting the radical transformation of the configuration of power in the international system. The Soviet Union, perceived as poised to dominate Eurasia, had to be ‘contained’ lest it expanded into the Rimland and challenged the West at sea. This geo-political obsession was reinforced by the ‘loss of China’ and the outbreak of the bitter struggle between North and South Korea. But the cold war was about ideology as well as military power, and containment was therefore not just a question of building pacts but of fostering the ‘right’ kind of political régimes.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Slocombe

<p>Understanding national identity through foreign policy provides a strong means of ascertaining the prevailing social constructions within a great power nation state. There is a growing need to understand the national identities of Russia and China without pre-theorising or depending on asymmetric comparative studies with regional states. China and Russia are frequently compared to their regional neighbours which undermines understanding their unique identities. There are also frequent misunderstandings of contemporary Chinese and Russian national motives, often likening the modern Russian state to the Soviet Union, or attempting to understand China as a challenger to US unipolarity. Both great powers exhibit common characteristics of authoritarianism, both have recently endured massive social and national changes, and both have global interests that manifest in the Middle East such as securing vital geostrategic resources, both states are conscious of their native Muslim populations and to be recognised as a great power identity both must demonstrate influence in the Middle East. Yet, there have been significant differences in agendas and outcomes of their foreign policy decisions. This thesis seeks to use a constructivist framework to discern Russian and Chinese identity through comparison of their respective foreign policy. Contrary to “neo-realist” and “neo-liberal” arguments that accept state interests as rational, determined by the international system, and not determined by identity, this thesis seeks not to pre-theorise but to identify how their respective actions towards three key case studies in the Middle East; the Syrian Civil Conflict, the Iranian Nuclear Framework, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, indicate their prevailing social constructions. This thesis compares Russian and Chinese attitudes and actions towards these cases. Despite their similar disposition and principles towards international relations these two nations had significant points of difference. Drawing upon foreign policy analysis and a comparative model this thesis finds that despite the commonalities between the Russian and Chinese nations, Russian identity as great power, unique Eurasian power, and an alternative to the West, ensures a defiance of its relatively weak economic position to engage in positions of leadership in the Middle East, whilst China’s identity constructions that are common with Russia, its great power, civilisational, and alternative to the West constructions manifest despite an increasingly influential and material position in the world order, has provided little incentive to engage in meaningful ways throughout the Middle East’s recent conflicts.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (56) ◽  
pp. 231-254
Author(s):  
Tomasz Łukaszuk

The primary purpose of the article is to present the long term ties between India and Central Europe, and examine the transformation of their relationship after the end of the Cold War. Using J.A. Braveboy-Wagner’s liberal approach to diplomacy and foreign policy-making of developing countries as a tool of analysis, the article shows how the executive preferences of political leaders, historical narratives, and the strength of local values such as soft power, have influenced the political and economic cooperation between India and the Visegrad Group of countries that constitute the core of Central Europe – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. This method helps to show that contrary to the widely held opinion1 that the bonds between the Indian subcontinent and Central Europe were an artificial creation of the Soviet Union, they were instead created much earlier by contacts of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Rabindranath Tagore in the first half of the 20th century. Indeed, a mutual interest and fascination between the two parties, combined with the complementary of needs of both sides after the end of WWII resulted in the development of a promising relationship in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Unfortunately, despite a lot of effort this promising partnership has failed to deliver since the end of the Cold War, and this paper is an attempt to find an explanation for this situation. The European’s focus on integrating with European institutions on one hand, and India’s new foreign policy priorities that were driven by modernization and regional, and then global power aspirations, on the other hand, weakened the intensity of this cooperation for two decades. The completing of the European Union enlargement process in 2004, and the increasing influence of China in Central Europe since 2012, has triggered a reaction by India in the form of the creation of India-Central Europe Business Forum in 2014, which until now has not yet met expectations. The article points to the potential of the Visegrad Group+ (V4+) formula of cooperation, which still possesses many untapped opportunities.


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