scholarly journals Identity through foreign policy: Russia and China in the Middle East

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Slocombe

<p>Understanding national identity through foreign policy provides a strong means of ascertaining the prevailing social constructions within a great power nation state. There is a growing need to understand the national identities of Russia and China without pre-theorising or depending on asymmetric comparative studies with regional states. China and Russia are frequently compared to their regional neighbours which undermines understanding their unique identities. There are also frequent misunderstandings of contemporary Chinese and Russian national motives, often likening the modern Russian state to the Soviet Union, or attempting to understand China as a challenger to US unipolarity. Both great powers exhibit common characteristics of authoritarianism, both have recently endured massive social and national changes, and both have global interests that manifest in the Middle East such as securing vital geostrategic resources, both states are conscious of their native Muslim populations and to be recognised as a great power identity both must demonstrate influence in the Middle East. Yet, there have been significant differences in agendas and outcomes of their foreign policy decisions. This thesis seeks to use a constructivist framework to discern Russian and Chinese identity through comparison of their respective foreign policy. Contrary to “neo-realist” and “neo-liberal” arguments that accept state interests as rational, determined by the international system, and not determined by identity, this thesis seeks not to pre-theorise but to identify how their respective actions towards three key case studies in the Middle East; the Syrian Civil Conflict, the Iranian Nuclear Framework, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, indicate their prevailing social constructions. This thesis compares Russian and Chinese attitudes and actions towards these cases. Despite their similar disposition and principles towards international relations these two nations had significant points of difference. Drawing upon foreign policy analysis and a comparative model this thesis finds that despite the commonalities between the Russian and Chinese nations, Russian identity as great power, unique Eurasian power, and an alternative to the West, ensures a defiance of its relatively weak economic position to engage in positions of leadership in the Middle East, whilst China’s identity constructions that are common with Russia, its great power, civilisational, and alternative to the West constructions manifest despite an increasingly influential and material position in the world order, has provided little incentive to engage in meaningful ways throughout the Middle East’s recent conflicts.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Slocombe

<p>Understanding national identity through foreign policy provides a strong means of ascertaining the prevailing social constructions within a great power nation state. There is a growing need to understand the national identities of Russia and China without pre-theorising or depending on asymmetric comparative studies with regional states. China and Russia are frequently compared to their regional neighbours which undermines understanding their unique identities. There are also frequent misunderstandings of contemporary Chinese and Russian national motives, often likening the modern Russian state to the Soviet Union, or attempting to understand China as a challenger to US unipolarity. Both great powers exhibit common characteristics of authoritarianism, both have recently endured massive social and national changes, and both have global interests that manifest in the Middle East such as securing vital geostrategic resources, both states are conscious of their native Muslim populations and to be recognised as a great power identity both must demonstrate influence in the Middle East. Yet, there have been significant differences in agendas and outcomes of their foreign policy decisions. This thesis seeks to use a constructivist framework to discern Russian and Chinese identity through comparison of their respective foreign policy. Contrary to “neo-realist” and “neo-liberal” arguments that accept state interests as rational, determined by the international system, and not determined by identity, this thesis seeks not to pre-theorise but to identify how their respective actions towards three key case studies in the Middle East; the Syrian Civil Conflict, the Iranian Nuclear Framework, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, indicate their prevailing social constructions. This thesis compares Russian and Chinese attitudes and actions towards these cases. Despite their similar disposition and principles towards international relations these two nations had significant points of difference. Drawing upon foreign policy analysis and a comparative model this thesis finds that despite the commonalities between the Russian and Chinese nations, Russian identity as great power, unique Eurasian power, and an alternative to the West, ensures a defiance of its relatively weak economic position to engage in positions of leadership in the Middle East, whilst China’s identity constructions that are common with Russia, its great power, civilisational, and alternative to the West constructions manifest despite an increasingly influential and material position in the world order, has provided little incentive to engage in meaningful ways throughout the Middle East’s recent conflicts.</p>


2019 ◽  
pp. 171-183
Author(s):  
Isabela de Andrade Gama

Since the end of the Cold War Russia has been treated as a defeated state. Western countries usually perceive Russia not only as a defeated state but also relating it to Soviet Union. Beyond that the West has Orientalized Russia, segregating it from the “western club” of developed states. But Russia’s recovery from the collapse of the 90’s made it more assertive towards the West. It’s proposed here that this assertiveness is due to it’s orientalization, it’s inferior status perceived by the West. The inferior perception by the West has triggered a process of identity’s reconstruction which will be analyzed through a perspective of ontological security. The more Russia has it’s great power status denied, the more aggressive it becomes regarding it’s foreign policy. As the international hierarchy continues to treat Russia as that of “behind” the modern states, and the more it feels marginalized, it will double down on efforts to regain its great power status it will have to dispose power. Russia’s ontological insecurity might lead it to a path of aggressiveness.


2019 ◽  
Vol II (I) ◽  
pp. 15-23
Author(s):  
Fozia ◽  
Abida Yousaf ◽  
Imran Ashraf

Foreign policy is one of the key tools to maintain the affairs of international relations. Foreign policy of a state is mainly shaped by domestic environment and international system. This study highlights the impacts of international structure on the foreign policy behaviour of Pakistan since 1947. During cold war period, the bi-polar world order mainly shaped the foreign policy of Pakistan. After independence, the economic, political and security challenges pushed Pakistan towards western bloc to protect its interests. Being an ally of west, Pakistan supported USA to contain the spread of communism. With the collapse of Soviet Union, the world order was shifted from bi-polarity to uni-polarity. Consequently, American supremacy shaped the world politics as a sole super power. With the start of 21st century, the incident of 9/11 and in response American invasion of Afghanistan again made Pakistani an ally of USA on their Global War on terror. Pakistan has faced serious consequences as an ally of USA. However, with the emergence of multi-polar world order, now Pakistan has opportunity to balance its relations with global powers like China, Russia and USA on the basis of mutual benefits, equality and equity.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 87-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Bromley

AbstractDuring the Cold War, United States (US) policies towards the Middle East and towards Afghanistan and Pakistan were largely unrelated. India's non-alignment and relations with the Soviet Union were reasons for close US-Pakistani relations, but the Chinese success in the war with India in 1962 also highlighted the importance to the West of India's position. 1979 marked a major turning point in US foreign policy towards the Middle East and Central Eurasia (CEA) because of the two events which were to shape so much of politics and geopolitics in those regions as well as in the wider international system: namely, the Iranian revolution in February and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. Taken together, these developments posed a major challenge to US strategy towards the Soviet Union, to the wider Middle East and to relations with China, Pakistan, and India. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during 1988/89, the US lost interest in Afghanistan and followed the policies of Pakistan for most of the 1990s. Then came 9/11 and President Musharraf took the historic decision to break with the Taliban. In March 2003, the US began its second war against Iraq. Whatever the rationale for the conflict, the outcome has been to turn the future of Iraq into a key fault-line of geopolitics in the Greater Middle East. Now, with the instability following the collapse of the Soviet Empire in CEA, the defeat of the Taliban and the ongoing future of Iraq, the US faces what the Department of Defense describes as an "arc of instability" running from the Middle East through CEA to Northeast Asia. This is the region that lies at the centre of planning for the "long war" announced in the Pentagon's 2006 quadrennial review.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolai N. Petro

A decade ago many Russian analysts concluded that the West’s efforts to preserve its global superiority would be futile and the emergence of a polycentric world was inevitable. To benefit from this transition Russia should adopt a strategy that combined great power realism and “traditional” Russian values. This strategy, first elaborated in Vladimir Putin’s Valdai Speech of 2013, is known as ‘Civilizational Realism’. This article describes the emergence of Russia’s new sense of self-worth, how and why Russia gradually lost faith in the West as a potential partner, and how, through the internal adoption and external projection of conservative multicultural values, Russia hopes to forge a new, and more pluralistic, world order.


Author(s):  
Gregorio Bettiza

Since the end of the Cold War, religion has been systematically brought to the fore of American foreign policy. US foreign policymakers have been increasingly tasked with promoting religious freedom globally, delivering humanitarian and development aid abroad through faith-based channels, pacifying Muslim politics and reforming Islamic theologies in the context of fighting terrorism, and engaging religious actors to solve multiple conflicts and crises around the world. Across a range of different domains, religion has progressively become an explicit and organized subject and object of US foreign policy in ways that were unimaginable just a few decades ago. If God was supposed to be vanquished by the forces of modernity and secularization, why has the United States increasingly sought to understand and manage religion abroad? In what ways have the boundaries between faith and state been redefined as religion has become operationalized in American foreign policy? What kind of world order is emerging in the twenty-first century as the most powerful state in the international system has come to intervene in sustained and systematic ways in sacred landscapes around the globe? This book addresses these questions by developing an original theoretical framework and drawing upon extensive empirical research and interviews. It argues that American foreign policy and religious forces have become ever more inextricably entangled in an age witnessing a global resurgence of religion and the emergence of a postsecular world society.


2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-551
Author(s):  
André Lecours

The formulation of a policy that will satisfy several values and interests more or less compatible is a classic problem of political decision making. This phenomenon by which there can be, in a foreign policy issue for example, several divergent values and interests was named value-complexity by Alexander George. When facing a value complexity problem, a decision maker must choose some values and some interests over others. The choice he makes will not necessarily be the one made by other decision makers. This can result in a serious impediment to the decision making process. The American foreign policy towards the Middle East faced, for the major part of the Cold War era, a value-complexity problem because it looked to reconcile four hard-to reconcile values and interests. The Reagan government was confronted rather acutely with this problem in the making of its Iranian policies. The administration was split in at least two factions over Iran : one who thought primarily of containing the Soviet Union in the Middle East region and the other for whom the political stability of moderate regimes threatened by revolutionnary Iran should be the most important priority. The existence of these factions, consequence of value-complexity, produced the making and the implementation of two distinct Iranian policies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 45-65
Author(s):  
Kardo RACHED ◽  
Salam ABDULRAHMAN

Since the Second World War, the Middle East has been mentioned in connection with the national interest of America manifested by US presidents. This paper looks at the US foreign policy in the Middle East from Truman to Clinton on the premise that the US foreign policy has contributed to creating a breeding ground for dissatisfaction toward the US In this context, the paper focuses on the doctrines in use from the time of President Truman to Clinton. Thus, every American president has a doctrine, and this doctrine tells what political line the president follows regarding domestic and foreign policies. Keywords: Middle-East, Israel, US national interest, Soviet Union, Natural resources, ideologies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-216
Author(s):  
Leonardo Luiz Silveira Da Silva

Resumo: A descolonização do Oriente Médio que originou novos Estados na região da Bacia do rio Jordão, coincide temporalmente com um novo arranjo da ordem mundial que se reorganizava no período pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. A trajetória da política externa da Jordânia na segunda metade do século XX é extremamente didática para entendermos os efeitos das relações de poder entre as nações em âmbito regional e global para a mudança de comportamento dos Estados que praticavam políticas anti-hegemônicas. Nesta trajetória destaca-se a intensa disputa pelos escassos recursos hídricos regionais, à medida que o recurso é fundamental para o desenvolvimento das atividades econômicas e para a própria soberania do Estado. Na já distante década de 1950, poucos anos após o conflito da Guerra de Independência que opôs Israel e os Estados árabes vizinhos, a Jordânia passou a adotar uma postura intransigente em relação à aproximação com Israel, apesar dos esforços dos Estados Unidos para promover a estabilidade regional. Com o acordo de paz entre Egito e Israel, mediado pelos Estados Unidos e costurado na virada das décadas de 1970 e 1980, o tabu da oposição sistemática a Israel foi rompido. Desta forma, este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as mudanças na política externa da Jordânia na segunda metade do século XX, associando estas mudanças às novas estratégias norte-americanas para região, permitindo a compreensão das novas formas de imperialismo que dominam o cenário do Oriente Médio desde a década de 1970.Palavras-Chave: Jordânia, Estados Unidos, Israel, políticas anti-hegemônicas. Abstract: The decolonization of the Middle East that originated in the new states of the Jordan Basin region coincides temporally with a new arrangement of the world order, which is rearranged in the post - World War II period. The trajectory of the Jordanian foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century is extremely didactic to understand the effects of power relations between nations on a regional and global level to the changing behavior of States which practiced anti - hegemonic politics. On this path there is the intense competition for scarce regional water resources, as the feature is essential for the development of economic activities and the very sovereignty of the state. In the distant 1950s, a few years after the conflict of the War of Independence which opposed Israel and neighboring Arab states, Jordan adopted an uncompromising stance towards rapprochement with Israel, despite U.S. efforts to promote peace in the region. With the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, brokered by the United States and sewn at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, the pattern of systematic opposition to Israel was broken. This paper aims to present the changes in Jordan's foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century, linking these changes to the new US strategy for the region, allowing the understanding of new forms of imperialism which dominate the Middle East scenario since the decade 1970.Keywords: Jordan, United States, Israel, anti - hegemonic politics.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.


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