scholarly journals Language Can Obscure as Well as Facilitate Apparent-Theory of Mind Performance: Part 2—The Case of Dyslexia in Adulthood

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barlow C. Wright ◽  
Bernice A. L. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Female Gender ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Other ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Processing Demands ◽  
Computer Based ◽  
Components Analysis ◽  
Affective Components

Many studies imply causal links between linguistic competencies and Theory of Mind (ToM). But despite Dyslexia being a prime example of linguistic deficits, studies on whether it is related to ToM have been relatively unforthcoming. In the first of 2 studies (N = 89), independently-diagnosed dyslexic adults and non-dyslexic adults were presented with false-belief vignettes via computer, answering 4 types of question (Factual, Inference, 1st-order ToM & 2nd-order ToM). Dyslexia related to lower false-belief scores. Study 2 (N = 93) replicated this result with a non-computer-based variant on the false-belief task. We considered the possibility that the apparent-issue with ToM is caused by processing demands more associated to domains of cognition such as language, than to ToM itself. Addressing this possibility, study 2 additionally utilised the ToM30Q questionnaire, designed largely to circumvent issues related to language and memory. Principal-Components analysis extracted 4 factors, 2 capturing perceptual/representational ToM, and the other 2 capturing affective components related to ToM. The ToM30Q was validated via its associations to a published measure of empathy, replication of the female gender advantage over males, and for one factor from the ToM30Q there was a correlation with an existing published index of ToM. However, when we considered the performance of dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants using the ToM30Q, we found absolutely no difference between them. The contrasting findings from our 2 studies here, arguably offer the first experimental evidence with adults, that there is in fact no ToM deficit in dyslexia. Additionally, this finding raises the possibility that some other groups considered in some sense atypical, failed ToM tasks, not because they actually have a ToM deficit at all, but rather because they are asked to reveal their ToM competence through cognitive domains, such as language and memory.

scholarly journals Reading and Theory of Mind in Adolescents with Cochlear Implant

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-223
Author(s):  
Mario Figueroa ◽  
Sònia Darbra ◽  
Núria Silvestre
Keyword(s):  
Reading Comprehension ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cochlear Implant ◽  
Cochlear Implants ◽  
Group Performance ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task

Abstract Previous research has shown a possible link between reading comprehension and theory of mind (ToM), but these findings are unclear in adolescents with cochlear implants (CI). In the present study, reading comprehension and ToM were assessed in adolescents with CI and the relation between both skills was also studied. Two sessions were performed on two groups of adolescents aged between 12 and 16 years of age (36 adolescents with CI and 54 participants with typical hearing, TH). They were evaluated by means of a standardized reading battery, a false belief task, and Faux Pas stories. The results indicated that reading and cognitive ToM were more developed in the TH group than in adolescents with CI. However, early-CI and binaural group performance were close to the TH group in narrative and expository comprehension and cognitive ToM. The results also indicated that cognitive ToM and reading comprehension appear to be related in deaf adolescents.

scholarly journals Developmental and cognitive aspects of children’s disbelief comprehension through intonation and facial gesture

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (6) ◽  
pp. 596-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghan Armstrong ◽  
Núria Esteve Gibert ◽  
Iris Hübscher ◽  
Alfonso Igualada ◽  
Pilar Prieto
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Task Performance ◽  
Belief State ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Comprehension Task ◽  
Unimodal Cues

This article investigates how children leverage intonational and gestural cues to an individual’s belief state through unimodal (intonation-only or facial gesture-only) and multimodal (intonation + facial gesture) cues. A total of 187 preschoolers (ages 3–5) participated in a disbelief comprehension task and were assessed for Theory of Mind (ToM) ability using a false belief task. Significant predictors included age, condition and success on the ToM task. Performance improved with age, and was significantly better for the multimodal condition compared to both unimodal conditions, suggesting that even though unimodal cues were useful to children, the presence of reinforcing information for the multimodal condition was more effective for detecting disbelief. However, results also point to the development of intonational and gestural comprehension in tandem. Children that passed the ToM task significantly outperformed those that failed it for all conditions, showing that children who can attribute a false belief to another individual may more readily access these intonational and gestural cues.

Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind

Cognition ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. B25-B31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bloom ◽  
Tim P German
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task

scholarly journals Theory of Mind and Linguistic Acquisition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arab World English Journal ◽  
Ronnie Goodwin
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Idiomatic Expressions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a conceptual theory that is credited with enabling individuals to anticipate the mental states of others, including their beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and additional emotive circumstances (Flavell, 2004). Linguistic acquisition is a natural development that begins to develop in children from birth and enables communication. The cognitive domains necessary to comprehend language is also required in order for the formation of ToM to develop. The interpretations made through ToM presumptions can contain the discernment of another’s false belief. In this context, the individual must be aware that the literal interpretation could be an inaccurate symbol or manufactured belief. This understanding requires a certain level of cognitive development in the child since the intention may be to signify something else and the child must be able to correctly process idiomatic expressions in order to accurately make ToM determinations (Caillies & Le Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008). This paper explores the relationship between ToM and linguistic acquisition in normally developing children, as well as those with various disabilities to ascertain the degree of cognitive development necessary in order to make ToM determinations. Exploration of this relationship reveals that linguistic and cognitive development are both essential in the construct of ToM perceptions in early childhood.

Complex language, complex thought?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
Suzanne T.M. Bogaerds-Hazenberg ◽  
Petra Hendriks
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Production Task ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Complex Thought

Abstract It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order ToM.

scholarly journals Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (47) ◽  
pp. 13360-13365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peipei Setoh ◽  
Rose M. Scott ◽  
Renée Baillargeon
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Generation Process ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Concurrent Processing ◽  
False Belief Understanding ◽  
Processing Demands ◽  
Practice Trials ◽  
False Belief Tasks

When tested with traditional false-belief tasks, which require answering a standard question about the likely behavior of an agent with a false belief, children perform below chance until age 4 y or later. When tested without such questions, however, children give evidence of false-belief understanding much earlier. Are traditional tasks difficult because they tap a more advanced form of false-belief understanding (fundamental-change view) or because they impose greater processing demands (processing-demands view)? Evidence that young children succeed at traditional false-belief tasks when processing demands are reduced would support the latter view. In prior research, reductions in inhibitory-control demands led to improvements in young children’s performance, but often only to chance (instead of below-chance) levels. Here we examined whether further reductions in processing demands might lead to success. We speculated that: (i) young children could respond randomly in a traditional low-inhibition task because their limited information-processing resources are overwhelmed by the total concurrent processing demands in the task; and (ii) these demands include those from the response-generation process activated by the standard question. This analysis suggested that 2.5-y-old toddlers might succeed at a traditional low-inhibition task if response-generation demands were also reduced via practice trials. As predicted, toddlers performed above chance following two response-generation practice trials; toddlers failed when these trials either were rendered less effective or were used in a high-inhibition task. These results support the processing-demands view: Even toddlers succeed at a traditional false-belief task when overall processing demands are reduced.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind Development in Adolescence and Early Adulthood: The Growing Complexity of Recursive Thinking Ability

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Valle ◽  
Davide Massaro ◽  
Ilaria Castelli ◽  
Antonella Marchetti
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Early Adulthood ◽  
Memory Task ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Third Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Thinking Ability ◽  
Recursive Thinking

This study explores the development of theory of mind, operationalized as recursive thinking ability, from adolescence to early adulthood (N= 110; young adolescents = 47; adolescents = 43; young adults = 20). The construct of theory of mind has been operationalized in two different ways: as the ability to recognize the correct mental state of a character, and as the ability to attribute the correct mental state in order to predict the character’s behaviour. The Imposing Memory Task, with five recursive thinking levels, and a third-order false-belief task with three recursive thinking levels (devised for this study) have been used. The relationship among working memory, executive functions, and linguistic skills are also analysed. Results show that subjects exhibit less understanding of elevated recursive thinking levels (third, fourth, and fifth) compared to the first and second levels. Working memory is correlated with total recursive thinking, whereas performance on the linguistic comprehension task is related to third level recursive thinking in both theory of mind tasks. An effect of age on third-order false-belief task performance was also found. A key finding of the present study is that the third-order false-belief task shows significant age differences in the application of recursive thinking that involves the prediction of others’ behaviour. In contrast, such an age effect is not observed in the Imposing Memory Task. These results may support the extension of the investigation of the third order false belief after childhood.

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