scholarly journals “Watching Eyes” Triggers Third-Party Punishment: The Role of Emotion Within the Eyes

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingping Li ◽  
Chenyu Shangguan ◽  
Huqing Shi ◽  
Jiamei Lu

Third-party punishment refers to a behavioral phenomenon whereby people punish wrongdoers even if their sanction incurs personal costs but yields no direct benefits. Given the eye cues demonstrated ability to convey signals of being observed, its effect on third-party punishment, driven by virtue of its effects on others' perceptions, was investigated. In addition, emotional message featured in the eye region is crucial in social interaction, whether the emotion within the eyes serves this effect with varying degrees of influence has rarely considered. The present study aimed at exploring (a) the watching eyes effect on the third-party punishment and (b) whether this effect varies from negative eyes to positive eyes. By two experiments using a modified Third-Party Dictator Game, we displayed either eye images or control images above the question on whether to punish the dictators or not. There was no emotional diversity of eye cues in Experiment 1, and most participants tended to punish for unfair offer. However, the appearance of eye images increased the punishment relative to control images. In Experiment 2, the eye cues were subdivided into positive and negative. The effect of watching eyes on the third-party punishment was significantly stronger when the eyes were negative than positive. Results revealed that eye cues play a role in promoting the third-party punishment and offer a potential insight into the mixed findings, such that the emotion within the eyes, especially the negative expression in the eyes, may influence the watching eyes effect.

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Anne-Sophie Fernandez ◽  
Francoise Pierrot

Coopetition is a paradoxical strategy combining simultaneously cooperation and competition. Previous scholars investigated the role of the third-party in coopetition dynamics: it can initiate and drive the coopetition strategy or it can be involved in the management of the relationship. But the consequences of this involvement remain under-investigated. This research aims to fill this gap: what are the consequences of the involvement of a third-party in a coopetition strategy on the partners and their relationship? To answer this question, we conducted a longitudinal case study of coopetition strategies between two institutions the FASB and the IASB in the specific context of the global accounting standard-setting process and convergence process between the US GAAPs and the IFRSs.Our findings enable us to identify three different phases in the process. We provide evidence on the role of the third-party (the European Union in the case) in the evolution of the coopetition dynamic between the FASB and the IASB, and analyze the consequences on both partners and their relationship.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. e0255071
Author(s):  
Frauke von Bieberstein ◽  
Andrea Essl ◽  
Kathrin Friedrich

Indirect reciprocity has been proposed to explain prosocial behavior among strangers, whereby the prosocial act is returned by a third party. However, what happens if the prosocial act cannot be observed by the third party? Here, we examine whether empathy serves as a clue for prosociality and whether people are more generous toward more empathetic people. In a laboratory study, we measured prosocial behavior as the amount sent in the dictator game and empathy based on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). By using an incentivized task, we find that people believe that more empathetic participants send more money in the dictator game. Thus, people see empathy as a clue for prosocial behavior. Furthermore, in a second dictator game, participants indirectly reciprocate by sending more money to more empathetic recipients. Therefore, we suggest that empathy can replace a reputation derived from observable prosocial behavior in triggering indirect reciprocity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1950007
Author(s):  
Ling Fan ◽  
Cong Cao

We present an arbitrated quantum blind signature scheme by entanglement swapping, which is simplified from the preparation and operation of the quantum states. Compared with the classical blind signature, quantum arbitration has added the role of the third party arbitration, so the structure of the protocol has changed. The traceability depends on the third party arbitration, and the blind operation and the signature operation can be carried out simultaneously.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 864-877
Author(s):  
Lívia Mathias Simão

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Theory & Psychology, my aim in this article is to widen the discussion about one of the issues I consider foundational in the approach of I–other–world relations in subjectivation processes, that is to say, that of the disquieting experience, which we have been developing in the ambit of semiotic–cultural constructivism in psychology. First, I will make an exposition of the main aspects that characterise the notion of disquieting experience. I shall then seek to deepen some of the relations between disquieting experience, hermeneutic inquiry, and conversation. In order to do so, I will make use of articles published in Theory & Psychology that are fundamental to this deepening, due to leading us to the role of the third party in subjectivation processes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Ali Askerov ◽  
Thomas Matyok

Despite the third party efforts of the significant international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, the Upper Karabakh problem remains unresolved for over 20 years. Neither the four resolutions related to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijani lands adopted by the UN SC in the early 1990s have worked, nor the formal negotiations over this conflict that have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group for more than 20 years have reached any tangible results. These facts give rise to questions about effectiveness of the role of this institution in reaching a resolution to the conflict. The ceasefire regime is in effect since May 1994 without changing the situation, in which Armenia still keeps about 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands under invasion and is effectively involved in building a new state over the invaded lands. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of UN resolutions in liberating Azerbaijan’s invaded regions, both within and outside of Upper Karabakh, as well as the OSCE mediation efforts to resolve this conflict. It also discusses effectiveness of the negotiation process, and raises a question about impartiality of the mediators and usefulness of the mediation institution of the OSCE in general. It argues that the OSCE Minsk Group has failed to successfully establish and lead the process of negotiations, thus expecting a fruitful yield is not realistic.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Ali Askerov ◽  
Thomas Matyok

Despite the third party efforts of the significant international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, the Upper Karabakh problem remains unresolved for over 20 years. Neither the four resolutions related to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijani lands adopted by the UN SC in the early 1990s have worked, nor the formal negotiations over this conflict that have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group for more than 20 years have reached any tangible results. These facts give rise to questions about effectiveness of the role of this institution in reaching a resolution to the conflict. The ceasefire regime is in effect since May 1994 without changing the situation, in which Armenia still keeps about 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands under invasion and is effectively involved in building a new state over the invaded lands. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of UN resolutions in liberating Azerbaijan’s invaded regions, both within and outside of Upper Karabakh, as well as the OSCE mediation efforts to resolve this conflict. It also discusses effectiveness of the negotiation process, and raises a question about impartiality of the mediators and usefulness of the mediation institution of the OSCE in general. It argues that the OSCE Minsk Group has failed to successfully establish and lead the process of negotiations, thus expecting a fruitful yield is not realistic.


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