scholarly journals Equivalence of the Frame and Halting Problems

Algorithms ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Dietrich ◽  
Chris Fields
Keyword(s):  
System Identification ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Quantum Computer ◽  
Identification Problem ◽  
Task Environment ◽  
Symbol Grounding ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Open Domain ◽  
Symbol Grounding Problem ◽  
The Frame Problem

The open-domain Frame Problem is the problem of determining what features of an open task environment need to be updated following an action. Here we prove that the open-domain Frame Problem is equivalent to the Halting Problem and is therefore undecidable. We discuss two other open-domain problems closely related to the Frame Problem, the system identification problem and the symbol-grounding problem, and show that they are similarly undecidable. We then reformulate the Frame Problem as a quantum decision problem, and show that it is undecidable by any finite quantum computer.

Afterword: Life after the symbol system metaphor

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl F. MacDorman
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Cultural Norms ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Special Issue ◽  
Symbol Formation ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
Symbol Grounding Problem ◽  
Sensorimotor Activity ◽  
The Frame Problem ◽  
Nonconscious Processing

After reviewing the papers in this special issue, I must conclude that brains are not syntactic engines, but control systems that orient to biological, interindividual, and cultural norms. By themselves, syntactic constraints both underdetermine and overdetermine cognitive operations. So, rather than serving as the basis for general cognition, they are just another kind of empirically acquired constraint. In humans, symbols emerge from a particular sensorimotor activity through a process of contextual broadening that depends on the coordination of conscious and nonconscious processing. This process provides the representational freedom and stability that constitute the human brain’s solution to the frame problem and symbol grounding problem. Symbol formation and grounding is an ongoing process of generalising constraints from particular contexts, selectively enlisting their use, and re-automating them. This process is central to the self-creation of a language-using person with beliefs, agency, and identity.

Cognition is Embodied

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin V. Butz ◽  
Esther F. Kutter
Keyword(s):  
Robotic Systems ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Binding Problem ◽  
Artificial System ◽  
Symbol Processing ◽  
Symbol Grounding Problem ◽  
Brain Interface ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Frame Problem

With the motivation to develop computational and algorithmic levels of understanding how the mind comes into being, this chapter considers computer science, artificial intelligence, and cognitive systems perspectives. Questions are addressed, such as what ‘intelligence’ may actually be and how, and when an artificial system may be considered to be intelligent and to have a mind on its own. May it even be alive? Out of these considerations, the chapter derives three fundamental problems for cognitive systems: the symbol grounding problem, the frame problem, and the binding problem. We show that symbol-processing artificial systems cannot solve these problems satisfactorily. Neural networks and embodied systems offer alternatives. Moreover, biological observations and studies with embodied robotic systems imply that behavioral capabilities can foster and facilitate the development of suitably abstracted, symbolic structures. We finally consider Alan Turing’s question “Can machines think?” and emphasize that such machines must at least solve the three considered fundamental cognitive systems problems. The rest of the book addresses how the human brain, equipped with a suitably-structured body and body–brain interface, manages to solve these problems, and thus manages to develop a mind.

The Frame Problem in Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gałecki
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Ethical Principles ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Classical Philosophy ◽  
The Frame Problem ◽  
The Invisible

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.

What role do the emotions play in cognition?

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason L. Megill
Keyword(s):  
Face Recognition ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Affective Computing ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Brain Disorders ◽  
Frame Problem ◽  
Cognitive Theories ◽  
The Frame Problem ◽  
The Way

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.

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