scholarly journals UNDERGROUND WELBECK: INTAGIBLE SPACES John Cavendish-Scott-Bentinck, 5th Duke of Portland (1800–1879)

Architecture ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-200
Author(s):  
María Isabel Fernández Naranjo ◽  
Tomás García García

The life of the 5th Duke of Portland is a story about the mental obsession to find a haven of absolute stillness, a worry-free place, and somewhere to feel safe (Pl L1/2/8/3/13: Four letters to Fanny Kemble, 1842–1845. In these letters, the 5th Duke refers to the subsoil as “shelter” and the “only safe place”, found in Manuscripts and Special Collections, Archives Nottingham University). Perhaps it is there, in the space that unfolded away from the visible world, that he found the strength to overcome his difficulties and to understand the scale of space and its intangibility; he was aware of the relationships and interaction between the human body, inhabited space, and the mind, and this information helped him in his hiding process. After his appointment as the heir to his immense estate, a series of investments on an unprecedented scale began almost immediately, which have been considered, both technically and conceptually, to be pioneers of domestic and landscape architecture during the nineteenth century. Welbeck Estate represents the construction of a double city, one that is visible and another that is concealed, but it is also a reflection of how our body and our mind interfere, dialogue, and create an architectural space that is framed in a cognitive process. Space and time were unfolded and folded into themselves in order to build this fascinating scenery, which represents the duke’s life.

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-974
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Pflugfelder

Put simply, hair and clothing make a difference. To phrase the matter another way, the presence of these material and visual forms, or alternatively their absence from the human body, embodies potent cultural meanings and has concrete effects in the social world. To be sure, more-hidden body parts may lurk below the surface that signal our membership in certain social categories—gender, to give a prime example. In practical terms, however, when we see strangers walking toward us from a distance, we are in the habit of assuming they are a man or a woman not because we have observed their genitalia (it would be strange indeed if that were the case) but rather because we recognize and extract meaning from a more readily visible set of identity markers—primarily clothing-related (sartorial) and hair-related (tonsorial)—whose semiotic rules must be learned culturally and which vary across space and time.


Author(s):  
Alexander Kluge

This chapter highlights the individual's capacity for differentiation. Imagine the human body: take, for example, the mouth, whose capacity for differentiation would be called a sensation. The largest organ, the skin, also has sensation. The ear: therein lies musicality, the sense of balance, the sense of hearing, and rhythm. These sensations are divided between two cerebral hemispheres. All of these sensations play a role in an encounter with another person. The moment when related sensations reach a decision about another human being is called feeling. This is not something sentimental, but rather is subject to the sentimentalization and commercialization of the nineteenth century. In reality, feeling is something very human. It is what a person adds to an objective relation. In order to be able to convey more clearly the difference between sensation and feeling, Alexander Kluge introduces another term: passion. There is the passion of the mind and there is the mind of passion. This is the intensification of the will, feeling, the sum of various feelings pointed in a single direction.


1902 ◽  
Vol 48 (202) ◽  
pp. 561-563
Author(s):  
A. W. Wilcox

The first part of this article consists of an interesting history of many attempts made to localise the mind in the human body before and since that made by Gall in the first decade of the nineteenth century. After mentioning the work done by Bouillaud, Flourens, and others, the author states that no further advance was made for twenty years or more, until Broca, in 1861, localised the centre for articulate speech. He then describes the experiments in cerebral localisation made by Fritsch and Hitzig in 1870, closely followed by those of Ferrier, Horsley, Schafer, and many others, resulting in the determination of centres of control for nearly or quite all the groups of voluntary muscles, for general sensation, and for the more important special sensations of sight and hearing.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-223
Author(s):  
Anna Burton

In The Woodlanders (1887), Hardy uses the texture of Hintock woodlands as more than description: it is a terrain of personal association and local history, a text to be negotiated in order to comprehend the narrative trajectory. However, upon closer analysis of these arboreal environs, it is evident that these woodscapes are simultaneously self-contained and multi-layered in space and time. This essay proposes that through this complex topographical construction, Hardy invites the reader to read this text within a physical and notional stratigraphical framework. This framework shares similarities with William Gilpin's picturesque viewpoint and the geological work of Gideon Mantell: two modes of vision that changed the observation of landscape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This comparative discussion at once reviews the perception of the arboreal prospect in nineteenth-century literary and visual cultures, and also questions the impact of these modes of thought on the woodscapes of The Woodlanders.


Philosophy ◽  
1936 ◽  
Vol 11 (42) ◽  
pp. 131-145
Author(s):  
W. R. Inge

My subject is the place of myth in philosophy, not in religion. If I were dealing with the philosophy of religion, I should, of course, have much to say on the place of myth in theology; and what I have to say may have some bearing on this subject; but I am not dealing with particular dogmas of Christianity or of any other religion. My thesis is that when the mind communes with the world of values its natural and inevitable language is the language of poetry, symbol, and myth. And, further, that philosophy has to deal with a number of irreducible surds which cannot be rationalized. They must be accepted as given material for reason to work upon. For example, we do not know why there is a world; we cannot unify the world of what we call facts and the world of values; there are antinomies in space and time which do not seem to disappear when we put a hyphen between them. Our reason–some would say reason itself— has reached its limits. We are driven to mythologize, confessing that we have left the realm of scientific fact. We give rein to the imagination, not exactly claiming with Wordsworth that it is reason in her most exalted mood, but hoping that the creative imagination may reveal to us some of the real meaning of questions which we cannot answer.


Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Amerini

AbstractThomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis (†1323) share a correlational theory of intentionality. When I cognize a thing, I am in a real relation with the thing cognized and at the same time the thing is in a relation of reason with me. Hervaeus coins the term “intentionality” to designate precisely this relation of reason. First and second intentionality express two stages of this relation. First intentionality refers to the relation that a thing has to the mind, while second intentionality indicates the relation that a thing qua cognized has to the mind. Thus, first intentionality involves direct cognition, while second intentionality reflexive cognition. This theory of intentionality has two purposes: first, to de-psychologize the cognitive process and second, to allow the application of Aristotle’s table of categories to the sphere of the mental. Through his detailed analysis of the relation of intentionality, Hervaeus clarifies some of Thomas’s obscurer points, but at the same time he has to solve a delicate problem of circularity entailed by the notion of intentionality as a relation of reason.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-419
Author(s):  
Makmudi Makmudi

Man consists of two elements, namely body and spirit, so that human beings are jasiman and ruhiyah at once. Hummans are also part of one element of the elements that exist in an educational process. Three element include the soul, the mind, the heart, and the human body. Humman and education, can not be separated from each other. Both are an interconnected entity, human as the perpetrator and education as a syistem in the process to achieve the goal of education itself.  Mental health education requires alignment and harmony in various stages and sectors as well as attention to the three elements that exist in the human self that is the physical element (psychomotor) which includes body building, skill (skill) and sexual education, the spiritual element (affective) which includes the formation of faith, and iradah (the will), the element of reason (cognitive) which includes the coaching of intelligence and the provision of knowledge. The purpose of writing this research is to know and analyze thoughts about the concept of life education perspective Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah. Soul education is considered successful, if one's soul has reached the degree of nafs muthmainnah, which has three main characteristics that mutually reinforce one another, namely; (1) a faithful soul to God, (2) a patient soul, (3) a soul that is self-serving to Allah (tawakal). Through the process of mental education which includes: the foundation of theology, the purpose of mental education, integrated curriculum / manhaj at-takamul, appropriate methods and applicable according to its stages, such as: takhliyah stages, tahliyah stages, muhasabah an-nafs, dzikrullah, and tahqiq 'ubudiyah. So that from the process will give birth ihsan attitude, and will increase the piety in worship, both related to God and those related to humans and the surrounding natural environment. Because, the essence of ihsan attitude itself is upholding 'ubudiyah.


2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04057
Author(s):  
Shengfang Peng ◽  
Baoying Peng ◽  
Xiaoxuan Li

In recent years, embodied cognition has become a new approach in the field of cognitive psychology. The shift in cognitive psychology from a focus on the brain to a focus on the human body,just as from the disembodied cognition to the embodied cognition is valuable for many fields related to cognitive science including product design and its method. With Gibson’s theory of affordances, embodied cognition is a perfect explanation of today’s products guided by the idea of intuitive design and its logic. On the premise of embodied cognition, it is the “Mind-Body complex” that serves as the subject of behavior and interaction, the basis of “natural interaction” in Intelligent age, and the foundation for building a more complete theory of “user experience”. Based on the embodied cognitive, the method of design and its research should put more emphasis on specific tools.


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-820
Author(s):  
David C. Hanson

In the first half of the twentieth century, analytic bibliographers in Britain turned their attention to the systematic study of the nineteenth-century book. Developing their subject, they felt compelled to distance themselves from the Victorian book collector, who touched off a “suspicion . . . deeply ingrained in the mind of scholars and librarians” (Sadleir, “Development” 147). A new generation of bibliographers – Michael Sadleir, John Carter, and Graham Pollard – acknowledged that Victorian collecting had laid the foundations for the bibliographic study of books by “modern” (i.e., nineteenth-century) writers, as opposed to incunabula, the traditional focus of British book collecting. The contribution was regarded as fundamentally flawed, however, owing to a “sentimental element” in Victorian collecting (Carter and Pollard 101).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriano D’Aloia

A common outcome of acrobatics, and a motif often combined with it, is the fall. The chapter ‘Fall. Descent to equilibrium’ discusses the recurrence of the motif of the falling human body in contemporary cinema, taking as a starting point Oliver Pietsch’s found footage film Maybe Not. Relying on Torben Grodal’s application of the notions of telic and paratelic to the film experience, referring to the use of cinema as metaphor for the mind proposed by Antonio Damasio, and interpreting several experiments on the perception of movement in film sequences whose temporality is manipulated, this chapter describes the modality through which cinema ‘regulates’ the fall by adopting a homeostatic process that reduces its traumatic character and, at the same time, enhances its expressive effectiveness.


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